Behind Öcalan's ambitions
by Haluk Özdalga*

This time, however, the violence is to seek a different end; the major aim of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) assaults now seems to be in order to make Abdullah Öcalan an official participant in negotiations with the Turkish state. Öcalan believes that his occasional meetings with state officials come up short and that he should instead negotiate with political representatives authorized at the highest level. Furthermore, the key expectation Öcalan and the PKK hold for such negotiations is a change in status for Öcalan; in other words, the initial downgrading of his imprisonment to house arrest, leading ultimately to his release.

Öcalan and the PKK

When he was captured in February 1999, Öcalan made an all-out effort to ensure he would not be executed. He made a number of interesting remarks at that time: "I love this country," "My mother is a Turk," "I am ready to do any service to the state they ask of me" and "From now on I will live only for peace." As Turkey has not executed anyone since 1984, it was when Öcalan realized he could avoid execution that he shifted tactics slightly. Now, he would try to ensure his release in return for arranging a permanent ceasefire with the PKK. To achieve this, he first needed to prove that he was still in control of the PKK despite being in prison at a time when they refused to lay down arms.

Shortly after his sentence was handed down by the court in June 1999, he asked the PKK to leave Turkey. Though they suffered heavy losses during their withdrawal, this difficult decision was respected by PKK militants. In fact, many disagreed with his directive, but dissident militants were effectively eliminated. Since 2002, when the death penalty was abolished in Turkey, there has been practically no risk of Öcalan being executed. Despite this development, Öcalan failed to gain the seat at the negotiating table he so craved. So in 2004, he ordered the resumption of the armed struggle. This time it was PKK members in favor of a democratic solution who were strongly opposed to his plan, but their numbers were few. The opposition was again eliminated, and Öcalan's orders were followed.

As a secondary consequence of these two major developments and eliminations, Öcalan has grown even more influential within the PKK. By wielding this influence, he has since used the terrorist PKK as a trump card in negotiations with the state in order to attain his personal goals. Of course, not everything the PKK does is under Öcalan's full control, but the PKK taking any significant step without his approval is unthinkable. Shortly after the escalation of attacks this July, Öcalan again made bold statements arguing that he – and only he – could put an end to the violence in a single week. To put it another way: It is now quite clear who is responsible for the bloodshed we have seen. A while ago, Öcalan announced a roadmap for a lasting resolution -- a plan which readers can find on the Internet. Missing from this roadmap are any concrete demands for the recognition of Kurdish rights and freedoms. It does not declare any ambitious goals such as the creation of a federation or instatement of autonomy. In addition to his mild formulations, Öcalan says he is not insistent on any issue and that he is open to discuss anything. In fact, the roadmap does cover one strategically significant issue: his position and status as a prisoner.

Political monopoly through violence

Another key aspect in the current crossroads is that Öcalan and the PKK now want to control Kurdish politics through violence, especially in light of the possibility that hostilities could cease and help to usher in an era of democratic politics in Turkey. In the general elections this June, the PKK worked ruthlessly to guarantee the defeat of its rivals in traditional PKK strongholds. Particularly in rural areas, they relentlessly intimidated voters. They committed numerous bomb attacks on their rivals' campaign offices. They even kidnapped the son of a mayor and threatened to kill him.

Their propensity for violence is not limited to the campaign season. For instance, they often threaten to kill Kurdish intellectuals who do not share their views. Concerning their so-called democratic autonomy program -- the content of which reveals their intellectual poverty -- some PKK spokespersons proclaimed they would implement it by force and in defiance of existing law. However, no popularly elected government will negotiate with Öcalan as a political player. In addition, no elected government will tolerate a single-party administration based on the use of force in a particular region and in opposition to the existing pluralistic democracy in the rest of the country.

BDP and Sinn Fein

Another option under discussion recently is the acceptance of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) as a party to the negotiations. Proponents of this option cite the negotiations and final deal in the 1990s between the British government and Sinn Fein to address terrorism issues in Northern Ireland. It has also been suggested that there is some similarity between the PKK-BDP duo and the IRA-Sinn Fein one. However, this is a false analogy simply because, unfortunately, we lack a Kurdish political party that bears any resemblance to Sinn Fein. In some ill-considered statements, it has also been argued that Sinn Fein is the political wing of the IRA terrorist organization. However, this can only be true in the very broad sense that the major ideological nourishment of these two organizations is Irish nationalism. Sinn Fein is an independent party which is not under the control or manipulation of the IRA; it has the ability to make its own decisions and take actions independently. Moreover, before the negotiations of the mid-'90s began, the IRA unconditionally announced it would not resort to violence. If we really need an analogy, we should go back many decades, as the BDP certainly has more in common with the old Agitprop (agitation and propaganda) Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party.

What should we do now?

Today, Turkish democracy has reached a more advanced stage. Öcalan and the PKK need to give up, unconditionally, the armed struggle and their ambition to hold a political monopoly based on violence in some parts of the country. If they refuse, there is a proper response to this: While the greatest emphasis is put on democratic reforms, there must be an equally strong emphasis on combating terrorism and violence. Turkey has seen remarkable reforms in recent years, but much still remains undone.

The fundamental factor in winning the war on terrorism will be the decisive implementation of reforms in the areas of law and democracy. Barriers to the use of the Kurdish language remain, including time restrictions on radio and TV broadcasts, mandatory subtitles for these broadcasts, and the hurdles to launch Kurdish language centers in vocational schools. Turkish will, of course, remain the official language of this country. However, we must plan for the transition to the use of two languages in public services in some parts of the country. It is unreasonable to deprive Kurds of education in their native tongue while non-Muslim minorities enjoy this right. Linguistic reforms are a very sensitive issue, and to implement them successfully we will need a well-planned transition period. Local administrations should have greater latitude. Freedom of expression should also be expanded in light of such recent cases as the person who shouted "Biji serok Apo" (“long live leader Apo,” meaning Öcalan) being sentenced to over 10 years in prison. Such a harsh sentence, which benefits no one but the PKK, is simply indefensible.

Should terrorism and violence continue, we must mount an effective response. Our troops have fought terrorism with courage and dedication, and they have celebrated impressive successes. Yet there are some flaws in the command and management of the war against terrorism. Different approaches are clearly needed. Yes, the PKK wages terrorism against civilians, but its fundamental strategy is classic guerilla (Spanish for “small war”) warfare. In guerilla warfare, a reliance on conventional military methods will not yield the best results. Surprisingly, however, in discussions of the fight against terrorism in the memoirs of some former Turkish commanders, mention of the concept of guerilla warfare is nowhere to be found.

The elements and components of guerilla and anti-guerilla warfare are well known; there is vast literature on the subject. In brief, anti-guerilla warfare is conducted by small units of combatants who have been strictly trained for special operations. They are very familiar with the physical and human aspects of local conditions and so are able to stay in the field for long periods to chase guerillas and keep them constantly on the move. Contrary to some common concerns, anti-guerilla warfare has nothing to do with the special operation units we had in the 1990s. In anti-guerilla warfare, larger units and conventional warfare techniques are employed only in cases where there are large concentrations of combat guerillas (as in northern Iraq). In those cases, it would be prudent to rely on the principles of the Powell Doctrine, including the deployment of extensive military intervention. Finally, we should let the democratically elected civilian government have full control over all aspects of the situation, including key military decisions.

*Haluk Özdalga is a Justice and Development Party (AK Party) deputy in Ankara.