Iran: Troubled neighbor or serious threat?
by Ferhad Mehdiyev & Zaur Shiriyev*

The general’s statement has destabilized Iranian-Azerbaijani relations and sparked serious concern in Azerbaijan. Firouzabadi warned the Azerbaijani president of a “dark and uncertain future” and the revolt of “100,000 [men] in Aran” (the south-central area of Azerbaijan). This threat virtually coincided with President Ilham Aliyev’s reception of ambassadors and heads of mission from Muslim countries in Baku, to mark the holy month of Ramadan on Aug. 11.

Azerbaijan has opened a political dialogue with Iran. The Foreign Ministry (MFA) has sent a letter of protest to Tehran, and several government officials have directly accused Tehran of interfering in Azerbaijani domestic affairs. In addition, the MFA has demanded that Iran refrain from making such inflammatory accusations, take immediate action to prevent anything similar from happening again, and to clarify Firouzabadi’s remarks. The head of the Azerbaijani presidential administration’s foreign relations department, Novruz Mammadov, has said that “Azerbaijan has built and developed its ties with Iran based on the principles of neighborliness, friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation.”

While this is a troubling development, it is not entirely surprising. The recent allegations reflect a continuation and intensification of the policy Iran adopted last December. This is exacerbated by competition for ownership of the state between factions of Iran’s ruling elite: Statements of aggression towards a Muslim neighbor could stimulate a tense debate, which could be helpful to the mullahs’ regime to divert increasing international interest in domestic politics in Tehran. At the moment, there is a powerful and growing belief in the Middle East that Syria, one of Tehran’s regional allies against the US, is increasingly politically divided that and Turkey is gaining influence throughout the Middle East. Tehran is keen to exploit the unrest in Syria as a means of distracting the international media from the domestic situation in Iran. US sanctions are likely to compound the regime’s problems, despite statements to the opposite effect made by senior Iranian officials. If anything, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s behavior since taking office demonstrates that he is unlikely to make concessions on regional issues in the event of US sanctions.

However, a local analyst in Baku takes a different view of recent events. Commenting on Firouzabadi’s statements, Azerbaijani Member of Parliament Fazil Mustafa argues that “the Iranian general hates Khomenei and the Iranian regime most of all, and so his statement can be seen a sign of aggression motivated by a hatred of the Iranian regime.” On the other hand, this seems like more than a “struggle between Iranian elites,” given that this is not the first time Firouzabadi has displayed antipathy towards Azerbaijan. He visited Azerbaijan in June 2009 on behalf of Ahmadinejad, in an attempt to prevent the planned visit of the Israeli president, informing Baku that Iran wanted the meeting to be cancelled. When Iran recalled its ambassador from Baku, Azerbaijan made clear that it will not tolerate interference with internal affairs. The head of the political analysis and information department at the Azerbaijani presidential administration, Elnur Aslanov, gave an interview to local news agency Mediaforum on June 23, 2009, in which he said that Iran must demand that Armenia liberate the occupied Azerbaijani territories and refrain from interfering with domestic issues in Azerbaijan. Now tensions are increasing, and there is cause for serious concern.

It does not take a genius to guess that Iran has an interest in exploiting any unrest or instability in Azerbaijan, to increase its influence in the country. However, unlike Iran, Azerbaijan’s population is predominantly secular and therefore less responsive to Tehran’s traditional political tools. Iran is using radical groups and the Islamic political party along with religious and educational institutions to speak out against the Azerbaijani government. When tensions rose between Baku and Tehran due to protests by the Islamic party in Azerbaijan last December, triggered by a change in dress code for secondary school students, Iranian clerics and officials voiced their criticism. These statements increased the tension during the protests.

Afterwards, amid statements of friendship by Iranian officials, local analysts make clear that they distrust Iranian claims of a “constructive position” or intentions of “friendship.”

Some analysts said that to pander to Iran’s demands to restore the right to wear the hijab would defy Azerbaijan’s Islamic heritage.

Tehran continued to say that “not [all] Iranian comments reflect Tehran’s official opinion.” It’s clear that Tehran sees Azerbaijan’s secular regime, and the greater liberty its population enjoys, as a threat to the mullahs’ regime. A lot of Iranian citizens travel to Azerbaijan every year, where they are able to enjoy the freedoms they are denied in Iran. 

Iran also appears to be expressing its anger through Sahar TV, an Iranian network which broadcasts in Azeri. Its programs regularly contain criticism of Azerbaijani policies. In the meantime, Iranian TV has announced its own version of “supporting Muslim solidarity,” emphasizing their long-term goal to “wipe out the Zionists.” Sahar TV is often described as “the spokesman who says everything that the Iranian government is too afraid to say directly.” Even a fleeting glance at the pro-government Iranian media shows that Azerbaijan is being insulted and denigrated with worrying regularity. The Azerbaijani authorities are accused of encouraging separatism, abandoning Islam and advancing contacts with the West, particularly with the United States and Israel. Tehran lacks any evidence to support claims of “insubordinate activities” by Azerbaijan against Iran. This is despite Azerbaijan’s negotiation of the ongoing controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program: Baku has been caught in a careful balancing act in implementing sanctions against Tehran, but it did not sign the UN Security Council Resolution last June, a measure that imposed additional sanctions on Iran for failing to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear research program.

Aware of the grave consequences, Iran tries to present itself as an advocate of a religion, which provokes this question in Baku: Why does the Iranian regime support Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territories? Iran’s officials and former civil servants frequently make statements in support of the development of Iranian-Armenian relations. These statements reflect anxiety about the arms build-up in the region and the risk that the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict will result in a new war. There are accusations against Azerbaijan for developing its military industry. Iran’s relations with Armenia tend to demonstrate that Tehran’s priority in the region is to promote its national interests rather than advance any “religious dogmatism.” Tehran’s foreign policy perceives the weakening of Azerbaijan as useful for Iranian national interests, and therefore it has pursued a policy of tacit support for Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

This assessment demonstrates how important it is for the international community to seek to defuse tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan. There is a serious possibility that the issue between the two countries will one day feature prominently in the news.