‘West cannot understand Middle East, Turkey only through prism of Islam’

“This is what I call the delusion over Islam. Old obsessions die hard. Seeing Islam and Islamists behind every move in the Middle East is an old obsession of many Western observers,” Thumann told us while answering our questions for Monday Talk.

In his new book “Der Islam-Irrtum: Europa und die muslimische Welt” (The Islam Fallacy: Europe’s Fear of the Muslim World), he says the West’s exaggeration of the influence of religious convictions and attempts to understand the Middle East and Turkey mainly through the prism of Islam could lead to misperceptions about the real strengths and weaknesses of the actors in the Middle East.

He elaborated on the issue for our interview.

A German publication called Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the “new caliph of the Middle East.” What do you think about the extent of support for this view in German and even in European foreign policy circles?

These catch phrases from the past are inept attempts by some of the German yellow press media not to explain but just to label Turkish foreign policy. These labels are not useful for serious reporting but for making the case that Turkey does not belong in Europe, or Turkey is teaming up with sinister forces in the Middle East. These stereotypes blur the real facts and events.

What do you think is really happening? What are the real facts as you observe them in regard to Turkey and the Middle East?

My reading of the most recent trip of the prime minister to the Middle East is that it was not an attempt to regenerate historic roles. I see a major shift here from policies that Turkey pursued until this spring, which was to have good relations with some neighbors despite their undemocratic character. The reality has changed very much in the region. Turkey’s foreign policy has changed from supporting authoritarian leaders to supporting freedom movements and people’s aspirations. It is accompanied by an earlier trend in Turkish foreign policy: Take into account what people think inside and outside of Turkey. There is also a strongly populist aspect to Erdoğan’s Israel policy. Whenever he turns the heat up on the issue, it either suits him or he intends to address larger audiences in the region. The latest fallout with Israel was preparation for but not the eventual focus of his trip to the Arab world.

You often travel to the Middle East. Why do you think Turkey is supported by the people of the region? Is it because of what Prime Minister Erdoğan says about Israel? Is it because of the relative success of the Turkish system? Or something else?

There are several factors. Prime Minister Erdoğan is very popular because people perceive him as a pious Muslim who is a successful leader. Turkey’s economic rise is very much reported in the Arab world. What people see is that he has managed to pursue economically oriented pragmatic policies. This has started a debate in hopefully democratizing states in North Africa and beyond. I am careful about the “model” talk because Turkey’s experience in the 20th century is so different from that of the Arab world. There is also increased economic and cultural exchange between Turkey and Arab countries, as opposed to 20 years ago. There are films and television series from Turkey reaching across the Arab world, much like the Egyptian movie industry’s dominance in the 1960s and 1970s, but in a more limited way. There is also the fact that Turkey is an open country now with all these visa agreements with the countries of the region. When I moved here in 2007, I met no Arabs in İstanbul and hardly anybody that I met in Cairo and Damascus ever came here. Beginning in 2009, it shifted. Now every month, I have somebody from a Middle Eastern country sitting in my office. İstanbul has turned into a place of encounter and meeting.

So they don’t see Prime Minister Erdoğan as the new caliph?

What is important is the soft power effect of Turkey. Arabs like Turkish soft power, but if Turkish policies change, you might see all the old prejudices resurfacing. The aggressive tendencies of Turkey with regard to the Cypriot drilling case could have a negative effect concerning the Arabs’ perception of Turkey. Turkey’s arguments about the Cypriot drilling case could trigger those prejudices, for example, because the exploration site is close to the shores of Egypt, Israel and Lebanon.

You say that Arabs like Turkish soft power. Does that also mean that Arabs do not like being hard? When the Arab Spring started, most Western observers thought it would be chaotic and Islamic or Islamist.

Old obsessions die hard. The obsession of seeing Islam and Islamists behind every move in the Middle East is an old habit of many Western observers. This is why I wrote my book; the delusion is wrong. Conflict, politics and social developments in most Middle Eastern countries have not differed much from Western or Eastern European ways in the last century -- nationalist movements, power struggles, the quest for money and success, etc. Many of the leaders of the Middle East have motives similar to actors in the West. The Arab Spring is a perfect illustration of that. When [Muammar] Gaddafi faced the uprising, the first thing he said was that this is the work of al-Qaeda. A similar reaction came from Hosni Mubarak, who always used Islamists as a tool to scare the West and continue his dictatorship. However, the Jan. 25 Revolution in Egypt was a revolution of young middle class people who proved to be highly disciplined and well-organized citizens. In the absence of any police, they managed to hold orderly demonstrations of a million in Tahrir Square, set up their own hospitals and security services and cleaned the square after major events. It was a revolution for a new civil order of Egypt, for transparency and freedom.

What about Syria and Tunisia?

That is also what we see in Tunisia and Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood is basically absent in Syria. There has been a law since 1980 requiring the death penalty for anybody discovered to be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather than an Islamic uprising, there is a civil uprising in Syria. In the course of a revolution, there are different phases. There could be a stronger showing by Islamist movements in the future. When I wrote about Islamist movements in Egypt, I described discussions over the last decade that indicate that they cannot survive as one party under democratic conditions; they have to split up because there are so many diverging views on any question; I heard starkly different opinions by Brotherhood leaders and mainstream Islamists. Today, there are at least 10 different Islamist-related parties in Egypt.

So there is nothing to fear from Islamist or Islamic movements, whether they be Hamas or Hezbollah?

There is a distinction to be made. We have mainstream Islamist movements related to the Muslim Brotherhood that clearly renounced violence some 20 years ago as a means of political struggle. This is very different from Hamas and Hezbollah, which are also Islamist movements in a broader sense; Hamas was initially tied to the Muslim Brotherhood but is now a rather distant offspring, and Hezbollah is a Shiite movement. They call themselves resistance movements, and I call them Islamic nationalists because they were founded to fight Israeli aggression as they see it. They are anti-Israeli movements in the tradition of secularist anti-Israeli movements. They take the flag of resistance from secularist parties like Fatah and combine it with an Islamist formula which is tough for Israel because their ideology is nationalism, but they also pursue religious goals. Then there are those fundamentalist terrorist organizations -- I would not call them Islamists -- we saw after the invasion of Iraq, which are al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-related movements.

You also shake up Western perceptions concerning Turkey-Iran relations and say that they are competitors.

There was a stupid equation in 2010 when there was the argument between the US and Turkey about Iran. The equation was that Turkey sides with Iran because Erdoğan has an Islamist background and Iran has an Islamist government; here is the link! That was a misperception disregarding facts on the ground. Turkey and Iran have been competitors. Their size, industrial base, population and military powers show similarities. These are two large non-Arab nations of the Middle East. They are often interested in selling similar items in the same areas in the region and elsewhere. When it comes to the political aspect, you have two models in the Middle East: soft power Turkey and hard power Iran, which fights with Israel and the West, provides Hamas with weapons, wants to bring down the Israeli regime, takes an aggressive stance militarily in Iraq if necessary and supports President Bashar al-Assad by all means. And Turkey is on the other side regarding Syria, supporting the population rather than Assad. You see Turkey having an entirely different role in Egypt, where Prime Minister Erdoğan has secular suggestions -- entirely different than Iran’s stance. Additionally, Turkey sided with NATO as it will host the radar component of a missile shield in the region.

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‘World-wide recognition of Palestine inevitable’

We heard quite dramatic addresses by President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. What is your assessment of those addresses in regards to the hopes of achieving peace in the region?

In a concise and deeply moving speech, Mahmoud Abbas made the case for a Palestinian state impressively clear. Benjamin Netanyahu’s answer sounded cynical and unconvincing. His right-wing government has thwarted all peace efforts over the last [number of] years, although Abbas was more than ready for a deal. The Palestinian state’s recognition bid at the UN is just a logical step now. Turkey is absolutely right in supporting statehood. Unfortunately, [US] President [Barack] Obama is domestically in a difficult position one year before elections, which prevents him from doing the same thing. But worldwide recognition is inevitable sooner or later.

‘Turkey’s good image at risk over oil exploration’

Turkish warships have set out for the Mediterranean at a time when Turkey and Greek Cyprus are deadlocked over possible deposits of oil and natural gas off the coast of the island. Turkish officials have said Turkey would start drilling in the area soon. What risks are involved in this move?

Turkey has been enjoying a soft power image in the region as a broker, an interlocutor. But the rhetoric of the prime minister on some issues such as Israel, and especially the escalating crisis over drilling rights in the eastern Mediterranean, has a strong potential to tarnish this image. It is highly unwise that the Greek Cypriots launch drilling activities at this critical moment, but we have to be clear here: It is their right by international law, and they have international agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel to delimitate the economic zones in the southeastern Mediterranean. Egypt has strong interests there as well. This is far away from Turkey. Turkey and northern Cyprus may launch similar activities along their shores. But any military or other interference in the area between Cyprus, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon would put Turkey’s good image at risk in Arab countries.

‘Merkel’s privileged membership idea evaporated’

Turkish President Abdullah Gül was recently on a four-day visit to Germany and made clear during his stay there that joining the European Union remains Turkey’s “strategic goal.” He also told journalists there that Germany has been more open than France during Turkey’s EU accession process, pointing out that more chapters had been opened during Germany’s EU presidency. Would you talk about the difference between the approaches of Germany and France to Turkey’s EU accession?

There is a big difference in the way Germany acts regarding Turkey’s accession. In Germany it’s quite rhetorical, whereas France actively blocks chapters. And it has blocked important chapters that could lead to membership. Germany did not block any chapters; it opened chapters during its presidency. Similarities between French and German attitudes toward Turkey’s membership are rhetorical -- like the CDU’s (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) “privileged membership” idea for Turkey. There is no clearly defined policy about it -- no clear concept behind it or solid thought. It has simply evaporated. Chancellor Angela Merkel said in her visit to İstanbul last year that she understands Turks do not like the privileged membership idea that much. At the moment the EU has entirely different problems to worry about. The whole debate has shifted from enlargement to the survival of the EU.

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‘Is Turkey’s ruling party an Islamist group?’

Thumann asks this question in his book and responds that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party or AKP) is an offshoot of the movement of political Islam in Turkey. He further explains that the party has neither a religious program nor does it implement any Islamist policies, and is basically a pragmatist conservative party.

The AKP faces competition on the religious right from two parties that garnered some 3 percent in the elections of June 12, while the AKP got almost 50 percent. It is a politically conservative and economically liberal party that makes politics for the pious middle classes and for those who were middle class and then became rich. It is a determined capitalist party. The questions over AKP rule do not arise from religion but from economic and political factors. Due to Turkey’s fast growth rate, it has won a third election in a row with an absolute majority. Today, Turkey’s Kemalist heritage of over-centralization plays into the hands of the ruling party. The Turkish Republic has a striking lack of checks and balances both in the center and the provinces. The AKP proves too successful for the old Turkish system, which is in dire need of a democratic constitutional overhaul.

Thumann also said in our interview that perceptions about the AK Party have shifted.

It is widely known now that the AKP is different than Arab Islamist parties. The negative view regarding the AK Party has changed in that it is now perceived as a party with authoritarian tendencies trying to monopolize power in Turkey. In this respect, it is interesting to observe how the views of the opposition parties have influenced Western perceptions.

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PROFILE

Michael Thumann

He has been the Middle East bureau chief for the liberal-centrist German weekly Die Zeit in İstanbul since September 2007 and has been reporting on the region since 2002. Previously, he was the foreign editor for the same paper in Hamburg, and from 1996 to 2001, he reported on Russia and Central Asia as the Moscow bureau chief. During the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, he worked as Die Zeit's correspondent for Southeastern Europe. For his new book he did additional research as a Bosch public policy fellow at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, D.C. His books include "Das Lied von der russischen Erde. Moskaus Ringen um Einheit und Größe" (The Song of the Russian Earth. Moscow's Struggle for Unity and Greatness, 2002); "La puissance russe: un puzzle à reconstituer?" (The Russian Power: Can it be put together again? 2003); and "Der Islam und der Westen. Säkularisierung und Demokratie im Islam" (Islam and the West. Secularization and Democracy in the Islamic World, 2003).