Serbia and Kosovo revisited, but as belligerent sides
by Hajrudin Somun*

My young British colleague Tim Judah was more cautious, saying the talks could “in theory, make a real difference in people’s lives.” However, what happened at border crossings between Kosovo and Serbia last week proved that “in practice” much more political good will, compromise and patience as well as more favorable circumstances are needed to make people living in both countries, and in particular those in northern Kosovo, experience a closer, conciliatory and more cooperative life. Though it happened in a very small space and lasted only three days, it involved not only Serbia and Kosovo but the highest United Nation’s body, the US and European Union politics, and NATO’s military mechanism. An analogy with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and considerations on possible regional territorial compensations were also revived. Even Turkey’s policy towards Kosovo was questioned by some of the locals.

The worst incident since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 as well as all tension between the two countries arises from two major problems: The first is Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo and the second is the unsolved status of the northern part of Kosovo. That small territory of around 1,200 square kilometers, 11 percent of the country, is inhabited by around 70,000 people, 95 percent of them Kosovar Serbs. Ninety percent of Kosovo’s population of 2 million are ethnic Albanians. Although many Kosovar Serbs who live in other parts of the country join the Kosovar Albanians in the country’s institutions, those Serbs from north of the Ibar River still do not accept Kosovo as their country and distrust Kosovar Albanians. With separating from Kosovo and joining Serbia proper as their final aim, they created their own local authorities, courts and police, supported and supplied from Belgrade. Serbia, in any case, still considers the whole of Kosovo as its province. The Kosovar government, on the other hand, strictly rejects partition of the country and seeks to integrate the northern country’s corner, rich in mineral and water resources, and to control the border with Serbia. The whole of Kosovo is still under the control of NATO forces going under the name KFOR.

This short reminder of the facts was needed to make it clear why in the last days of July armored units of Kosovo’s special police force took over the so-called Gate 31, one of two border crossings to Serbia, and why local Serbs, around 50 of them masked and armed, put roadblocks, preventing Kosovar police from approaching the second crossing, Gate 1. In the violence that ensued, one of the border gates was set on fire and one Kosovar policeman was killed. KFOR intervened to protect its soldiers, civilians and property. The US and German contingents secured the area around the border gates.

700 additional soldiers to Kosovo

In addition to the 6,000 troops already there, NATO was requested to send a further 700 soldiers to Kosovo. KFOR agreed with the Serbian government, representing the Kosovar Serbs, saying control of the two border crossings should be maintained by NATO troops, roadblocks are to be removed and the limited free movement of people and humanitarian goods is to be re-established. The Kosovar government rejected the deal, stating decisively that “there will be no return to the situation prior to July 25.” The people in the area continue to live in fear of a new wave of violence. Kosovar Serbs turned against KFOR, accusing its forces of helping the Kosovar police get to the border posts. They started to send their children to Serbia, expecting that “[Kosovar Prime Minister Hashim] Thaci will send his people again.”

Thaci for Serbs is a synonym for the whole of Kosovo that they are losing and is held responsible for launching this new crisis as well. He accused the Kosovar Serb police of not implementing a reciprocal ban on goods entering Kosovo from Serbia and of acting as a parallel security force “taking orders from Belgrade.” Thus, he justified the forceful taking over of the border crossings, citing economic reasons; i.e., Kosovo replied using the same measures to Serbia’s decision to not allow the import of any goods bearing Kosovo customs stamps. Kosovo’s move, however, is primarily a political one. By preventing the supply of goods and food from Serbia to the local Serbs, the Kosovar government created a chaotic social and humanitarian situation in that northern enclave that has already became a paradise for criminals and smugglers from both sides. Prime Minister Thaci to all appearance wants to impose conditions in which the US and the European Union would force Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence and to not oppose the integration of the disputed northern area to Kosovo’s full sovereignty and control.

It seems, however, that Thaci has chosen the wrong time and means to achieve that. He incited Serbian nationalists against any compromise over the Kosovo cause and provoked anti-Serb tempers among his own extreme Albanian nationalists. That is why Belgrade’s arguments of new tensions with Kosovo were accepted internationally with more understanding than those of Pristina. It was there as a move to postpone Serbia’s EU accession process just after it fulfilled one of two main conditions for further talks by arresting and extraditing to The Hague the last Serbs accused of war crimes and genocide in Bosnia and Croatia. The normalization of relations with Kosovo was expected as a new step. The Serbian parliament adopted a resolution accusing Kosovar authorities, and especially Prime Minister Thaci, of “threatening peace, stability and the possibility of finding a compromise.” Speaking in parliament, Serbian President Boris Tadic said with resentment that “Serbia will not wage a war,” but he also stressed that “Serbia will not agree to any change in the north of Kosovo and Metohija, nor to any blackmail related to European integration.”

US administration not happy

It seems as well that the US administration, which usually gives unquestioned support to Kosovo, was not happy with the new situation there. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Countryman denied that “Washington had known about or approved the operation of Kosovo’s special police” to take control of border points. EULEX Kosovo, the EU Rule of Law Mission, was confused, signaling concerns from Brussels over the escalation of tensions. Robert Cooper, the EU mediator in the technical talks which resulted in the first Serbia-Kosovo agreement a month ago, flew from Belgrade to Pristina only to be disappointed by Thaci’s rejection of a new deal. In such circumstances there is no room for a new reconciliatory initiative. It is interesting that in such situations Kosovar Serbs not only renew their anti-American, anti-NATO, anti-Albanian sentiments but their anti-Turkish feelings as well. They probably oppose in advance a possible mediating effort by Turkey in Belgrade on the Kosovo issue. Dragan Krstic, a Kosovar Serb journalist, recently wrote: “Turkey is currently [Serbia’s] enemy and has been for centuries. It supported the split of [Serbia] and now supports corrupt politicians in Pristina through the development of highways and airports.”

The role of Turkey in the Balkans is regarded in the same way by the majority of Kosovar Serbs and Bosnian Serbs. However, there is something else, also connected to Bosnia but not solely, that I want to emphasize on this occasion. It is the status quo of Kosovo’s north that Kosovar Serbs and Serbia are striving to uphold as long as possible and the Kosovar government’s efforts -- however unfortunate -- to change it.

Some people compare the situation in the north of Kosovo with Cyprus, but with the tables turned. Florian Bieber from the University of Graz in Austria argues that a parallel can be drawn between the crisis in Kosovo and the one in Georgia in 2008 but that the impact in north Kosovo still remains to be seen. “In both cases,” he stresses, “a government sought to change the status quo with a unilateral move without consulting its allies, or against their advice. The government might be formally right to take control of its territory, but it seems like an unwise move, which escalates tensions and might actually backfire.” Agreeing with this knowledgeable Balkan expert, particularly in light of the reserved US stance on Kosovo’s move, I would broaden the approach to the status quo by reviving an old thesis that I developed during my extensive stay in the Middle East as a correspondent and later adapted to the situation in my own country, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There are significant differences but also similarities between Kosovo’s north and Bosnia’s integral part that is Republika Srpska. Northern Kosovo has no demarcation lines or official status and exists, according to the International Crisis Group’s characterization, “under dual sovereignty, Kosovo’s and Serbia’s.” Republika Srpska, which covers almost half of Bosnia, has, in accordance with the Dayton Agreement, an internationally confirmed status as one of the country’s two entities. Both northern Kosovo and Republika Srpska are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Serbs. The problem starts with nationalism, in both cases Serbian. Unhappy that a Greater Serbia was not created out of the ashes of the former Yugoslavia, manipulating the nationalist myths and feelings of the masses and supported by the Serbian Orthodox Church, Serb nationalists continue, in peace, to strive to achieve what they failed to achieve through war, ethnic cleansing and genocide in the last two decades. That is why the leadership of both Republika Srpska and Kosovo’s northern region still regards Serbia proper as their homeland and Belgrade as the capital that might become their own as well. However unrealistic today, the idea of compensation is also considered from time to time: getting half of Bosnia to compensate Serbia for losing Kosovo and -- considering what is going on in Kosovo today -- getting the northern part of Kosovo as a possible compensation for the recognition of Kosovo.

Aware that such goals are not possible to achieve under the circumstances prevalent in the world today -- NATO’s bombardment of Serbia in 1999 serves as a lesson -- Serb leaders in Republika Srpska and those of the region north of the River Ibar in Kosovo, still supported by nationalist parties and nationalist circles from Serbia, spare no effort or means to maintain the status quo in their “dukedoms.” To illustrate such an attitude, let me quote Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska, who recently said, “Republika Srpska will, by all means, defend its Dayton position,” adding that “Bosnia and Herzegovina will never recognize Kosovo.”

And where is the Middle East in all of this? I learned in the Middle East what I have since seen in Bosnia and Kosovo: If someone maintains the status quo for as long as possible, the actual and the desired situations change from de facto to de jure. This is accepted under all local legal and international laws, from Roman times up until today. I would not go with examples from distant areas such as Kashmir or Timor, but it is exactly what happened in the Middle East. Today, everyone -- President Barack Obama, the Arab states and the Palestinian National Authority -- calls for the Palestinian state to have borders based on the cease-fire lines from the 1967 war. No one, not even the more radical Palestinians, mentions the Palestinian territories that Israel occupied in the first war with the Arabs in 1948.