Part of the problem
by David L. Phillips*

Since then, little has happened. The AKP could have pushed for reforms enhancing political and cultural rights. Instead it focused on the constitutional referendum, which weakens the judiciary and military in favor of the executive and legislature that it controls. With Erdoğan focused on consolidating the AKP’s rule, the democratic opening and civil constitution will have to wait until after elections on June 12.

Kurds in Turkey also bear considerable responsibility. Whenever there has been a hint of progress, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its current political proxy, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), have undermined it.

PKK terrorism has set back, not advanced, the Kurdish cause. The imprisoned PKK head, Abdullah Öcalan, is able to maintain a stranglehold on the Kurdish community by threatening moderate Kurdish intellectuals and independent-minded businessman who refuse his diktats.

Cultural figures are also at risk. When Şivan Perwer, a beloved Kurdish poet and singer, indicated his desire to return to Turkey after decades of exile in Europe, Öcalan labeled him a traitor. His threats were reminiscent of Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie.

The PKK’s entire leadership cohort plays an insidious role. Murat Karayılan, who heads the PKK militia based in the Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq, has threatened kidnapping and extortion of both Kurdish politicians who oppose the PKK as well as AKP officials. His assorted criminal activities are well known. He has a stake in continued violence, which makes him and the organization relevant. The PKK terminated its unilateral cease-fire in early March.

Most Kurds are cowed into silence by the PKK’s heavy-handed tactics. As a result, the political space is dominated by radical groups in the Kurdish community. They fuel national extremists in Turkey who reject reconciliation in favor of a security solution.

Turkey needn’t be in a constant state of war. After decades of conflict, the government realized the need for a more nuanced approach. Its heavy investments in economy, infrastructure and social services in Turkey’s Southeast translated into political support at the polls. The AKP smashed the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in elections on July 22, 2007.

However, the democratic opening stalled and Kurds have grown disaffected by the AKP’s empty promises. To regain momentum, the government gave amnesty to 34 PKK members crossing from Iraqi Kurdistan on Oct. 19, 2009. The decision could have been an important precedent for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating the PKK. But when the PKK members entered Turkey from northern Iraq, they celebrated like conquering heroes. There was a massive rally in Diyarbakır, where jubilant Kurds praised Öcalan, displayed his photo and flew the flag of Kurdistan. Turks watched in horror. They despise Öcalan for the pain he has inflicted on so many families, Turks and Kurds alike. The botched amnesty may have poisoned the possibility of further amnesties in the near term.

BDP deputies are also provocative. Their insistence to speak Kurdish in the assembly is not a genuine expression of cultural identity, but a tactic to annoy their assembly colleagues. They stubbornly refuse to condemn politically motivated violence. While espousing “democratic autonomy,” the BDP has failed to study autonomy arrangements in other countries. There are many examples worldwide where decentralization has proven to be an effective form of power-sharing that simultaneously advances minority interests and enhances state sovereignty. By envisioning ethnic not geographic and administrative autonomy, the BDP’s proposal is unrealistic and uneducated. It would create a quasi-state in the Southeast, which Turks see as a pit stop on the path to independence.

Ignoring the genuine interests of their constituents, the BDP called for a boycott of last year’s constitutional referendum. It was motivated by a desire to deprive the AKP of a political victory and show its clout with Kurdish voters. The move backfired. Many Kurds ignored the BDP, voting in favor of the referendum.

I met with Ahmet Türk, former DTP chairman, during his most recent visit to Washington. He presented a long litany of complaints about conditions in Turkey and failures of the AKP to address Kurdish grievances. He complained about poverty and unemployment with no plan to stimulate investment and jobs. He insists that the United States pressure Turkey into making changes. “With all due respect,” I asked. “This is the same conversation we had 20 years ago. Has nothing changed?”

Turkey has in fact changed dramatically. Its dynamic economy has spawned a large middle class. Turkey is a leading member of the G-20 and the world’s 17th largest economy. Economic growth last quarter was 9.4 percent. Turkey’s growing middle class and rising expectations have made the country more democratic. More than 20 political parties will compete in upcoming elections. Democracy’s rise has caused the deep state to retreat and emboldened the government to place security institutions under civilian control. Turkey’s diplomatic influence is on the rise in the region and worldwide. Turkey remains rhetorically committed to fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and EU membership.

However, serious problems still exist. The AKP has dragged its feet on reforming provisions in the Constitution and penal code that are used to restrict freedom of expression. Journalists are arrested and media groups harassed, giving rise to serious concerns about press freedom. Erdoğan displays an unnerving authoritarianism that risks reducing democracy to majoritarianism.

The BDP and the Kurds in Turkey have a right to public protest. Such is the privilege of a historically aggrieved minority in democracies. More than complain, however, they need to present constructive proposals. Kurds in Turkey must become partners in the country’s democratization and development. If they are not part of the solution, they are a part of the problem.

*David L. Phillips is director of the Program on Peace-building and Human Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He is also a fellow at Harvard University’s Future of Diplomacy Project.