What Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood can learn from Turkey’s AKP
by Tozun Bahcheli & Sid Noel

The Brotherhood’s leaders, however, have no prior experience of participation in government and only brief experience of democratic politics. Apart from vague commitments to “Islamic principles” and “democracy,” what does the Brotherhood stand for and how is it likely to govern?

One established Islamist party they might view as a model is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has held office since 2002, won three consecutive elections and each time increased its percentage of the popular vote. Despite causing much initial alarm for secularists, the AKP has shown that religiosity can be fused with democracy and is no barrier to effective economic management.

The AKP has significantly enhanced Turkey’s democratic credentials. Above all, it has presided over a period of burgeoning economic growth during which Turkey’s per capita income more than doubled, foreign investment and exports soared, and employment opportunities multiplied. As a result, Turkey enjoys greater respect and influence in the region than ever before and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the most popular foreign leader in every Arab country where the previous regime was overthrown.

But does the AKP provide a realistic model? Before the AKP took power, Turkish Islamist parties had at various times been partners in governing coalitions. That experience cannot be gained overnight. However, in a world where information flows freely there is ample opportunity for parties in newly democratizing countries to learn from the best practices of parties elsewhere. In our view, there are useful lessons that the Muslim Brotherhood can draw from the AKP.

Like the Brotherhood, the AKP was widely suspected of having an Islamic fundamentalist agenda. The AKP response was to reassure its opponents and perhaps forestall a military coup by focusing on economic reforms. It also committed itself to “push hard” for membership of the European Union, a goal much favored by secularists and the military, and declined to act on issues close to the heart of fervent Islamists, such as banning the consumption of alcohol. “We don’t plan to disturb anyone’s way of life,” Erdoğan declared.

The Egyptian military sees itself as the guardian of the secular state and insists that it has a right to oversee the writing of Egypt’s new constitution, thus placing the Brotherhood in a difficult quandary. Should it try to accommodate the generals or confront them?

Or could it take a page from the AKP’s strategy book? When threatened by overbearing generals, the AKP adroitly chipped away at their political authority instead of confronting them openly, which it did only after winning a resounding second election victory. Then, when elements in the military were caught plotting a coup, the AKP let the justice system deal with them. At one point in 2009 over 10 percent of Turkey’s generals and admirals were in jail and the era of military dominance was over.

Secular Egyptians and minority religious and ethnic groups fear becoming marginalized, or worse, if the Islamists set the country on a radical course. Here too the Brotherhood might usefully take a lesson from the AKP, which from the start understood that in a diverse country it would not be able to govern successfully or for very long if it governed solely in the interest of Islamists.

The AKP has not always succeeded. Thus far, its efforts to end hostilities between the Turkish state and militant Kurdish separatists have failed. However, an electorally significant minority of Kurdish voters appreciate that the AKP has done more to improve their lives than previous governments, and vote accordingly.

The main lessons that the AKP can provide for parties in newly democratizing states are twofold. First, sound management of the economy is a necessary precondition for success in other areas, including bringing the military under civilian control. Second, a moderate approach to governance can have enduring appeal in a politically fractious country -- something the Brotherhood’s leaders would do well to keep in mind if they hope to win more than one election.

*Tozun Bahcheli & Sid Noel are professors of political science at King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario, Canada.