The invisible front

While the global public prefers to focus on fancier cases like Egypt or Israel, any development has the potential to create huge outcomes for the Gulf.

The Gulf region itself is naturally fragile for many reasons: Many states have demographic problems; there are still unsolved territorial issues… Naturally, many feared that the recent crises of Arab politics could easily capture politics in the Gulf States, but that did not happen, with the small and short-term exception of Bahrain. Yet, ironically, the Gulf States did not advocate maintaining the status quo. Instead, they supported regime change in countries like Libya, Egypt and Syria, which is interesting, given the nature of the Gulf States’ political structures.

In this vein, thanks to the recent activism in Arab politics there have been several important developments in the Gulf. First of all, these recent developments have made Turkey a natural ally in the region -- which is no secret to anyone. Turkey counterbalances Iran, which has, from a local perspective, the biggest potential to destabilize the Gulf region. More than counterbalancing Iran, Turkey also raises the profile of the Gulf States in global politics. To a large extent, Turkey’s Gulf strategy relies on political concerns rather than economic ones. Despite what many have claimed, Turkey received little foreign direct investment from the Gulf in the last six years -- the total foreign direct investment from the region during this period was no more than $10 billion. Economic issues do matter to Turkey in the long term, but so far Turkey’s main concern in the Gulf has been a political one that is more about its position and influence in the larger Arab politics.

Meanwhile, Iran plays a critical role. It has a leverage potential, particularly on the Shiite population of the Gulf. But Iran has never been an avid regime exporter to the region, for several reasons. The stability of the energy market is extremely critical to Iran. But the more critical factor is that Iran’s Gulf strategy is its main asset in global politics vis-à-vis the US and other Gulf States. The other states should be very careful about isolating Iran as too much aggression may incite Iran, which would not be a good thing for several reasons. A limited Iran in the Gulf is the price of tolerating its relatively high profile in other issues, including Syria. In other words, an exaggerated attack on Iran may increase this country’s activism in the Gulf.

Countries like Iran and Russia want the Arab Spring to go no further than Syria. Similarly, countries like Turkey do not want the Gulf to be destabilized by the same process. Thus, there emerges a fuzzy border in the Middle East, which stretches from Syria to Oman. In fact, this border is the most dynamic politico-tectonic fault of Middle Eastern politics. More, it evolves very interestingly, so that it becomes more malleable in the face of the usual crises of the region’s politics.