Prime Minister Erdoğan and secularism
by Helene Flautre*

The Arab Spring, which has been relocating the stones in the region and closely followed by the world, is almost as bloody as the French Revolution; where these countries are heading to within the democratization process is also a matter of curiosity. The Iranian revolution started with a popular uprising as well; however, it was converted into a process that made the people look to the shah era. For this reason, the West, following the political movements in the region, tries to take the pulse of developments in Arab countries and also desires for the process that Turkey has gone through by pointing to the Turkish example.

The reason that accentuates Turkey as a source of inspiration, if not a model, is the fact that the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the ruling party in Turkey for a decade, is rooted in a movement like National Outlook that could be described as Islamist. Perhaps for the first time in the history of Turkey, the AKP and particularly Prime Minister Erdoğan have successfully managed the synthesis of social issues, economic development and democratization; and despite all crises and coup attempts, they carry the jug without breaking it. By this success, Turkey is a model for not only the West but also for the Arab masses.

Erdoğan has already become a hero for the Arab street because of his emphasis on the Palestinian issue and his new foreign policy. For this reason, many thought that in his most recent trip he would display an attitude to heal the wounds and appeal to the hearts of the streets, as well as seeking common ground to maximize the economic interests of Turkey in the region. By his emphasis on secularism, Erdoğan amazed not only his Arab brothers but also the West. Let us take a look at the importance of this emphasis for Turkey with reference to Erdoğan and the AKP dimension, for the Arab Spring and how it is perceived in the West as well as for the influence of Turkey in international affairs.

Even though it displays some nuances, the secular state approach held by Erdoğan that guarantees impartiality to all faiths and freedom of religion is an influential structure in Europe and Western democracies in general. It was not a coincidence that even the columnists arguing that the AKP had a hidden agenda held that Erdoğan’s emphasis was worthwhile for Turkish domestic affairs and for the process of making a new constitution because by this emphasis, Erdoğan states that the modern secular state model is the future for not only his country but also for the Arab world. What makes this emphasis interesting is that the AKP has been suspect in respect to the secular order and that it was accused of undermining the secular order by the Constitutional Court. To this end, some reckless steps taken to abolish the headscarf ban at universities brought the AKP to the brink of dissolution.

Referring to Turkey as a secular state

However, even the seculars admit that it is not possible to refer to Turkey as a secular state and that radical reform is needed in this matter. The secular state “supervises” thousands of secular civil servants, meaning the Sunnis through the Religious Affairs Directorate, while it completely excludes the Alevis and other faith groups. It would be naive to believe that such a system would guarantee religious freedom. The message Prime Minister Erdoğan delivered in Egypt also addresses Turkey as well. In other words, Erdoğan promotes a secular state impartial to all faiths, not a Turkish model.

Unfortunately, not only the Arab states, but also Turkey is remote from this state approach. Even if it is not hard to predict how Erdoğan’s secular state approach will be reflected in the new constitutional process, it will of course not be easy in practice to implement a secular state project impartial to all faiths. A potential autonomous Religious Affairs Directorate to be financed by the state will be open to other faith groups; but I do not think that this would please them. The other faith groups that ask for non-involvement of the state in their religious affairs and full respect for their rights would not want to be embraced by the state like the Sunnis.

Erdoğan’s emphasis upon secularism in Egypt and his defense of these views in Tunisia and Libya is important for the AKP’s current progress and the process for making a new constitution. In fact, the discussion over the AKP’s sincerity or its hidden agenda started on the first day of this party in office; the EU institutions took this discussion seriously, and for this reason, they kept an eye on its actions. During the decision-making process at the start of membership talks, the AKP’s stance with respect to civil law and criminal law reforms constituted an example. In the end, the EU concluded that the AKP is a conservative party that is comparable to the Christian Democrats in Europe and gave a green light for the initiation of the talks. The recent process and the emphasis by Erdoğan I referred to confirm the authenticity of this analysis. This emphasis gives some hints on the debate on a new constitution that will likely dominate the daily agenda in Turkey in the months to come and sheds light on Erdoğan’s views on the secular state.

Hopefully, instead of appealing to the classical fear reflexes of the past, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) will be open to a new structure that guarantees religious freedom in Turkey and that improves Erdoğan’s views on the secular state. It is a fair approach to point to the tangible facts stemming from the past where doubts concerning Erdoğan and the AKP are concerned; however, it will be equally unfair to ignore the transformation and renewal process that Erdoğan and the AKP have undertaken by referring to these mistakes. I think the failure of the opposition in Turkey is at least partially attributable to their failure to read and understand the AKP and Erdoğan properly.

This issue of fear has become popular in Europe and the West in general after the AKP’s coming to power in 2002. Those who followed the developments without prejudice remained calm, whereas the secular circles that held Islam was not compatible with democracy concluded that Turkey was becoming an Islamist country and that the AKP would implement its hidden agenda. These scenarios of fear were promoted even with the AKP’s expanding sphere of influence and popular support and its introduction of bold democratization reforms for the first time in Turkey; and fear was further aggravated due to Israel’s Gaza offensive and the famous one minute incident in Davos.

At this time when the axis shift thesis attracted a great deal of attention, some columnists argued that Turkey was turning into another Iran, whereas some others alleged that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Erdoğan had much in common. Some still promote this thesis. I am not sure whether these circles are able to understand the message Erdoğan gave in Egypt. But by the secular state message, Erdoğan clarified his position for Turkey, as well as the Arab masses. Erdoğan recommends a state order that remains impartial to all faith groups and guarantees religious freedom for all.

A strong message

This is a strong message to not only Islamic movements but also to the people in the region. Erdoğan, by this message, not only favors a secular state and democracy, but also promotes an alternative state model to the Iranian model. Based on the opposition by some Islamist circles, we could conclude that this stance is a brave and courageous initiative rather than a populist move.

I am sure it is necessary to stress that this initiative was held by Erdoğan and not by any politician because a similar message by leaders like French President Nicolas Sarkozy would be credible but less influential. The secular state values presented within the discourse of civilization of the European colonial past, the extensive support that the same countries have extended to secular dictators for decades have already permeated the minds of the people in the region. For this reason, we may say that the West is happy with Erdoğan’s attempt to promote its own values. It is not hard to estimate that this initiative would promote the movements focusing on democracy rather than political movements that take Islam as a reference in Egypt. For the Arabs, Erdoğan is a popular politician not because of his Palestinian discourse but because of his political and economic achievements. It is Turkey not Iran that was dreamed of by the young people that started the Arab Spring. Arabs desire a free, secular and democratic order that enjoys economic development; Arab youngsters dream of İstanbul rather than the repressive mullah regime in Iran. For this reason, it is no coincidence that the Arab media have paid extensive attention to Erdoğan’s remarks on the secular state.

Erdoğan’s secularism move has attracted attention in the West as well (but for some reason, not in my home country, France). We may say that the West is now pleased but also surprised with Erdoğan’s emphasis upon the secular state in Egypt, Morocco and Libya despite this attracting the fury of the Muslim Brotherhood, given that he is known for his appeal to the Arab street and critical stance vis-à-vis Israel. This was an unexpected attitude, and it was immediately recalled that Erdoğan has never made such explicit statements on the secular state.

Even though they observe that this stance was not so original in Ankara, where secularism is a constitutional principle, but meaningful in Egypt, commentators also noted the importance of the message for domestic politics. But most importantly, in addition to the emphasis upon the secular state, Turkey’s readiness to host the anti-missile radar system confirmed that Turkey’s axis has not shifted. In a way, by these two moves, Turkey confirmed its axis. Hopefully, the ambivalent approach on axis shift is abandoned and full membership in the EU, a key process for Turkey’s integration with the West, is further underlined.

In case it finds lasting solutions to two major problems by its new constitution, religious freedom and the Kurdish issue, Turkey will become an element of stability with greater influence in the Middle East and serve as a source of inspiration for the Arab world during the process of their transformation. With these assets, Turkey will become an important factor in the democratic Western world and have the opportunity to deal with the major obstacles during the membership process.

Because issues like democracy, civilian control over the military, women’s rights and minority issues have dominated the agenda in recent years, the true and serious obstacles have never been addressed; and for this reason, Turkey’s membership has been viewed as a remote possibility. Membership of a Turkey that made achievements in economic development and welfare, guaranteed fundamental rights, adopted a secular and democratic state approach and structure and became influential in regional and global politics will become a serious matter; and in this case, it will also become a real possibility even if it still remains obvious that membership is not an easy task.