Besides the growing distance in Turkish-Israeli relations, some of the reasons for which were analyzed in my previous article, there is yet another factor to ponder. The other factor can be summed up as a series of peace offensives toward old adversaries such as Syria and Armenia and developing warmer relations with Baghdad and Tehran.Relations with Baghdad were direct, bypassing Arbil until recently. However, as the peoples of Iraq have demonstrated willingness to stay together and keep the country intact, the suspicion of a runaway (independent) Kurdistan disappeared from the emotional radar of the Turks, especially Turkish officialdom.
The Turkish government is about to open up a consulate in Arbil (following those in Mosul and Basra) and the volume of Turkish business realized with the autonomous Kurdish part of Iraq (under the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government [KRG]) rose to $6 billion. The economic potential of the KRG region, offered to Turks more than any other international actor, and the Iraqi Kurds’ sincere desire to establish strong and protective relations with Turkey have eased the anxiety of Turkey’s officialdom, which originated from the belief that Iraqi Kurdistan would be the fuse of a wider Kurdish problem seen as dynamite put under Turkey.
How can we interpret this radical change from the old Turkish foreign policy line that was basically hinged on the West to a more multifaceted and versatile one? There are two reasons for this change. The first is the loosening grip of the old bureaucratic elite on the state apparatus and policy making. As more social groups and their political organizations made their way into politics, a new leadership emerged that was much more sensitive to popular inclinations and needs. A more pluralistic interpretation of social reality and political expression enriched Turkey’s political choices. This opening affected both domestic and international politics. The state began to make its long-neglected peace with religious and ethnic minorities. Political expression and criticism expanded in parallel with the increasing power of civil society. As civil society felt more empowered, it began to enter into forbidden zones occupied by the military in the political realm, thus demilitarizing the system.
This pluralism was reflected in Turkey’s foreign policy choices. Without cutting loose from her transatlantic ties and relations with Europe, Turkey turned to other directions that were once a “war zone” and a security liability for herself. This trend was further facilitated by a “de-Westernization” of the old Western oriented bureaucratic state elite.
This elite’s Westernism was a matter of controlled change that allowed only the adoption of “safe” modes of conduct and institutions from the West. In fact, it was modernization without Westernization. The old elite either by choice or failure have never developed the country to the level of being an industrial power. Hence the private sector never challenged their control over the economy and politics. Similarly, the old elite have been reluctant to democratize society so that they would not lose control over the state apparatus. Their authoritarianism filtered out the basic principles of democracy, such as the rule of law, human and minority rights and pluralist and deliberative ways of engagement. As the conditions of being a member of the European Union demanded the adoption of these principles and institutions, the old bureaucratic political elite balked at Westernization. They tried to deceive people into believing the effects of such values and institutions that made what is Europe would be harmful.
The second factor that led to the development of a more versatile foreign policy was the changing gravity of globalization. Europe is no longer the center of the world. Both economic and political power that has the capacity to project itself (strategic influence) is shifting to the East. The emerging centers of the new global system are China and India. Japan is close by. In between the East and the West is a geography where most of the natural resources of the world are concentrated.
Turkey is located in this fertile geography on what I call the “folding line” of east and west and north and south. It is influenced by all trends in all directions and has the opportunity to benefit from the intermingling of these economic and political zones. It is no coincidence that following the demise of the Western centered G-8, Turkey took her place in the G-20, which is more international and balanced.
Turkey’s national borders are only relevant on paper. Turkey has cultural, linguistic, economic and ethnic spillovers in all directions. Now it is time to reap the rewards of this versatility. However, all of these opportunities had to be realized and utilized by the understanding that they were always there but never activated. Now is the time.