Zero problems with neighbors revisited
by Richard Falk*

These critics point to the heightened tensions with Syria and Iraq, the persisting inability to overcome the hostile fallout from the Mavi Marmara incident with Israel, and even the renewed salience of the long unresolved dispute with the Armenian diaspora sparked by a new French bill that makes the denial of genocide associated with the 1915 massacres of Armenians in Turkey a crime.

Troubles to be sure, but should these be interpreted as “failures,” and more precisely as “Turkish failures”? Perhaps, Davutoğlu was insufficiently cautious, or alternatively too optimistic, when he articulated the zero problems diplomacy, but was it not an accurate way of signaling a new dawn for Turkey’s approach to neighbors, especially its Arab neighbors, and actually, to the world as a whole. And Davutoğlu followed through with a dizzying series of initiatives, conceiving of the neighborhood in a broad sense and managing to banish many of the bad memories associated with Ottoman rule over much of the Arab world.

It should be recalled that Turkish foreign policy began charting a new course years before Davutoğlu became foreign minister. In an important sense, the turning point came in 2003 when the Turkish government refused to allow the United States to use its territory to stage an invasion of Iraq. At the time the anti-Justice and Development Party (AKP) opposition called the decision the biggest mistake in Turkish republican history. In retrospect, it was a transformational moment that showed Turkey, its neighbors and the world that it could think and act for itself when it comes to foreign policy, that the Cold War was over and that Washington could no longer take Ankara for granted. And yet this move did not mean, as some critics immediately claimed, a turn toward Islam and away from the West. As recently shown, Turkey still values its NATO ties even to the extent of allowing radar stations on its territory that is linked to missile defense for Europe, Israel and the Gulf in relation to Iran.

Forgetting Turkey’s past

By now it is almost forgotten that it was Turkey that encouraged peace talks between Syria and Israel that seemed to be headed for dramatic success until their abrupt breakdown, a development attributed at the time to the Israeli attacks on Gaza at the end of 2008, but in retrospect better understood as the unwillingness of Israel to give up any of its 1967 conquests. Turkey also sought to be a peacemaker further afield in the Balkans and the Caucasus, doing the seemingly impossible, bringing Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia together in a manner that moved their two antagonistic governments on a path leading to peace. Even more ambitiously, in collaboration with Brazil, Turkey used its new stature as an independent player in May 2010 to persuade Tehran to accept an arrangement for the storage of much of Iran’s enriched uranium in Turkey, thereby demonstrating the plausibility of a peaceful alternative to the United States/Israel posture of sanctions and warmongering.

To be sure, the earlier sensible effort to have friendly relations with Syria backfired, but not until the regime in Damascus started the massive shooting of its citizens and refused to meet the demands of its people for far reaching reforms. Arguably, the same reversal of outlook in Ankara occurred in relation to Libya after Muammar Gaddafi threatened to massacre his opposition, leading even to extending some Turkish support to the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 that shaped the outcome of an internal struggle for control of the state. Also, there is no doubt that the refusal of the European Union to shift its one-sided stance on Cyprus has soured relations with Greece, producing a temporary deterioration that has taken place despite the Turkish show of reasonableness and exhibiting a spirit of compromise.

Even with Israel, despite the strong sympathies of the Turkish public with the struggle of the Palestinians, the AKP leadership has done its best to restore normalcy to the relationship between the two countries. After all, the May 31, 2010 attack by Israel’s navy in international waters on the Mavi Marmara carrying humanitarian activists and assistance to Gaza and challenging the Israeli blockade was not only a flagrant breach of international law but resulted in the death of nine Turkish passengers. Turkey has demanded an apology and compensation for the families of the victims, a reasonable set of expectations that was on the verge of acceptance by Tel Aviv, but collapsed when challenged by the internal opposition to Benjamin Netanyahu led by the super-hawk foreign minister, Avigdor Liebermann, now under indictment for fraud.

What this brief overview argues is that Turkey has consistently tried to avert recourse to intervention and war in the Middle East and to promote diplomatic approaches that rely exclusively on soft power. It has, to be sure, resisted geopolitical rebuffs, as in relation to its efforts to end the confrontation with Iran, impressively refusing to stay in line behind the bellicose leadership of the United States and Israel. Davutoğlu has correctly affirmed Turkey’s resolve to act on the basis of its values and convictions in the post-Cold War politics of the region and not blindly follow directives from Washington. Iran is a striking case where the Turkish approach, although incapable of stemming the drift toward war being mounted by the West, is both wiser and more likely to achieve the goal of reassuring the world that Tehran means what it says when it insists that it does not intend to acquire nuclear weapons. As in every other foreign policy setting, Davutoğlu is exhibiting his belief that in the 21st century persuasion works better than coercion, not to mention the avoidance of death, devastation and displacement.

In sum, the zero problems with neighbors as a touchstone to Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and the world needs to be understood as an aspiration and strong preference rather than as an invariable guide to practice. There are too many contradictions embedded in political realities to be slavishly tied to a rigid doctrine incapable of taking account of context. For instance, in Syria and Libya the Turkish government was forced to choose between siding with a regime slaughtering its own people and backing the population in its efforts to democratize and humanize the governing process. Zero problems needs to be understood as a framework for addressing the relations between countries, not just governments, and in situations of strife choices must be made. Arguably Turkey went too far when it backed NATO in Libya or not far enough when it failed to show support for the Green Revolution in Iran after the stolen elections of June 2009. These are difficult interpretative choices that do not invalidate the principled positions that Davutoğlu has repeatedly affirmed as being as important as realist calculations in shaping foreign policy in complex situations. Possibly, if the Green Revolution had shown more persistence or the regime had engaged in more widespread killing of its people Turkey would have made a “Syrian choice.”

‘Great historical transformations’

Davutoğlu on more than one occasion has expressed enthusiastic support for the upheavals grouped together under the banner of the Arab Spring. He calls these upheavals great historical transformations that are irreversible and expressions of a thirst by young people for lives of dignity and democratic freedoms. There is nothing that Turkey has done to thwart these high ideals.

In this respect, I think it is possible to reach an assessment of Turkish foreign policy as of early 2012. It has charted a course of action based on -- to the extent of which it is feasible -- soft power diplomacy, taking initiatives to resolve its conflicts with neighbors but also to offer its good offices to mediate conflict to which it is not a party. Its credibility has become so great that İstanbul has replaced European capitals as the preferred venue for conflict resolution whether in relation to Afghanistan or even Iran. It is notable that despite Washington’s annoyance with Ankara regarding Iran or due to the simmering dispute with Israel, the US government seems to favor İstanbul as the most propitious site for negotiations with Iran concerning its nuclear program.

At the same time, as Syria and Libya show, it is not always possible to avoid taking sides in response to internal struggles, although Turkey has delayed doing so to give governments in power the opportunity to establish internal peace. In a globalizing world boundaries are not absolute, and sovereignty must give way if severe violations of human rights are being committed by the regime, but that still should make armed intervention a last resort, and one only undertaken in extreme instances on behalf of known opposition forces and in a manner that has a reasonable prospect of success at acceptable costs for the targeted society. Such conditions almost never exist and so intervention is rarely if ever, in my judgment, justified, although conditions may quite often create strong interventionary temptations.

We can only hope that Turkey stays the course, pursuing every opening that enables positive mutual relations among countries and using its diplomatic stature to facilitate conflict resolution among others. Rather than viewing “zero problems” as a failure, it should be a time to reaffirm the creativity of Turkish foreign policy in the course of the last decade that has shown the world the benefits of soft power diplomacy. This diplomacy, as supplemented by Turkey’s economic success and political stability, helps us understand the great popularity of and respect for the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, throughout the region and the world.

*Richard Falk is a professor emeritus of international law and practice who taught at Princeton University for 40 years.