Former UN envoy de Soto suggests unilateralism to solve Cyprus impasse

“A very clever thing to do for the Greek Cypriots would be to lift their block over Turkey’s accession. This would remove all the blame on Greek Cyprus for standing in the way of Turkey-EU negotiations. Or other Europeans who are also not in favor of negotiations with Turkey could lift their objections. Or Turkey could enable admission of the Greek Cypriots to Turkish ports and airports. Or the Greek Cyprus could remove itself from being an obstacle to the European Union, which needs to keep its promise to the Turkish Cypriots,” said de Soto for our Monday Talk interview in İstanbul.

Cyprus was split into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south in 1974 when the Turkish militarily intervened after a coup by supporters of Greece. The island joined the European Union in 2004, but only the internationally recognized south enjoys membership benefits. Several UN-mediated attempts at reunification have failed. The dispute has also clouded Turkey’s bid to join the EU. There are other core issues yet to be discussed, including how to settle territorial adjustments and claims on private property lost in the 1974 war.

Answering our questions, de Soto noted that the Cyprus problem is like a padlock requiring four keys to open; and the four keys have to be ready at the same time, but one of them always fails -- Turkey, Greece, Turkish Cypriots or the Greek Cypriots. He told us more about the issue and where the process is heading.

Five UN secretaries-general have dispatched good offices missions to help negotiate the reunification of Cyprus over nearly five decades, but none has yet succeeded. Everyone wonders if there is a way out of deadlock. What is your opinion on this?

What is clear is that until now they have not been able to agree. Basically, there are three options. One is reunification within a federal system -- bi-zonal and bi-communal. The second is continuation of things as they are. The third is some sort of partition. Reunification is obviously a preferred way out. I continue to think that what we produced in 2004 was a formula that could have worked well, but the timing was probably not good. When it comes to partition, it would be extremely difficult not only for the Greek Cypriots but also for the international community to accept; the Security Council has come out very clearly against it, and the continuation of things as they are has been many times declared unacceptable by the Security Council. Nevertheless, it is accepted. It’s a major puzzle, very difficult to solve.

If 2004 was not a good time to solve it, why?

In 2004, on the Greek Cypriot side, it could have gone the other way because one of the political parties that carries a lot of weight hesitated. If it was in favor, it might have been approved. Ultimately, the arguments that were put forward by the Greek Cypriot leader [Tassos Papadopoulos] at the time proved very persuasive, “Why should we accept a compromise that we don’t particularly like when in a few weeks we will be in a position to get a better deal?” So it went in the other direction. Even though it could have gone the other way, the support for a compromise solution on the Greek Cypriot side was never strong, it was soft. There was very little enthusiasm, whereas those who were against were very energetic and campaigned very ably against the plan. Making the case for the plan was much more difficult especially at that moment -- which means that the time that was wasted during the efforts that began at the end of 1999 and ended in Spring of 2004 was extremely costly. The time was wasted essentially because the Turkish Cypriot leader did not like the whole approach; he was able to delay efforts for a very long time. Precious time was lost because the Greek Cypriot leader [Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides] at the time very much wanted a solution. He did his level best. Turkish Cypriots and Turkey lost a very good interlocutor.

Then in April 2005, came pro-EU and pro-unification Talat who was elected president of the Turkish Cypriots replacing 81-year-old Rauf Denktaş. In addition, Talat and Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias had political affinity. They had numerous talks but without a solution to major problems.

That was an opportunity lost. The Turkish side had a good interlocutor. Clerides was a good interlocutor and a pragmatic one beyond the ideological conundrum. In the same way, Talat was a very good interlocutor for the Greek Cypriots. He was very pragmatic. That’s always the problem and that’s why at the UN we compared the Cyprus problem to a padlock requiring four keys to open; and the four keys have to be ready at the same time, but one of them always failed -- Turkey, Greece, Turkish Cypriots or the Greek Cypriots. There is no problem with Greece now.

Are there any carrots left for the Greek Cypriots after their admission to the EU in 2004?

The Greek Cypriots seem to have the pan by the handle because they are in the European Union and they have a government recognized by the entire world. The carrot for the Greek Cypriots is not an immediate, a close one. It is that for the Greeks not only the North of the island but also Turkey are such obvious markets. The Greek Cypriots have demonstrated that they are very good entrepreneurs and very clever. Apart from that, who would benefit most from reunification? It is the Greek Cypriots for obvious reasons. Since you asked about carrots, there is one point that reveals a lot, and it is that the Greek Cypriots who had left property behind in the North and who had something to obtain from reunification voted the same as everybody else. It made no difference to them that they were going to lose the opportunity to recover their property which shows that there is still somewhere a deep, lingering fear of Turkey among the Greek Cypriots, rational or not. I think that Turkey could go a long way to alleviate those fears by making gestures that would be non-costly.

Such as?

That would be up to Turkey of course to decide. But a carrot for the Greek Cypriots would be for Turkey to make absolutely clear in a tangible way that they do not need to be afraid. How to do that? I don’t know. Turkey still has an important military presence there. Even if Turkey confines its military presence to what is allowed under the treaty arrangements of 1960, it would not be really making a significant sacrifice in strategic terms. It’s very difficult, I know, to contemplate doing things unilaterally, but my sense is that the Turkish government has shown the ability, particularly starting in January of 2004, to be bold. I was very impressed when the prime minister declared and repeated subsequently, “We’ll always be one step ahead.” On the other hand, I can understand the reluctance to do anything unilaterally given the remaining suspicion -- the fact that whatever you do, there will be negotiations afterward, and they [Turkish officials] are not prepared to reward Europe, which they believe has not kept its word. Among the Turkish Cypriots, people who are older have a very vivid recollection of the way they were treated by the Greek Cypriots in the early 1960s, and Clerides admitted it. They were very badly treated by the Greek Cypriots, and there are a lot of Greek Cypriots who were badly treated by the invading Turks in 1974. Once you have a memory like that it is not difficult to stimulate it.

Does time work against or for reunification?

Clerides was hoping very much that the nostalgia for a house, an orchard, a beach, etc. in the North would be a strong factor. What you have to worry about is the younger people who have no such memories, no such emotional chords, no such recollections; there are more and more of them, and there are less and less of the older ones. So you don’t have that resource on which to work. Time is not helping. Younger generations might be more prepared to look at more concrete opportunities, like business, but you can’t count on their emotions and their attachments to something in the North; they don’t remember it. The exit polls after the referendum showed that younger people in significant portions were more opposed to the [Annan] plan than their elders.

You don’t seem to be hopeful about a solution to the Cyprus problem.

A golden opportunity was missed. Before the European Union enlargement, you could have a certain leverage over the Greek Cypriots.

It’s a problem for the European Union, isn’t it?

It is a problem for the European Union. There is a deadlock. Turkey is under obligation to extend the customs union to the Republic of Cyprus; it hasn’t done it. Turkey says that it is because the European Union did not keep its promise to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. There has always been a debate that it is better to concentrate on confidence building measures instead of trying to negotiate the substance that goes around in circles, and there has been little progress made. Maybe the mistake is having a reference to them as confidence building measures. Why not call them context changing measures.

What can be done in that regard, would you give us some examples?

A very clever thing to do for the Greek Cypriots would be to lift their block over Turkey’s accession. This would remove all the blame on the Greek Cyprus for standing in the way of Turkey-EU negotiations. Or other Europeans who are also not in favor of negotiations with Turkey could lift their objections. Or Turkey could allow the admission of the Greek Cypriots to Turkish ports and airports. Or the Greek Cyprus could remove itself from being an obstacle to the European Union, which needs to keep its promise to the Turkish Cypriots. If any one of those things can be done unilaterally, it could help things a lot.

UN Secretary-General stated last week that he expects Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to reach an agreement over the future of the divided island of Cyprus by October. Do you think an agreement is likely to be reached by this fall?

I know only too well how difficult it is to discuss in public what transpires in negotiations that must necessarily remain confidential if progress is to be made. Mining the secretary-general’s statement following his meeting with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders yesterday I can identify two positive elements: The leaders have agreed to intensify their efforts, and they have accepted his offer for “enhanced UN involvement” -- whatever that means. These elements are, of course, remedies for failings in the talks under way -- they are intensifying them because they have moved too slowly to date, and they have accepted an enhancement of UN involvement because when left to their own devices the leaders find it difficult to make progress. Indeed, the secretary-general reveals yet again that important areas -- including, reportedly, both territory and property -- remain untouched. Also, by calling upon them to “prepare their communities for the compromises required” he is pointing to the absence of such preparation -- one of the reasons for the rejection by the Greek Cypriots of the 2004 plan. In this light it is hard to see the basis for the secretary-general’s assertion that he has “every expectation that by October the leaders will be able to report that they have reached convergence on all core issues” when he meets them again.

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‘You can’t have peace by ignoring sentiments of Hamas’

You resigned from your last post at the UN in 2007 as the special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, saying that it was because the UN refused to talk with Hamas. This reminds me of the words of some European political observers who say that even though the West has been critical of Turkey because of its talks with Hamas, they are indeed pleased with what Turkey does because Turkey does what most European governments cannot.

That’s exactly the point. Maybe they have to criticize Turkey for some reason but there is a growing realization in Europe that a wrong turn was taken in 2006 by refusing to talk with the legitimately elected Palestinian government and going along with the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Most of the Europeans would imply or privately tell you that it was a mistake. I tried my best to have it changed, and when I wasn’t able to have it changed, I packed. Unless you talk to such a significant and powerful political force, you are condemning the problem to continue. What’s the alternative?

Before the Israeli occupation, the one that began in June of 1967, there was no Hamas, and there was no terrorism against Israeli civilians. Hamas and the violence that ensued in a sense are creatures of the occupation. Unless you actually do something to end the occupation, unless you address the motives that led these people to do those horrible things, it’s almost an invitation for them to continue that.

Starting in 2005, Hamas gave indications that it was prepared to go in the right direction. They agreed to suspend violence against Israel and to participate in elections -- in other words, to fight via democracy. They are now openly talking about a two-state solution within the June ‘67 borders, and there hasn’t been an attack of the kind that you saw some 10 years ago for a long time. Obviously you could work with these people. The idea that telling Fatah that it can either make peace with Hamas or make peace with Israel is a false choice. You can’t have a lasting peace by ignoring the sentiments of Hamas.

You have to have them on board.

Are you hopeful for a solution?

I’m not very hopeful right now. A serious opportunity was missed.

I’d like to ask your opinion about the Arab Spring.

Egypt has helped to entrench and preserve the Palestinian division, and it has helped to maintain the blockade of Gaza. This was partly because they wanted to have good relations with Israel, and they are a close ally of the United States. But under the Mubarak regime, the Muslim Brotherhood was portrayed as the equivalent of Hamas or al-Qaeda. And all of a sudden in early February, in desperation, they decided to bring about a political dialogue in order to find a solution to the problem of this insurgency in Tahrir Square. And who do you have? One chair away from Omar Suleiman [former intelligence chief who Mubarak appointed as his first vice president as one of his final attempts to cling to power] they had the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood – all of a sudden, enemy number one becomes part of the solution.

Are the Arab revolts changing context?

They are the context changers, yes. It means that Israel in its attitude of keeping Palestinians divided is more isolated than it was before. There are changes in the European policy too. They are favorable to Palestinian reunification. They are not talking about the Quartet conditions anymore. You have an entirely different situation.

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Alvaro de Soto

During a 25-year career at the United Nations, he conducted the 1990-1991 negotiations that led to the transformational peace accords ending the war in El Salvador and the 1999-2004 negotiations on the Cyprus problem that concluded with parallel referendums on a comprehensive proposal for a settlement known as the “Annan plan.” He was the UN special envoy for Myanmar (1995-1999) and the secretary-general’s special representative for the Western Sahara (2003-2005). His last UN mission, from 2005 to 2007, was as the chief UN envoy for the Arab-Israeli conflict. He is currently a senior fellow at the Ralph Bunche Institute in New York, an associate fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a member of the Global Leadership Foundation and a visiting professor at Sciences Po in Paris. In 2010 and 2011 he was a guest lecturer at Bahçeşehir University in İstanbul.