Ergenekon’s summit
by Mümtazer Türköne

Many people initially thought they were murdered as a result of a conservative backlash, as was believed to be the case in the murder of Hrant Dink. The suspects were caught. The general public then believed it was committed in reaction to missionary activity. Later, on April 27, the chief of General Staff issued an e-memorandum to the government and the tension between subversive generals and the civilian government continued up until elections, held on July 22 of that year.

Four years later, the Zirve massacre is now being prosecuted as part of the Ergenekon probe. A few days ago, several people, including members of the gendarmerie, were detained in various provinces. What do these detentions mean? Prosecutors are investigating the allegations that the Zirve massacre had been committed in order to lay the groundwork for an eventual military takeover or to rig or manipulate the 2007 presidential election. This is the current state of the Ergenekon case.

Understanding Ergenekon correctly

There can only be one explanation for the efforts to criticize the detentions conducted as part of the Ergenekon probe as a blow to freedom of the press: Ergenekon propaganda. Ergenekon is a coup network that has developed parallel to the state. It has numerous members and supporters. It claims that it wields state power and operates in a very broad, but illegal, sphere. There are many people who are influenced by the size and power of this network. Politicians, members of the mafia, businessmen and journalists have obtained certain benefits from this network. The Zirve massacre gives us clues about its extent and scope.

People tend to confuse two processes with each other with respect to the Ergenekon case. The Ergenekon case is a judicial process that is under way and it has its own indictments, defendants and hearings. At the same time, it is a political process as it is the last move in the history of coups and armed interventions in our democracy. Using this judicial process, we intend to put an end to the period of coups in Turkey so that this process cannot be reversed from the political point of view. Using the Ergenekon case, we aim to consolidate our legal system and provide extended guarantees for democratic rights and freedoms. It is our intention to make this case a deterrent for future coup attempts and to ensure that society will never be manipulated into turmoil, polarization or strife for the purposes of paving the way for a coup. Each of these are legitimate political objectives that are worth promoting, aren’t they?

It is not our job to establish so-called courts for TV screens or newspaper columns and to criticize or scrutinize evidence and hastily arrive at a judgment. The lawyers will defend the defendants from a legal point of view while our, i.e., the nation’s, case will be a political one. They will argue that the defendants are not guilty, and we will advocate the rights of the nation by telling them about the bloodshed and illegal activities caused by coups. Who can object to this?

Ergenekon-based separation

The political separation the Ergenekon process has created is concrete proof for the need to defend democracy and the rights of the nation, isn’t it? Almost all marginal leftist organizations have been further polarized among themselves due to their attitudes towards the Ergenekon process. A referendum held on Sept. 12 of last year further intensified this polarization. Currently, the noisiest ones are pro-Ergenekon leftist organizations.

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), too, is experiencing a similar polarization depending on the distance maintained from Ergenekon. Which of the new projects its new leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has recently announced is capable of doing away with the shadow Ergenekon cast over the party? Is there any party that can make it to the ballot boxes on June 12 other than pro-Ergenekon and pro-democracy ones?

Even if it does not openly participate in elections, Ergenekon is operating just like a political party. This is because the election slated for June 12 will perhaps be the last turning point for Ergenekon’s fate. That is why we see an outpouring of pro-Ergenekon sentiment as the election nears and it starts to become a factor in political debate. Ergenekon does not participate in elections as an official party, but how will it win? Through the CHP, of course.

Ergenekon’s election

This election will confirm the end of the period of coups, the military’s system of tutelage and, of course, Ergenekon. It will also serve as the beginning of the democratic system that will replace the tutelary system. Some wise members of the CHP are aware of this. Therefore, they are trying to get rid of the burden called Ergenekon or compensate for its damage.

The Ergenekon-based division has become one of the main cleavages marking political polarization. There is a vocal group of CHP members and executives who translate the CHP’s pro-coup tradition and anti-Justice and Development Party (AK Party) sentiments as sympathy for Ergenekon. The CHP approaches Ergenekon under the pressure of this group. On the other hand, the pro-Ergenekon mobilization that increases as we near elections is making the AK Party an indispensable choice for the survival of democracy. Any reasonable analysis will indicate that Ergenekon undermines the CHP.

Kılıçdaroğlu is trying to overcome this troublesome situation using a formula that has no credibility. Here is his formula: Stand against coups and afford some protection to Ergenekon. His election promises about subordinating the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense, narrowing the jurisdiction of military courts and shortening the period of compulsory military service actually mean putting some distancing between himself and the military, but not military coups.

The standing-against-tanks discourse is not convincing because it would be too late by the time tanks made it out into the streets. The right thing to do is to resist the pressure on the Ergenekon case and deter military coups. However, Kılıçdaroğlu suggests that Ergenekon hearings should be aired on TRT 3 with the intention of turning the courtroom into a theater stage. By building its election strategy on efforts to discredit the Ergenekon case, the CHP is trying to please members and supporters of Ergenekon and earn their active support. Kılıçdaroğlu’s oft-used phrase the “AK Party’s judiciary” is an important sign of the war he has declared against the Ergenekon case and of this destructive strategy.

But will this advocacy for Ergenekon translate into votes? The answer is a big no. Indeed, the Ergenekon advocacy cannot be carried out without waging a war against the peace and tranquility society needs. Investing hope in conflict does not earn anyone votes.

Ergenekon is entering the election via the CHP. The CHP’s image as a cauldron of never-ending intrigue and conspiracy is indicative of Ergenekon’s hand within the CHP. Emerging after an operation at Odatv, the İklim Bayraktar scandal, which involves Kılıçdaroğlu, has urged columnists to make serious comments, including the claim that this scandal aims to oust Kılıçdaroğlu and replace him with a pro-Ergenekon leader.

The inclusion of the Zirve massacre in the Ergenekon case implies that this massacre was the summit of this network’s crimes. It further warns us of Ergenekon’s power and capabilities as well as the conspiracies it would bring into the elections via the CHP.