Milbus and Arabs
by Yusuf Ergen*

 The first of these two structures is Military Business (Milbus), which corresponds to Hosni Mubarak and his dictatorship, which American defense and military groups have been supporting for over 30 years. The second is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which represents the social, political and baseline economy and which is being accused of organizing the uprising in Egypt.

Milbus is a term coined by Pakistani political scientist Ayesha Siddiqa to explain that aside from the money allocated to it from the state budget, the army dominates all civilian business circles and has created a mafia-like capital class in Pakistan. The same applies for Egypt with respect to Mubarak.

The MB movement was started by Hassan al-Banna in the 1920s as a lawful anti-colonial reaction against Zionist expansionism in particular. The main principle of the movement, which had gained legitimacy by 1930, was to set up a democratic Islamic state. The basis of this state relied on educational and socio-economic reforms. Sayyid Qutb became leader after Banna was assassinated in 1949. Qutb set up a combative wing for the MB and he was hanged by Nasser in 1966, which led to the creation of the “Jihadi Arm” and growth of militancy in the movement. This movement created a prominent figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri joined the Muslim Brotherhood at the tender age of 14, and in 1979 he joined the even more radical group the Islamic Jihad, now called the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. In 1998, al-Zawahiri formally merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad with al-Qaeda. According to intelligence assessment reports, he has worked in the al-Qaeda organization since its inception and was a senior member of al-Qaeda’s shura council. It must be noted that al-Qaeda was not supportive of Mubarak’s Egypt and neither is it zealous regarding that which might replace the dictator: democracy.

A recent video by al-Zawahiri shows him criticizing Egypt’s democratic Tahrir Square movement, saying such a rebellion can only lead towards a non-religious state and he would rather see an Islamic government take control of Egypt. However, one of the current leaders of the MB, General Guide Muhammad Badie, seriously opposes him.

The MB’s appeal

The mainstay of the MB is its multifaceted identity. This identity provides sustenance to the uprising and its growth, as more and more people are joining the movement. It has the aforementioned “Jihadi” wing as well as a “militant wing” and a large segment of youth, who value Western-style democratic freedom, human rights and secularism. Yet it seems there is no conflict within the MB. The MB describes itself as a centrist and religious mainstream political movement. It should also be stressed that the MB emphasizes that they don’t take Iran as a model for themselves. A military regime has been controlling Egypt since 1952. And ever since Mubarak came to power, the administration in Egypt has been formed within the scope of military relations shaped by the US. After Mubarak resigned on Feb. 11, 2011, power was transferred to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which includes six of the most senior officers of the Egyptian army. WikiLeaks documents show that Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, chairman of the supreme council, is not a figure America can trust too much.

Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s intelligence chief and the vice president Mubarak appointed in late January, a position he held for less than two weeks; Gen. Sami Hafez Annan; Air Forces commanders Reda Mahmoud Hafiz Muhammad and Abd El Aziz Seif-Eldeen and Navy Commander-in-Chief Mohab Mamish are members of Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The head of the council is Tantawi, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the minister of defense.

The international media frequently reported on talks between Tantawi and US Defense Secretary Robert Gates during the uprising in Egypt. Gates praised the army for making a contribution “to the evolution of democracy.” It is also important to note that the US provides about $1.5 billion in military aid to Egypt every year. But according to a 2008 cable released by the WikiLeaks website, US officials described Tantawi as someone “reluctant to change” and uncomfortable with the US focus on fighting terrorism. This document also suggests that events in Egypt are not a “revolution” or “coup” but rather a US-guided “change” movement.

Tantawi has been the minister of defense since 1991 and the head of the army since 1995. While his military experience and seniority make him a suitable candidate for the presidency, he does not have a lot of support from within the army.

Hence, both military aid and the WikiLeaks cables clearly demonstrate the sides -- the US and the Egyptian military -- that are involved. The aid and the special relations maintained over the military have led to the formation of a Milbus empire. This empire consists of military-backed private property, business holdings, the defense industry and big national investment projects.

The Milbus Empire has strong connections in Cairo and Washington. Defense industry cartels collaborate with retired and active bureaucrats, multinational business oligarchs and especially with the Jewish lobby. It really should be no surprise that Washington sent special envoy Frank Wisner to Egypt to engage in “crisis management,” to provide “global strategic advice” and to do “damage control.” Wisner was specifically chosen by Obama and Hillary Clinton to maintain the interests of the Mubarak-army-US “Private Cooperation Network” nexus. In other words, Wisner was chosen to protect Mubarak from the MB, or more precisely to protect Mubarak’s wealth and private property.

The millions of Egyptians who were inspired by the MB and gathered in Tahrir Square seem to have broken this setup for now. The Mubarak-army-US “Special Cooperation Network” will evolve into a new form as demands are met gradually. Mubarak’s refusal to resign on Feb. 10 when millions were demanding his resignation was a sign that a compromise could not be reached in negotiations. His resignation that next day was a partial acknowledgement that the crowds would start getting out of control. After Mubarak transferred most of his authority to Suleiman, the army shifted toward a neutral position, which is acceptable for now. But in the future, the army will be party to negotiations and will launch political campaigns to balance the influence of the MB.

What happened at Tahrir Square

Let me conclude by addressing the question of what essentially happened at Tahrir Square. The domineering role of the army and the dictatorship were rejected. The army is going to have to adhere to the limits of the democratic order at all times from now on, including when it wants to make a political move. The crowds have eroded the Mubarak-army-US nexus. Even though the crowds at Tahrir Square included people from both the “Special Network” front and the MB front, they paved the way for the formation of a Turkish-style democratic vision. Once the two constitutional articles indicated by Mubarak are amended, the rhetoric on a New Egypt will intensify. Hence, the recent developments have played a role in shaping political designs and polarizations regarding the electoral system and the election schedule.

The changes in Egypt should not be seen as a step backwards by Egypt in Arab-Israeli relations. The process will now take place in a more realistic framework and a framework that is approved by the world’s democracy conjuncture for the Middle East. There are two important priorities in this framework: Nuclear armament issues and ensuring the protection of Israel. In order for America’s military aid to continue in a healthy way, US-Egyptian relations need to be adjusted according to the new order. It is very likely that there will be negotiations in this area. Mubarak’s resignation is meaningful not only for Egypt’s but the entire region’s stability and struggle for democracy. A likely topic to come up in talks will be for Egypt to take various measures to ensure that radical groups do not lead Egypt and its future down the wrong path.

In the end, a revolution has taken place in Egypt. The army no longer has to protect Milbus. Instead it will be responsible for reforming Milbus in an ethical and a gradual way. The purpose of the reforms won’t be to protect Mubarak’s $75 billion fortune. After all, change is inevitable and beyond the control of the army.