Turkey and the secular Arabs

Turkey prioritizes Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood for good reason, given that the Islamic groups or parties are strong, and are leaders in Arab politics, including in Egypt. However, allowing Islamic politics a monopoly in Turkish foreign policy will prove a fatal mistake. A wise strategy would incorporate Arab seculars and liberals. Even in countries like Egypt, a friendly dialogue between Turkey and the secular Arabs is a "must" for the long-term interests not only of Turkey but of the entire region's politics.

The recent developments in Egypt have again demonstrated the critical role of the liberal and secular Arabs. There are a thousand reasons for condemning the army's abuse of its power for the purpose of maintaining the dirty status quo in Egypt. But equally important is the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to persuade the seculars and the liberals. On many issues, including its choice of presidential candidate, the Muslim Brotherhood should know that it has to take into account the balances and expectations of the whole of the Egyptian public, not only of the narrow calculations of its own party or organization. The inner bargain of the Muslim Brotherhood should not overshadow Egyptian realities.

I am not sure that the Muslim Brotherhood's leadership is really aware of this. As far as we know, in the last elections, while the statist seculars (who believe that the Muslim Brotherhood is more dangerous that the military junta) voted for Ahmed Shafiq, the liberal seculars (who believe that the military junta is more dangerous than the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood) stayed attached to Mohammed Mursi. Thus, a realistic and cooperative contact between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular/liberal Arabs is yet to be consolidated. It should be noted that the third bloc (seculars and liberals) ought to keep its ticket of legitimacy in full view of the global public. Without that, the competition between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian army will soon, in Western eyes, become the struggle of similar actors, each side declaiming its own as the democratic standard.

This is why Turkey's relations with the liberals and seculars of the Arab world are very critical, and this is how it should be nurtured: First of all, Turkey's diplomacy must be egalitarian, favoring no political group, be it Islamist or secular. Only this will allow Turkey to exert its soft power upon the Arab public as a whole. I am reluctant to say this, but I think that the Turkish government should immediately become aware of a growing resentment of Turkey among the liberal and secular Arab intellectuals. Secondly, Turkey should be wise enough to include its own seculars and liberals in the Arab-Turkish dialogue. So far, Turkey's conservative actors have monopolized the Turkish approach to Arab politics. A wiser policy would include Turkish social democrats and liberals in that approach. This is vitally important for Turkey's long-term interests.

The Turkish government should create channels for dialogue between Arab seculars and Turkish seculars. Despite the problems of the leading Kemalist party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), Turkey has many distinguished liberal and secular intellectuals who can contribute creatively to that dialogue. Not all the Turkish faces that the Arabs see should belong to those who propound a conservative ideology! The ideological diversity among Turks on Arab politics is a primary Turkish asset.