Recalling that one politician’s reference to the Stockholm Syndrome is a syndrome in itself, former dean of the faculty of communications at Gazi University Bostancı gave an exclusive interview to Today’s Zaman.
Parliament did not get off to a good start after a successful election; do you think that the boycott undermined this success?
Turkey is not the old Turkey anymore. The Turkish voters have achieved a delicate balance between fairness in representation and stability in the government. This is not something that is easily achieved, maintaining balance between fair representation and administrative stability. These were achieved in the recent election by an 87 percent voter turnout and a 95 percent voter representation in Parliament (meaning that only 5 percent of the votes went to parties that are not represented in Parliament) and 50 percent of popular support for the political administration.
Stability and fair representation have been achieved in Turkey in 2011. It is true that there have been attempts to undermine this success. However, the strengthening democracy of Turkey and the wisdom of the public made sure that these attempts were aborted.
Why such a crisis?
We can explain this with the recent change Turkish politics has been going through. This is not something that took place over night. In essence, Turkey is becoming more democratic, modern and urbanized.
The sociological change is also transforming the political power relations in Turkey as well. In a closed society, the power relations of the political sphere are not expected to overlap with social demands. The actors of the power relations are bureaucratic elites, rather than people authorized by the voters. The original power holders in such societies are privileged elites.
But elections have been held as part of the multiparty political life since 1946.
True, the people have gone to the ballot boxes since 1946 to elect their deputies; however, these deputies have often failed to truly represent the people because they were not allowed to act freely. They had to stay in touch with certain circles and advance through the course or path these circles identified. Those who failed to do so were removed from the political stage. This is one of the reasons for the military coups. The last intervention on Feb. 28 is now referred to as a postmodern coup. There are also ongoing investigations into other coup attempts after that.
How does it feel to be “stronger” than those whose power is based on popular choice?
The top bureaucracy and the traditional economic elites holding the greatest share of power while their rule is not based on the people, the intellectuals alienated from the people and the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which aligned with these circles, have assumed such superiority over many years.
This is a longstanding assumption of power then?
One of the most significant references in the CHP’s codes is the feeling of political superiority independent of the quantitative majority. In the 1980s, Bülent Ecevit made a slogan out of it, saying, “Maybe our quantitative majority does not suffice, but our political power is above everything.” This has been the case up until recently. The CHP has assumed power thanks to its cooperation with the bureaucracy and traditional economic elites. In the modern and urbanized Turkey, it has become evident that political power requires a quantitative majority. The CHP now realizes that it cannot hold onto power through its old methods. If coming to power requires ballot support, the CHP now has to accomplish this. The CHP realizes the need for change in this era.
Did the new CHP come out of necessity?
The CHP has, up until recently, been a party that sided with those who lost in power struggles; the CHP represented a political inclination to seek power in cooperation with the bureaucracy and former traditional elites. The “new” here means that acquiring power is not possible through former relations. Considering that the only source of power is the ballot, the CHP defined itself as a new CHP. To this end, it also took some actions, replacing the party chairman and articulating a new discourse.
Did the oath crisis unfold under this psychology?
Yes, we see that very clearly. The sentiment, “If I do not take the oath, there will be a system crisis and all will be mobilized to ensure that I take it,” led them to adopt this policy. However, the actual power of the CHP is proportionate to its quantitative representation. In a democratized Turkey, the power of a political party is proportionate to its quantitative power. It is no longer possible to conclude, “Regardless of the election results, I will have the power.”
Is not it odd to see the reality of the new CHP on the one hand and an oath crisis on the other?
This is very tragic. The CHP attends Parliament; however, they bind themselves so they cannot speak. The irony here is that two are under arrest by court order and the CHP appeals this, arguing that popular choice cannot be placed under arrest. Interestingly, by not taking the oath, they are doing the same thing that the court order did. They are doing the same. They are promoting an action that actually justifies the court order.
However, in politics, you talk to the people, you negotiate and discuss, you ask people to elect you so that you can resolve their problems in Parliament. Their approach of skipping the fundamental contract and resorting to extreme actions is caused by the political power syndrome that still exists.
Are not they right in their argument of popular choice?
The CHP is arguing that popular choice is under arrest. However, they are trying to take the AK Party’s support base hostage as if support for the AK Party were not popular choice. You see, if popular choice is unquestionable for two persons, is the 50 percent vote for the AK Party not popular choice, also? Should they not be respectful? How can they argue that the system is deadlocked and Parliament unable to work unless their deputies are allowed to attend Parliament?
The CHP strategy fails because they do not plan their next move while making the current one. This is a strategy destined to fail. Besides, despite the fact that they were asked about their offer to address problems, they referred to the prime minister and the AK Party as those responsible for resolving issues. This is a party that cannot find common ground within itself for a resolution.
The AK Party did not make the move the CHP asked; they even argued that the CHP would eventually back down. Did this not complicate the situation?
There is a problem between the CHP and the judiciary. The judiciary has made a decision under the existing legislation. How would you respond to the demands of a party that views this as an outcome of the AK Party’s enmity and animosity? Tension escalated further when they sought to take popular will hostage through illegal actions. There is no Turkey where such illegal acts will work. They have to realize this by now.
Is it so hard to appreciate and acknowledge the change?
The CHP administration lacks the proper data and information on the new outlook of Turkey. They rely on discussing this outlook through the discourse of the AK Party and the prime minister alone. If they realize that Turkey has been urbanized and that the Turkish people are now aware of what is going on and are asking for their rights, they would think twice before adopting such a method.
Well, we call democracy a regime of rules. If you receive 25.9 percent of the vote, then you are not ordinary people on the street. You have to attend the parliamentary sessions, where you can raise your objections.
Considering the composition of Parliament, maybe they think that they cannot promote their agenda there.
Is it possible to accept such a defense? They say: “The alignments and blocs are clear; I cannot get what I want.” Then you should resort to arbitration by the people, asking for further support. If your strategy is worth it, the people will extend the necessary endorsement and support.
If they do not, you cannot get the support the nation did not give you by relying on blackmailing. It is not possible to be part of democracy by suggesting that you are always right and that you can paralyze the system when the people do not support you.
It seems that both the CHP and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) will attend Parliament and take oaths.
The administration may commit mistakes, but it cannot do so independent of the support base. I would not think that the collective mind of the CHP would allow this boycott of taking oaths. This is a traditional party with a long history that we are talking about. People see everything. I think that the CHP’s points of reference, which I am familiar with, would not allow the party administration to keep this stance. Who could argue that an action and protest modeled after the 1968 student protests that took place in Turkey, is a discourse that holds the promise of resolving a crisis in Turkey?
What sort of language would you use?
The discourse that will resolve the crisis is this: you stage your protest in a hall, and at least some people in another hall would find this protest reasonable. You present your case so eloquently that even those who did not vote for you believe that you are suffering an injustice. It is not possible to generate a solution from the stance [by the CHP] that nothing else is acceptable and that, if need be, oaths will not be taken for another four years.
How would you respond to the CHP leader’s remarks suggesting that Stockholm Syndrome was the reason behind the 50 percent popular support for the AK Party?
A certain group of writers and CHP figures have been blaming the people for the party’s failure to come to power. This is a syndrome the CHP suffers from. It appears that they not only view the Turkish people that way, but also most CHP supporters. “We take decisions and they comply.” If you violate the basic contract [of representing the people] by your actions, then this means that you actually insult the people who voted for your party as well. This is a flawed perspective that insults not only AK Party supporters but also everyone else. This protest implies that the CHP administration accuses its supporters of being ignorant and unaware. If you call the majority of the people “jug-headed” [simpletons] in the end, we are talking about the same people regardless of whether they voted for the CHP or the AK Party. These people share a lot in common in their daily lives. If one group is considered jug-headed, then the others should be the same.
This is a harsh response.
Some CHP members and supporters may see this as a harsh statement. But the CHP sought to pursue a different strategy by ignoring a fundamental contract from the very beginning by refusing to represent people in Parliament while the voters were expecting that the party would adopt a position compatible with these expectations. This is at the very least disrespectful. The CHP is not a marginal party; we are talking about a main opposition party here. We are talking about a party with a strong past and tradition that received 25.9 percent of votes in the recent elections and presented itself as the main actor that founded the republic.
The CHP failed to attract international support out of their attempts.
They cannot because there is not a systematic practice [of discrimination] against the CHP or the BDP. There is legal action that has been taken against some candidates. This is a practice under the laws in effect. The fact these people were nominated does not eliminate the charges against them. The courts hold the discretion to release them. Some party representatives thought that the world would show interest in their case. They expected that the world would react. But then they realized that the world did not care at all.
They also tried sending letters and lobbying abroad. But they could not explain why they did not take the oath. I would understand if you promoted your case in accordance with international norms and through legal means; this would be different. However, it was wrong to seek political support in political venues by setting aside the legalities of the issue.
The BDP has some grounded claims in respect to the Hatip Dicle incident
There is no legal problem with the YSK’s Dicle decision. The BDP nominated a candidate; but his nomination posed some legal challenges. And in the end, he lost his deputy status and the YSK made a decision on this. There are criticisms that the decision came too late and that the conditions for redeeming the damage have been eliminated. I would not say these are insignificant. I always believe that such objections are important. But the remaining part is purely legal. The BDP should make a decision on this: Do we resolve this problem by democratic political means or do we keep violence as an option at all times?
What would you say about the fact that the pro-Kurdish movement has become more hawkish as Turkey makes progress towards democratization?
As Turkey becomes a more democratic country and expands the sphere of freedoms, the actors of this movement seem to have turned into hardliners. Many in Turkey support this argument. A concrete indicator is this: other representatives of the same movement were removed from Parliament in the 1990s even though they wanted to stay. Now, nobody is trying to remove them from office, but they want to throw themselves out. The BDP needs to explain this. In democratizing Turkey, everyone should get rid of their own “syndromes.”
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