Turkey and the ambivalent, reluctant military intervention over Libya
by Gülnur Aybet

In 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted against the transit of US troops through Turkey into Iraq. However, Turkey’s ambivalent attitude to the military intervention over Libya cannot just be seen in the light of previous Turkish reluctance to become involved in regional conflicts.

This particular intervention has set its own precedent for international dilemmas in implementing UN Security Council resolutions in support of the doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect,” on the one hand, and the involvement of Western military intervention to implement it, on the other. The former presents moral pressure, and the latter creates discomfort. It is almost as if the solution is more problematic than the problem. Turkey’s ambivalence is linked to these broader regional and international dilemmas that surround this case, and the root of these present dilemmas can be found in the legacy of Western-led military interventions since the end of the Cold War.

How the Libyan intervention will be remembered

There is something eerily familiar about this intervention in Libya and the first Gulf War of 1991: A clear cut UN Security Council resolution, using the phrases “threat to international peace and security” and “all necessary measures,” which are the legal keywords for a green light for military action, and a US-led military coalition supported by Arab states in the region. The similarities end there.

1991 was about the breach of international law, when the Iraqi forces invaded neighboring Kuwait. So in traditional interpretations of international law, it was a “threat to international peace and security.” The no-fly zone (NFZ) established over northern Iraq after that conflict, in 1991, was put in place to stop Saddam Hussein from attacking the Kurdish population there. The significance of the UN Security Council resolution that established that NFZ was the linking of the necessary phrase “threat to international peace and security” to a humanitarian crisis for the first time.

Since UN Security Council resolutions that authorize a Chapter VII-type intervention (the only part of the UN Charter that can legally authorize military action against a state, apart from Article 51, which covers the case of self-defense) were designed for implementation in state-to-state wars, not intra-state civil wars, this was a clear change in direction in the implementation of international law. The same kind of implementation linking Chapter VII to humanitarian intervention was used in UN Security Council resolutions passed over military action in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again, an international coalition of support emerged, including Russia. That consensus was broken over the US-led military intervention in Kosovo, which due to Russian and Chinese objections went ahead without a UN Security Council resolution.

The urgency of the “humanitarian” nature of the Kosovo crisis left open-ended arguments about the thin line between “legitimacy” and “legality,” while the US-led military action in Iraq in 2003 was far more controversial, as it not only failed to get the authorization of a UN Security Council resolution but was also challenged by two NATO allies, Germany and France.

In all of these milestones of intervention it was pretty clear who was for and who was against, and what the objectives were, despite the blunders. However, this one over Libya will probably be remembered as the ambivalent and reluctant intervention. One would have thought that with a clear-cut UN Security Council resolution, the support of the Arab League and the abstentions of both China and Russia at the Security Council, that would not be the case. But after the controversies of Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003 and the aftermath of the Iraq war, any US-led military intervention in the region has almost become a taboo. Hence, the US reluctance to take a lead in this operation and the ruling out of ground troops.

Here the West is caught between the tarnished image and the embarrassment of Iraq and the inconsistency of ignoring the responsibility to protect a doctrine. Doing nothing would have sent the signal “we don’t do responsibility to protect anymore because it didn’t work out very well for us.” Doing something looks dangerously like a replay of Iraq: a US-led military intervention in the internal affairs of one more oil-rich Arab state.

Despite abstaining and paving the way for the adoption of Resolution 1973, Russia is now making statements that it finds the military action “regrettable,” urging the coalition to stop its military action against Libya and calling the implementation of the UN resolution a “controversial step.” Why, then, did Russia not veto the resolution when it had the chance? Apparently, seeming to block the path of a resolution so tightly bound with the urgency of humanitarian intervention looks bad.

The “Responsibility to Protect” may be problematic and unclear as a doctrine, but it is still very powerful in terms of how states would like their international image to be represented. What about the Arab League? They supported the no-fly zone, paving the way for the adoption of the UN resolution days later. Now Arab League leader Amr Moussa has voiced his discomfort with the coalition’s bombing of targets in Libya, saying this is different from the NFZ backed by the Arab League.

Again, yet another dilemma: An NFZ cannot be established without taking out air defenses. But I guess seeing the very familiar images on TV of the green hue and exploding lights of missiles and bombs against a dark backdrop looked too reminiscent of US-led interventions in the region for the past 20 years. Damned if you do and damned if you don’t. This is how the Libyan intervention will be remembered by those who supported it, those against it and those who couldn’t quite make up their minds.

Where Turkey stands: regional and international dilemmas

It is no surprise then that Turkey is not the only one who has not been able to make up its mind over the Libyan crisis since the beginning. At first, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Turkey would be against a no-fly zone and any military intervention in Libya. Then, once the UN resolution was passed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared Turkey would make necessary and appropriate national contributions to implementing the no-fly zone and measures to protect civilians. For the time being, Turkey’s offer to act as a “protecting power” for the United States in Libya, offering “good offices” and consular services for US citizens, gives it a neutral but useful role in the crisis. Discussions are also under way about possible military and civilian support for the no-fly zone.

In principle, the Turkish position has not been contradictory to the provisions in place in UN resolutions 1970 and 1973. Turkey had previously stated that any action should be legal under international law, include contributions and support from the region, and that its main aim should be the prevention and cessation of violence against the civilian population. Both resolutions cover this. However, it seems for the first time that it is the actual implementation of the UN resolutions that is being called into question.

While the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs included the cautionary note that the implementation of the UN resolution should be careful to ensure the safety and security of the Libyan people, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arınç has said that some countries wanting to take a leading role in the implementation of the resolution could be criticized for their actions. This was also reflected in official Russian statements, namely, that the implementation of the resolution was too “hasty.”

Meanwhile, at an economic forum in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, over the weekend, Prime Minister Erdoğan reluctantly acknowledged the necessity of military action but wished Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had ceded power earlier so as to make the military intervention unnecessary. Surely all wish that were the case.

This is at the heart of the dilemma over this action. If the demands of the UN resolution that has the statement “all necessary measures” are not met, it is very clear that military action has to follow immediately, otherwise it renders the resolution invalid. Should the US-led coalition have waited for the resolution to take effect before undertaking military action? It is clear that the threat of military action made Col. Gaddafi play for time by declaring a cease-fire. But that cease-fire did not hold, and this indicated that any further delay would have seen Gaddafi’s forces entering Benghazi, the rebel stronghold.

Once street-to-street fighting begins in such a case, there would be very little that air power could have achieved to protect civilians. Therefore, there was a military rationale behind acting swiftly. Was it the best choice? That will be debated in years to come, but it seems that it was the only choice at the time. The implementation of this UN resolution has undoubtedly become one of the most uncomfortable for those implementing it and those watching, whether they be neighboring states or allies like Turkey.

One thing is for sure: Unfortunately, the discomfort this has created will open cracks in the Atlantic Alliance and leave open doubts over the merits of international intervention in the region no matter what the cause or how unquestionable the legality behind such actions. Gone are the days of the 1990s when confidence in upholding international norms through military enforcement emboldened such actions.

*Dr. Gülnur Aybet is a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Kent, England.