Arab Spring visit promises Turkey is back in the game

The emerging order, or lack of it, in the Arab Spring countries has hit all global actors but had more profound effects on Turkey, which has, in every sense, striven to be a close and trustworthy neighbor to those countries that were part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries. Turkish foreign policy since the collapse of the empire has inevitably been shaped with regards to developments in neighboring countries of the Near East, depending on where its priorities lay, but also on where it felt mostly at home, with family.

The Arab Spring, in that regard, promised the opportunity for mending the ties once severed when Turkey was pushed out of the area, first by ex-colonizers of Europe, then by the strongmen the world today calls dictators, who were once instrumental in saving those countries from Western exploitation. Turkey traditionally shied away from involvement that required ruthless competition with Western or Eastern powers, but the current government policies shine with a never before seen self-assuredness that shows Turkey will either be a part of the new order, or put up a fight that will give its rivals a good run for their money. When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan embarked on Tuesday on a tour of the freshly out-of-revolt countries of North Africa, accompanied by hundreds of colleagues and businessmen, the media reverberated with reports that he had received a hero’s welcome from the people. Erdoğan was greeted with a sense of enthusiasm no leader in the region had enjoyed for decades. He repeatedly called on the Arab countries to unite and bury the hatchet to avoid the risks of the current absence of strong ties, while his words clearly included a subtext that Turkey saw itself as being a part of the new, hopefully democratic but still Islamic-rooted, union of Arab countries.

Erdoğan’s words also received popular backing in Turkey. The change in Turkish foreign policy has been evolving in parallel with public opinion, as surveys show that Turkey no longer wants to be a lone wolf. The results of the Transatlantic Trends 2011, an annual German Marshall Fund-sponsored opinion poll, on Wednesday indicated the same tendency toward cooperative politics among the Turkish public. The poll suggested that 43 percent of Turks in 2009 believed their country should act alone. The figure dropped to 34 percent in 2010, and eventually fell to 27 percent this year. But the idea of cooperation with others did not include the European Union or the United States; the public preferred cooperation with Middle Eastern countries.

Taking sides

What observers say regarding Turkish initiatives in the region reflects the change of mood in Turkish foreign policy but also highlights the cost of decisive action for a country that has to tread carefully not to upset the balance. Mehmet Ali Tuğtan, an academic from the international relations department of İstanbul Bilgi University, addressed the change as an issue of seeking involvement versus leadership, which he believed was a big decision for Turkey with far-reaching consequences. “Previously, Turkey was involved in the region, but not a party in the developing crises,” said Tuğtan in an e-mail interview with Sunday’s Zaman earlier this week. “Turkish leaders believed that taking sides and seeking leadership would cause Turkey’s relations with either its neighbors or with the West to deteriorate,” Tuğtan suggested in belief that after 2007, when EU negotiations stalled and the US was in need of Turkish support for its policies in Afghanistan and Iraq, the country was more comfortable with taking sides and vying for leadership in the region. But naturally, well-defined policies that clearly outlined rights and wrongs bore consequences for the country, and Tuğtan claimed it was Israel that went down the drain, a price the government was willing to pay. Erdoğan’s popularity in the region, particularly among the politically active Muslim youth who welcomed the Turkish leader at Cairo Airport in a display of admiration and approval for his policies, undeniably ties in with his row with Israel. Erdoğan fired up ministers at an Arab League meeting in Cairo on Tuesday, and probably millions of viewers from around the world, with a speech that was punctuated with applause every time the leader poked Israel where it hurt the most: its growing isolation in a region that might grow more hostile in the wake of the Arab Spring. Erdoğan spoke of the imminent threat facing Israel in that it might alienate itself even further when he said Israel was not capable of interpreting the changes in the region. The Turkish government’s reaction to Israel escalated in early September with powerful public backing as Turkey hit Israel with sanctions, which foresaw a sharp drop in diplomatic ties and a freeze in all military deals.

Regional equation

But not everybody thinks the current Turkish-Israeli crisis or the ensuing sanctions provide enough data to analyze the relations in a way that makes sense in academic terms. İnan Rüma, vice chairperson of the department of international relations at İstanbul Bilgi University, stated that one has to keep in mind “a multidimensional and complicated regional equation” when viewing the Turkish-Israeli rift, in an e-mail correspondence with Sunday’s Zaman earlier this week. Calling the current war of words between politicians from both sides a “mere daily rhetoric,” Rüma pointed out in words that highlighted the possibility that the current aggressive mood might be aimed at pleasing governments’ grass roots in both Turkey and Israel, as he cited the intact trade relations between countries’ elites despite the hell that has broken loose. Rüma’s words came in affirmation of the possibility that on an insider’s level, what happens between Israel and Turkey might be around the limits of “tough love,” aimed at coercing each other to submit to the other, with divorce not being an option for a turbulent marriage. “One has to pay attention to a very basic distinction between state and government, and also the personal level,” Rüma suggested, as he added that politicians may behave differently when state tradition was in question and that the Israel-Turkey issue was not the only example where personal choices affected a country’s policies as a whole. But the chances of success in the event Erdoğan decides to pursue a leading role in the region, depends not only on the approval of the Arab world but also on “whether the US is willing to relax its long-standing ‘Israel first’ policy,” Tuğtan contributed to the argument, highlighting the complexity of matters that looked rather simple at the onset.

An older brother in the family

Although it is no secret that Erdoğan’s strong image in the foreign political scene overshadows the country’s aspirations in the region, the absence of a strong Arab leader in the Middle East and the current political environment make it easy to accommodate Erdoğan’s charisma as the crowds adore him. Having emerged victorious in all the three elections since he entered the Turkish political scene, and with an increased public backing every single time, Erdoğan’s strong rhetoric and charm seem to work at both the domestic and international level. Analyzing Erdoğan’s attitude and gestures in last week’s appearances in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, a political communication expert and an academic in the faculty of communication of Erciyes University, Ahmet Öztekin, stated that Erdoğan was not going for the leader image but rather for a “caring older brother” role that tries to keep the family together and unites it around common goals. “In the current environment there is a serious absence of a strong leading figure in the region,” Öztekin said in an interview with Sunday’s Zaman earlier this week, as he expressed the belief that the Arab countries were currently devoid of a strong person who has the merits and image of a convincing leader.

Viewing Erdoğan’s constant appearance in the Arab media and the frequency of visits from Turkey to the Arab Spring countries in a positive light, Öztekin summarized what might be the heart of Turkish policy of visibility in the region. “One that is close in sight is also close to the heart,” the academic said of the apparent improvement of ties between the Arab world and Turkey, but he also warned that Arab leaders may not be too happy about Erdoğan’s current pull on Arab youth and his position as a new and admired role model.

Whether the new Turkish investment in the region catches on or fades off as competition heats up among world powers depends on many factors, but a Turkish foreign policy that strives to be the interlocutor in global matters is sure to look for comfortable alliances with strong regional and global actors. A leader or a friend, Turkey looks to be in the family regardless.