Where does the KCK Convention stand within the context of civil society?
by Alparslan Nas*

However, the current reactionary approach of the opposition or dissidents, which relies on the paranoia of “you are next” in the process of arrests, makes an indirectly positive reference to the KCK phenomenon. However, it is essential to subject this phenomenon to a critical analysis through the text of the KCK Convention, and it is also necessary to conduct this analysis by focusing on the convention’s text and relying on an anti-violence and anti-militarist position. It is apparent from the preamble of the convention drafted by Abdullah Öcalan that the KCK Convention, which entered into effect on March 20, 2005, adopts an approach of democratic confederacies. The main emphasis of the convention, which argues for a free and equal union of all peoples without any discrimination, is a horizontal organizational model as opposed to the nation-state model. The preamble also refers to an ecological community model. Likewise, notions like social gender and women’s freedom are frequently stressed in the text. In this current form, the KCK Convention presents a theoretical transformation for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that has been inspired by present time socialist movements: a socialist stance that encompasses cultural and environmental rights instead of the Marxist class struggle.

The KCK Convention is not isolated from the overall PKK organization. Article 36 explicitly states that the PKK is the ideological wing and branch of the KCK system. The striking contradiction in the text of the convention strongly appears at this point. The KCK refers to itself as close to some sort of anarchism in the form of a stateless and horizontal organization, whereas the articles pertinent to the PKK suggest that the case is extremely different. Whoever works within the KCK system is obligated under the convention to consider the ideological and ethical criteria of the PKK. Under the same article, the PKK is referred to as responsible for implementing the philosophy and ideology of the leadership. The text, which argues that the KCK is not a hierarchical structure or organization, also makes strong reference to leadership. Article 11 openly states that Öcalan is the founder and leader of the KCK. The convention further notes that the institution and office of the leadership represent the entire people in all fields and refers to it as the final decision maker in the major issues pertinent to the people. The provisions that put emphasis on a leader, positioned as a supreme entity, in an allegedly stateless civil society organization is a plain contradiction.

The notion of citizenship

Another contradiction in the text is related to the notion of citizenship. Citizenship, in its modern sense, is a phenomenon associated with the nation-state model that appeared in the 19th century. The convention dismisses the nation-state model, but it also fails to offer an alternative to the notion of citizenship. By stating that whoever is born in Kurdistan is considered a citizen of the KCK, the text relies on the understanding of citizenship held in the modern nation-state. The most striking aspect of the citizenship discussion in the text stresses that those who commit the crime of treason will lose their status of citizenship. The convention notes that the Supreme Court of Justice and Kongra-Gel may approve the removal of citizenship rights. It is extremely problematic for a system that refers to the sacred nature of fundamental rights and freedoms and to a non-hierarchical model to rely on powerful judicial institutions vested in the power to execute all sorts of punishments without any checks in its endeavor of nation-building. This does not take the KCK to an anti-militarist and non-violent position. Quite the contrary, Article 32 of the convention, which states, “In case all peaceful methods are aborted, guerilla warfare based on uprising and revolt shall be considered,” justifies militarism and violence.

Another flaw in the KCK Convention that attracts attention concerns the relationship between ideology and society. Article 14 states that it is extremely important to prepare the community for ideological matters. Ideological training centers that will be established for the fulfillment of this goal will be responsible for theoretical studies and the ideological struggle consistent with the leadership’s priorities as well as for the training of personnel. The top-down approach of the KCK Convention becomes visible in this provision as evidenced by the training of the people accompanied by the teaching of a vague leadership line. This is not actually a current or fresh tendency. This emphasis, unique to the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, seeks to instill the perception of an undisputable leader among the entire people.

Holding criticism against the political administration in reference to the KCK arrests represents a fairly superficial reaction. This attitude, which fails to criticize the KCK, ignores the convention’s repressive content and further leads to the adoption of a perception that the KCK is the civil society movement of the Kurdish people and that the arrests are a manifestation of the repressive state of the 1990s. It could be argued that with the KCK Convention, the PKK seeks a paradigm shift through the consideration of modern socialist movements and the spread of its “struggle for freedom” in the social sphere by relying on civilian resources. But these two goals bring about some contradictions. Despite the direct democracy discourse in the KCK Convention, the text states that the leader is given a special and undisputable place at the top of the pyramid and that society should be organized in reference to the leader.

Looking at social inequality

Marx and Engels uphold that the primary reason of social inequality is economic. For the emancipation of the repressed segments of society, they argue that the means of production should be seized. According to Antonio Gramsci, for a communist revolution, cultural hegemony should be maintained by the repressed over the dominant classes rather than the acquisition of the means of production. This hegemony may be maintained by a passive revolution along with a civil society movement instead of violent methods. The PKK makes reference to civilianization in the KCK Convention, and at this point, it gives the impression that it is eager to move the revolutionist method from the Marxist understanding to Gramsci’s conception of civil society. However, this seemingly civilian movement as spelled out in the convention justifies violence and militarism in some provisions, which state that guerrilla warfare may be waged under certain conditions.

In the preamble to the KCK Convention, Öcalan says that he has repeatedly noted that there was revolt wherever there was power, also calling for insurgency against the state. It should be noted that it is not Öcalan who originally made this remark. Michel Foucault stated this about three decades ago, but in a fairly different context. According to Foucault, the state is not the only source of power. An organization seeking to organize the masses around an absolute leadership and designing a system for this may emerge as a power mechanism. It is visible that the KCK Convention is designed as a means to achieve power. According to Foucault, revolt or resistance is staged against all kinds of powers and resistance is a civilian movement. It could therefore be expected that the KCK, which is trying to manipulate the perceptions of the Kurds in Turkey, faces resistance.

The KCK Convention implies that it serves as the constitution of the Kurds. In its modern sense, a constitution is a bill of rights addressed to the citizens. However, the KCK Convention, instead of offering rights for the Kurds, defines the citizens as sub-actors in a system dominated by a leadership. Once the dynamics of this system become effective and influential, the insurgency referred to by Öcalan may go against its own focal point of power like a boomerang. From this perspective, a recent campaign launched by Kurdish youth against the PKK, “Ser navê min nekuje” (Do not kill on my behalf), is pretty meaningful. Today, the Kurds are well equipped to stage a civilian resistance against all types of repression through their political parties and civil society organizations. They do not need a social contract that has failed in its claim of change, includes many contradictions and tends to rely on militarism and violence. The PKK, with the KCK Convention, escalates tension and promotes marginalization within society. However, the Kurds need to take the side of life in the process of making a new constitution and contribute toward the attainment of peace. They need to get rid of the hegemony of “leadership” and adopt a constructive critical approach towards the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has acted as the representative of the silent majority and taken bold steps in the promotion of the democratic rights of the Kurds.

*Alparslan Nas is an instructor at Sabancı University’s department of cultural studies.