The issue of violence as Kurdish and PKK issues separate
by Markar Esayan

We quickly exited the insane period where words such as “Kurdish” and “Armenian” were considered swearwords. Interior ministers who supposedly belittled outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan by saying he was the offspring of an Armenian are a reality of our recent past. We basically jumped from there to a level where Turkish prime ministers remember those killed in Dersim in Parliament and described it as a massacre, even genocide, and where the state accepts it role in unsolved murders. Deputy Prime Minister Hüseyin Çelik recently spoke on the Dersim debate again and said the state should accept and admit mistakes and apologize for them if necessary.

While the current government acknowledges the existence of Kurds and the reality of the Kurdish issue, it has also significantly increased political expectations in the country. A Turkey where the word “Kurdish” is not perceived as a swearword, continued TRT Şeş broadcasts, investments in the region, aid to families, the replacement of governors in the region who were representative of the state’s iron fist with people who have empathy and respect for Kurds and are responsive to human rights are all very positive developments that have taken place; however, they are not enough for its people. All segments of society have higher expectations. A democracy’s dynamos are the demands from the bottom put on the top and a political mechanism that is responsive to this pressure.

It is evident that some people consider the events taking place in the present as the end of the Kurdish initiative. A certain portion of Kurds in particular are quite hopeless and angry. This despair stems from the accumulation of expectations in the early stages of the initiative. If people in the region were asked their views on the initiative, most of them would say it is a failure.

Mistakes in the initiative

There are many mistakes the government made regarding the initiative. The government knew it was undertaking a very difficult issue but it seems it poorly coordinated it, left too much discretion to ultranationalists and did not think it out clearly. The government could have completed the lengthy course without waking up the demons if it had carried out a less flamboyant, more humble and profound effort. Incidents like the return of PKK members from the Makhmour refugee camp, which took place early on when Turks and Kurds were not yet ready to understand each other, caused some short circuits in the process.

But it was the PKK issue and not the Kurdish initiative that was essentially halted. Ever since we started talking about the Kurdish initiative, we have been mixing these two together. The Kurdish people have legitimate demands, most of which are based on cultural and human rights: such as the right to speak, teach and learn Kurdish freely, ending human rights violations in the region, improving welfare and strengthening local administration. I did a little research and I came across an article in the Taraf daily dated May 2009 that gave the government 20 easy recommendations to end psychological resistance to solving the Kurdish problem and to improve trust between the sides. I was part of the team that put these recommendations together. Our intention was to explain that taking the steps a civilized state governed by the rule of law is supposed to take anyway would not cause any resistance but instead provide tremendous relief. When we look at what happened with those proposals in February 2011, we see that the government has in fact fulfilled a portion of them.

The legal roadblock to reinstating the original names of places has been solved. Kurdish institutes are being set up within universities, the ban on Kurdish campaign material during elections has been removed, theatrical performances in Kurdish are being allowed, Kurdish-speaking personnel are being appointed to the region, the ban on speaking Kurdish in prisons has been removed, regulations on children who throw stones have been changed, Kurdish sermons are being allowed and the use of torture at Diyarbakır Prison has been acknowledged.

Of course there are also steps that have not been taken, but most of those have an aspect that concerns the PKK as well. For practical reasons, I am separating the two issues from each other, but in reality the two are obviously intertwined. It is important to realize that when we speak of the Kurdish problem we associate it with the future of the PKK and find ourselves in deadlock.

This implies a very fragile area in which several complex dynamics come into play at the same time. Whether Kurds accept or reject it, the AK Party is the only party on the side of the solution. The AK Party is the Peace and Democracy Party’s (BDP) political rival in the region, but must cooperate with the party regarding the PKK. The opposite is also true. But while the AK Party is caught in the claws of the pro-status quo state tradition, the BDP is caught in the claws of Kandil and İmralı. It is for this reason that meaningful cooperation has not been achieved until now. The AK Party accused the BDP of supporting terrorism while the BDP accused the AK Party of tricking the Kurds.

PKK demands

One visible PKK demand is to meet the conditions for an honorable return from the mountains. At least for now it seems Öcalan is still in charge and can keep Murat Karayılan, the man closest to the group in favor of continuing an armed struggle, under control. These conditions include the placement of PKK leaders into Northern European countries, granting amnesty and Syrian citizenship to Syrian PKK members and allowing the majority of Turkish members that have not killed anyone to return to Turkey. It also includes finding employment for these people and allowing them to take part in politics, adopting a decentralized local administration system that complies with the local EU administration proviso and, of course, transferring Öcalan to house arrest.

But since the AK Party is part of a coalition regarding this matter and a political party that derives its power solely from the votes of the people, it complicates the process. It is precisely for this reason that the ruling party has not taken any major step in the initiative or the PKK issue since a cease-fire was declared. Instead, we saw Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan intensify his nationalist discourse, as the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) moved closer to the election threshold.

On the other hand, the BDP’s lack of political leadership falls right into place. Instead of following a positive political line that aimed to expand the changes the AK Party made to the official state ideology’s Kurdish strategy, the BDP developed ineffective policies that focused on the lack of sincerity in the reforms. Instead of using this opportunity to explain the Kurdish problem to Turks and trying to become a Turkey party, the BDP adopted an aggressive, populist and reclusive attitude. Actually, the BDP did in the Southeast exactly what the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the MHP were doing in the west.

As a matter of fact, the closing statement of a conference held in Diyarbakır with the participation of the Democracy Society Congress (DTK) and 689 Kurdish nongovernmental organizations wrapped up with an example of this lack of politics.

A statement in the declaration says that, based on the fact that the AK Party did not take any measures during the period the cease-fire was in place, they do not find it ethical that “the Kurdish Communities Union/Turkey Council (KCK/TM) is being called upon to extend the state of nonviolence” and that the call to “appeal to Kurds to enter the period with a spirit of mobilization on the basis of democratic resistance,” was an attestation of insulting politics. In my opinion, that declaration marked the end of the DTK. They would be doing a good deed if they dissolved themselves.

First of all, we should question where the use violence as a bargaining chip stands in civilian politics. The notion that conflict will continue if the AK Party or the Turkish state do not meet the demands of the BDP, the KCK or Öcalan no longer makes sense in today’s world. If a political party has come to the point where it thinks making an appeal to suspend violence is immoral, then what is moral? What opportunities does politics offer?

The KCK’s Executive Council Presidency announced that the unilateral cease-fire announced on Aug. 13, 2010 is no longer valid. They feel that since the AK Party is, in their eyes, only using delay tactics to eliminate the PKK, they are returning to a state of war with an embellished discourse, saying that they will be able to defend themselves more effectively if they attack. The AK Party is not completely blameless, but it is an important and the only dynamic interlocutor. It’s obvious that it is inclined not to do anything risky before elections. That is why even though they promised a new constitution on Sept. 13, they quickly delayed it until after elections. They are not uttering a single word about the Armenian initiative. As for the KCK case, it has turned into an absurdity where the innocent and guilty have become mixed up. It does not meet the legitimate demands of Kurds, it is not willing to lower the election threshold and it is not doing its part to engage the BDP in politics. In fact, it’s not even willing to address the BDP.

But is killing people the political answer to this? How can that be a bargaining tool?

PKK and Kurdish issues growing apart    

It seems that we have or are going to enter a period in which the Kurdish and PKK issues, which were formerly hard to distinguish from one another, are going to start growing apart. What the PKK needs to realize is that its lack of politics will harm it more than the AK Party. The more the Kurdish and PKK issues grow apart, the more the PKK will lose public support. The more the AK Party faces pressure on the PKK issue, the more it will focus on meeting the legitimate demands of Kurds for rights and improving the economy in the region. This will make the PKK less significant in the eyes of Kurds, who will start seeing it as a burden.

The PKK’s honorable return from the mountains depends on its ability to do so at a time when it won’t become a burden on the Kurdish people. This requires politics, but it is highly doubtful that this can be achieved. The BDP is being controlled by Kandil and İmralı. Osman Baydemir, who said disarmament was necessary, is being undermined; Şivan Perwer is being threatened; and liberal Kurdish intellectuals are being repressed. While mysterious murders committed by the state are at least being debated, not a single word is being said about the PKK’s execution of Kurds.

The PKK needs to realize that the curtain has closed on it and that it needs to remove the option of stirring up cities and starting civil war for the sake of prolonging the conflict a little longer. This is made possible by taking proactive instead of reactive steps that are focused on the state. In this respect, it should stop trying to discredit the BDP; it should pave the way for politics, admit its crimes and develop high quality and intelligent strategies that will pressure the state to make peace.

If by an honorable return from the mountains the PKK means it wants to establish its own totalitarian “Kemalism” that won’t allow any other political formation in the region, then that is not going to happen. The first to oppose this will be the Kurds. The only option is peace. The issueis what peace will cost us.