Washington’s Syria policy

To be sure, elections matter in terms of political expediency. Yet, there is a strong case to be made that the Obama administration would have been very reluctant to take military action in Syria under any circumstances. There are at least four reasons why Washington would have favored diplomacy over war with Syria, even without the pressure of looming elections.

First, there is an American public that no longer wants any kind of military involvement in the Middle East. Let’s not forget that Obama won the last election partly by promising to bring the troops back home from Iraq. Simply put, Americans are sick and tired of the Middle East. They not only supported a pullout from Iraq, but they now also support bringing the troops back from Afghanistan, a place much more intimately linked to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Obama used to refer to a “war of choice” and a “war of necessity” during his election campaign in 2008. Iraq, accordingly, was a war of choice, and Afghanistan was a war of necessity. If Americans, who always understood the logic of war in Afghanistan, now want to get out of Afghanistan, one can easily understand why they would not support military involvement in Syria, where the national interests of the United States are not vitally at stake. It is not surprising that according to opinion polls, Americans who favor military action in Syria are in the single digits.

The second reason why the Obama administration would not engage Syria militarily has to do with economic problems at home. Military campaigns, even with no troops on the ground, are very costly. Needless to say, America has a growing deficit problem. At a time when military expenditures are under severe scrutiny and the Pentagon will face major cuts in its budget, the cost of a new war will be even higher. The country appears to still be under a recession (or going through a very weak recovery that feels like a recession), and spending billions of dollars in Syria would not be a rational choice for this administration.

The third reason is related to the international environment surrounding Syria. As is often argued by Washington, “Syria is not Libya.” Unlike what many people in Turkey think, it was not because of oil that America supported the military option in Libya. Libya was geographically and logistically a much easier military campaign. Perhaps more important, in Libya there was room for multilateralism. The Obama administration is not prone to taking unilateral military action. The fact that Russia and China were on board at the UN Security Council was crucial for the Obama administration. When France and Britain took the lead in NATO in terms of setting the no-fly zone and the ensuing air bombing campaign, Washington was happy to “lead from behind.” The situation is drastically different in Syria. There is no international consensus, no easy military target to bomb, the Syrian regime is politically and militarily stronger than Gaddafi’s, the Syrian opposition is more divided and the country is prone to sectarian war.

Finally, the last reason why the Obama administration would not pursue a military strategy is the Iran factor. Unlike in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt or Yemen, the role of Iran in Syria is crucial. Any war against the Assad regime will sooner or later involve a military confrontation with Iran, the main ally of Bashar al-Assad.

Anyone who follows the diplomatic strategy of Obama with Iran would know that a military confrontation with Iran is the last thing Washington wants. Reaching a political solution to the challenge that Iran’s nuclear ambitions presents is a top priority for the White House. War with Syria would certainly turn into a proxy war with Iran. Needless to say, this would end diplomatic negotiations with Tehran and pave the road for an Israeli attack against Iran’s nuclear sites. In short, military action in Syria would set the whole Middle East on fire. For all these reasons, even without the presidential election, the Obama administration would have done its best to pursue a diplomatic strategy in Syria.