For the period when Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu were or are at the helm of the party, it can best be described as the “Club of Fear” or the “Association of those who don’t like the Justice and Development Party [AK Party] and Muslims.” It is a penalty history inflicts on them. Those who tended to develop no policy and did nothing but seek help from the military for political power are now paying a heavy price. This has always been the case, hasn’t it? When a cell stops performing its normal duties and starts to betray the body, it is called a tumor. It either spreads to the entire body or is removed from the body.
As a person who is a minority in Turkey and who is from a family that customarily supported the CHP, I used to have sympathy for this party. I was raised in a family that had set its heart on the party of the Karaoğlan, i.e., the pro-public Bülent Ecevit, who took on the mantle of the CHP from İsmet İnönü and tried to make it a people’s party. I never lost my hopes regarding a CHP with Erdal İnönü or with Aydın Güven Gürkan. Even if I tried to, I had no alternative other than Süleyman Demirel, who eagerly approved the execution of Deniz Gezmiş and his friends, who said, “A state can be expected to be nothing, but deep,” who defended his populist policies by saying, “We cannot be the ones who drink the non-existent oil,” who would easily back down without resistance in the face of any coup, or Necmettin Erbakan, who amply played into the hands of pro-tutelage groups by asking, “[Our coming to power,] will it be in a bloody or bloodless manner?”
Actually, all of them were the state’s men. They were statist, pro-military and pro-status quo. They knew they should stop and they stopped as they were expected. They bent down when democracy demanded sacrifice. In this way, they directly or indirectly strengthened the regime of tutelage. They acted as role models for the junta’s propaganda that required the denigration and humiliation of civilian politics. And Ecevit considerably coalesced with the state during his last days. I was done with Ecevit on the day he shouted, “Teach this lady her place,” referring to Merve Kavakçı, who had entered Parliament wearing a headscarf.
Then came the Baykal era, and the CHP completely avoided any link to politics. Hoping he might facilitate an open or a postmodern coup, Baykal injected the party’s supporters with fear. His wishes were not fulfilled. They were never eager to understand the change in the country or around the world. As the Doğan Media Group’s papers and TV channels winded them up, they falsely believed they would win an overwhelming election victory by playing on “fears of Shariah,” the “bogeyman of the [Gülen] Community” and the “secret agenda of the government.”
The reality of July 22, 2007
But the voters gave them a cold shower on July 22, 2007, and this time they started to humiliate the general public, by describing them as “the poor countrymen who scratch their bellies” or the “unconscious masses who sell their votes for two bags of food.” Then, smarter people came from one of the dark rooms. They were smarter than the rulers of the CHP. They reasoned that if they could not carry out an open or closed coup, they should try to destabilize the country and, at the same time, find a political party that would be kept as a backup party and that could be pushed to power at the first blunder of the ruling AK Party.
First they tried to use the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) for this purpose. (See the Ergenekon indictment.) But Devlet Bahçeli was at its helm. He was able to control the local organizations of the party. He had kept his party in touch with its voter base. He was cold to coups and Ergenekon. And so the MHP did not suit their needs.
This time, they turned their faces to the CHP. In fact, Baykal was good, but he could not develop new policies. Even the party’s fanatical supporters were not happy with him and completely lost hope of coming to power. This was unacceptable. As I said above, those in the dark room were smarter than the executives of the CHP. It was no longer enough to trip the AK Party up; the CHP had to harvest more votes as well. They devised a plot to throw dust in the eyes of the public.
And the video conspiracy happened. Baykal lost his position in office even before he could understand what was happening. Kılıçdaroğlu was “elected” in his place. After a small rift within the party, Kılıçdaroğlu, now marketed as Gandhi Kemal by the Doğan Media Group, managed to defeat first Baykal and then the former secretary-general of the party, Önder Sav, as well as both their supporters. Baykal performed very poorly in his struggle against Kılıçdaroğlu and everyone tended to think that his hands were tied because of a second videotape that might be made public at any moment.
No one could understand what Kılıçdaroğlu’s new CHP really was. He would promise to solve the headscarf issue and then he would refer the matter to the designers who were expected to find an approved method for wearing the headscarf. He would never directly refer to Kurds or Alevis or their problems, and he would immediately backpedal from any real promises. Then he launched his campaign against last year’s referendum, which was his first real test. The CHP, which today complains about a cumbersome judiciary, acted as the flagship of the “no” block that tended to term the radical judicial reforms a project of betrayal. Kılıçdaroğlu said nothing new. Actually, he did not say anything at all. He partnered with the MHP to launch a disgraceful campaign against the AK Party in connection with the government’s Kurdish initiative. Again, he failed to develop any policy but just blurted out fears and delusions. On Sept. 12 the nation gave him a clear answer with a 58 percent “yes.” This was a carte blanche for change, the initiative and a new civilian constitution. By losing 30 percent of its voters, the MHP received a heavy blow. The CHP chose to avoid the truth by assuming that the voters who said “no” to the referendum package -- 42 percent -- exclusively belonged to its party.
And then there was the recent Odatv scandal, or Gandhigate, involving Kılıçdaroğlu’s close relations with a media representative who was arrested under the Ergenekon probe, a 45-minute tête-à-tête meeting with Odatv reporter İklim Bayraktar, the main opposition party leader from whom Bayraktar could request a wiretapping device for what she called the “big fish operation,” Kılıçdaroğlu’s telling the same reporter to “do it with your own means” and a Kılıçdaroğlu who did not deny this meeting took place.
A chain of extraordinary promises
But politics continuously traps itself. There is no escape. Sweating under the pressures of Gandhigate, Kılıçdaroğlu spurted out some extraordinary promises in order to keep up appearances. His long silence in the face of Gandhigate must have been for the purposes of preparing for this move. So he says: “Military service will be reduced to six months. The military will not be used for counterterrorism. A family insurance system will be established, and every woman will be paid a monthly salary of TL 600. We will fund these projects by restricting the defense budget.”
Thank God!
Every evil deed will eventually lead to a good one.
But what do you think? Can the CHP keep these promises? Those conditioning the CHP, will they approve of this policy of Kılıçdaroğlu? If a new videotape is disclosed to the public, won’t we be fooled by these promises? Moreover, the wiretapped Odatv calls imply that the above-mentioned 45-minute meeting and the offer to plot against Baykal made during that meeting also targeted Kılıçdaroğlu and that a new “sun” will rise instead of Kılıçdaroğlu. These affairs are really complicated and they are not assuring in the least. Thankfully, I am not a supporter of the CHP. How could one lend support to Kılıçdaroğlu with peace of mind without knowing how one’s support could contribute to which conspiracy?
There is also the issue of our Ergenekon-loving media on a parallel course with the CHP. It might be overshadowed by Gandhigate, but the coup-loving journalists who have suddenly become fervent advocates of freedom of thought and expression upon the detention of journalists Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener are skillfully using Şık’s clean record in order to discredit the Ergenekon probe. Those who insist on turning a blind eye to Hrank Dink’s murder, the campaign against Ahmet Kaya or some 17,500 unresolved politically motivated murders are now waving placards demanding freedom for the detained journalists and delivering passionate speeches in Taksim Square. Among them are venerable figures who are expected to be conscious enough not to walk side by side with members of the Workers Party (İP) and the Turkish Communist Party (TKP). Well, we can understand the reasons of the CHP, but what are these democrats doing there? Are they confused? Is this a dignified stance against a real violation of rights or of freedom of thought? If so, why am I not there? Am I standing in the wrong place? Why do I feel that I don’t want to go there? Questions, questions and more questions…
First, let me say what the Ergenekon-loving journalists are not after. They don’t care about Şık. If they really cared about him, they would have helped him when he was fired by Radikal and left unemployed for many years. Both Şık and Şener were arrested upon a prosecutor’s demand and with a court order. I hope they are innocent. But isn’t this hurried clamor that does not wait for the disclosure of the indictment, the supplements and the evidence intended to discredit the Ergenekon probe?
The case of the good guys
Now, added to them are the cosmetic and confused democrats who were disappointed due to their sympathy for Şık. These guys tend to lend “conditional and provisional” support to the change in Turkey and now think that the line is being crossed. This is too much, they say. Retired generals Veli Küçük, Hurşit Tolon and Şener Eruygur are OK, but Odatv owner Soner Yalçın and Şener are our good guys. They are from among us and they could not have done anything wrong. Pro-Gülen Community police officers are taking revenge and may be their next target. So they feel compelled to raise their voice against this course of events.
But why? According to the principle of the presumption of innocence, Yalçın is no different than Küçük. If you did not trust the court that ordered Küçük’s arrest, why didn’t you raise your voice four years ago? Why did you support this case? How can you guarantee that someone is innocent and has not committed any offense? How, then, do you differentiate yourself from Ergenekon-loving journalists? Why did you harshly criticize former Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt, who said, referring to a soldier who was caught red-handed in Şemdinli, “I know him; he is a good boy”? What is the difference? Everyone is innocent until proven guilty, aren’t they?
I must clearly note that there are, of course, serious problems in the judicial system of this country and that we should all seek a quick and impartial administration of justice. Not only these “reputable” figures, but also the poor and ordinary members of the general public should receive high quality judicial services. But if those who failed to defend this view in the past quickly become fervent supporters of democracy in this individual case and if they don’t have a miracle gauge of justice, then theirs is not an honorable pursuit for rights, but mere partisanship. Of course, this can hardly be done for Küçük. And you cannot possibly use Alparslan Arslan, the 2006 Council of State hitman, for the purpose of discrediting the Ergenekon case. Thus, Şık and Şener are a good opportunity for these groups. They serve as good material for discrediting the case under the guise of advocacy for democracy. There is also the sensitivity of our cosmetic and pure democrats not being “contaminated.”
What I should say to them is this: You are doing something you will regret. Events should not go down to the point of no return. The judiciary is our last crutch; if we lose it, there is no ground to stand on. Let justice do its job and be patient until the indictment is disclosed. If we find any error, flaw or bad intentions, we will rush to the streets all together and seek justice.
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