Iran’s threats in Strait of Hormuz: a challenge to US policy
by Emrah Usta*

 In Iran, which is accused of trying to develop nuclear weapons, several nuclear physicists have been mysteriously killed in bomb attacks, while the crash of a US unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Iranian territory re-escalated the tension between the two countries.

Iran recently threatened to block transit through the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil transportation route, if the US and the EU impose sanctions on Iranian oil. In response, the US administration stressed that they would not allow the Strait of Hormuz to be closed by Iran, describing such a move as a “red line” for US foreign policy.

The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, had indicated that Iran’s blocking the strait would be an unacceptable move. “Iran has the military power to block the Strait of Hormuz for a period of time if it decides to do so, but the US would take action to reopen it,” he said, implying that the US may resort to preventive action against the threat.

The fact that US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert had acknowledged that the issue of the strait “keeps [him] awake” is proof that the US attaches great importance to the Strait of Hormuz. The Hormuz threat Iran issued after US President Barack Obama signed an agreement to deal a blow to Iran’s economy has been worrying not only the US, but also the EU, which is already fighting with problems in the eurozone. Iran’s threat may culminate in close contact pursuits in the region in coming months.

Every day 15-17 million barrels of oils are transported via the strait, which accommodates about 40 percent of the world tanker transportation. For this reason, it is very unlikely that a crisis will be averted here thanks to the US’ or Iran’s efforts. “Given the strategic consequences of the US pullout from Iraq, such tension can be predicted in advance,” says Reva Bhalla, the chief analyst at Stratfor, suggesting that the US was unprepared for the crisis. This tension has the potential to deal a blow to world oil prices if a close encounter occurs between the US and Iran, rival countries along the Pakistan-Iraq-Gulf line.

What has been its impact on foreign policy ahead of the US presidential elections? This and similar questions need to be answered. In particular, the US public will not be inclined to see a repetition of the Afghan or Iraqi syndrome, and the Iran issue will be of special importance prior to the elections. Indeed, a potential armed conflict with Iran is not very likely before the US elections.

There are many reasons to debate whether America’s Iran policy is the result of America’s hostile attitudes or its harsh interventionist position against the world. The debates being conducted on this matter are very interesting. In particular, Vali Nasr, a foreign policy analyst at Brooking Institute and an Iranian-American Bloomberg columnist, is urging the US to adopt stronger measures against Iran. The burdensome sanctions imposed on Iran, the assassination of Iranian professionals and the killing of an Iranian general in charge of missile development are among the important points stressed by Nasr. He argues that in the wake of these developments, Iran has reflexively returned to the crisis situation, which was further confirmed by the raid into the British embassy in Iran. Noting that the ruling clerics are particularly uneasy about the developments, Nasr says that the economic structure in Iran has nearly reached the point of collapse. He maintains that the existing economy has set off alarm bells. Nasr holds that in the face of sanctions, the Iranian government has recently canceled existing natural gas and oil projects.

The Iran agenda, which has proved to be a test for the US foreign policy, has become a policy closely monitored by the White House and the Pentagon ahead of elections. In the face of Iran’s Hormuz threat, the US was set to conduct a big military maneuver with Israel, but later decided to cancel it, due to the Netanyahu government’s attitudes. This cancellation is just a message given to the US; it can be argued that Israel has revised its security paradigms since Hamas decided to join the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and its concerns over Iran have made their mark on this military maneuver. Israeli politicians’ attitude of doing nothing about Iran, but hurling accusations at the US can be said to have had a role in the cancellation. The Obama administration seems to have an inadequate perception of the Iranian threat. Its emphasis is placed on the deteriorating economy of Iran. Iran’s policies rely on attitudes developed by a state that is realist, pragmatic and capable of understanding the change in the region. These disagreements have led not only to the examination of the balance of power among Israel, Hezbollah, Hamas and other actors, but also to an increased struggle by the US foreign policy where Iran is concerned.

Future scenarios delicately poised on Hormuz

It is hard to create a formula that is open to multifarious strategies vis-à-vis the US-Iran tension. Apart from Iranians who perceive oil prices as the soft spot of the US before the elections, the Hormuz crisis, it seems, will maintain the current situation.

The future of Iran internal affairs as well as its relations with the US can be discussed under five headings. The strategies that are/can be produced within the framework of these factors will allow Iran to perform more active maneuvers in the region. These are: (1) Despite Iranian officials’ claim it is making progress in its nuclear bid, Iran’s nuclear activities are progressing more slowly than Pakistan’s. It is clear that the recent developments -- such as the Stuxnet virus and the killing of several Iranian scientists -- have created uncertainty in Iran’s nuclear efforts. This uncertainty reflects in Iran’s domestic policy as well. Nuclear activities certainly provide a bonding force -- more powerful than religion -- for diverse groups within the country. If Iran conducts its future nuclear activities in a more transparent manner, this may not only decrease the tension in Hormuz, but also contribute to US-Iran relations. (2) Iran does not appear to be triggering a “nuclear crisis” as it does not generate nuclear power as quickly as Pakistan or Russia is doing, and it uses the electricity so generated primarily in industrial production. While its primary goal is to observe internal balances, this policy certainly has a deterrent force in the international arena. (3) The paradigm shift triggered by the Arab Spring has brought about a shift toward model countries that emphasize security and democracy. In the face of this change, even groups such as Hamas have changed how they appear to the world and joined the PLO, but how will Iran change?

This question is open to discussion. Although it failed to serve as a model of democratic representation for neighboring countries after the 1979 revolution, how long will Iran continue to keep the bans on freedoms introduced by this revolution? This remains as the most important sociological factor that Iran needs to address. (4) In 2009, Iran experienced a series of domestic riots and repression of the opposition and of the young, which has carried over to 2012 as well. The collapsing banking and public sectors, high food prices and the high cost of living are dissipating the pragmatic harmony between the superstructure (Ali Khamanei) and the substructure (the public), while an attempt is made to keep it together with the middle class (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad circle). Religious sentiments are amplified to boost the bonds among the components and to project a unified image of Iran to the outside world. Does this model have the potential to become stronger in coming years? (5) The Shiite Crescent tactic is becoming a traditional component of Iran’s foreign policy. With this strategy, Iran is able to send all of its energy from the center to the periphery. In particular, the Shiite Crescent has proved successful in allowing Iran to distract attention from its nuclear efforts and shift power -- to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain -- thanks to the Shiite population in these countries. However, it would be wrong to say that this is the only goal of this policy that Iran -- a state with a deep-rooted tradition -- is pursuing. In this context, Iran’s diplomacy can be defined as more professional, more rational and appropriate. Amplifying role of Iranian diplomats in the international arena may help develop more sound relations among Iran, the US and Israel. It seems hard for the time being to determine if Iran is ready for a war if the Hormuz tension escalates into a conflict. Iran certainly lacks a big ground force and its Artesh (army) and Revolutionary Guards are designed to give the country a competitive edge in unconventional warfare and are certainly not for attack purposes. Given the fact that Tehran’s air forces are largely old school, its naval forces can only play a harassment role in the Gulf and are good for conducting maneuvers. The US intervention with such an Iran may not only pull the US deeper into the economic quagmire, but also put an end to the status quo in Iran.

*Emrah Usta is a US foreign policy analyst and a fellow at the Center for American Studies at Süleyman Sah University in İstanbul. He can be followed on Twitter @StrategcAnalyst