There is an ongoing civil war in Libya. Rebels dominate nearly three-quarters of Libya. So it is Gaddafi who is resisting, and not the Libyans.
Gaddafi is a shrewd politician. He claims on the one hand that the US is behind what is taking place, but at the same time tries to influence the West -- starting with the US -- saying that the rebels are being supported by al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. In Turkey, this form of defense is called “peasant cunning.” This form of cunning tries to fool the other party, but in fact it only fools the one who wields it. Gaddafi’s is a simple form of this cunning: tribal cunning. This tribal factor is what distinguishes Libya from Egypt.
Social developments in societies that have not historically undergone “individualization” are completely different from those that occur in modern societies. Tribal structures are archaic forms of social organization that existed before the emergence of nations. In some niches of the world, these forms of organization continued to exist side by side with modern industrial societies. Libya is one of these niches. This is why what is happening in Libya is different from other uprisings.
The Ottoman effect
Relations between Arab countries, which are currently seeing a wave of revolts, and Turkey took place under the umbrella of the same state up until 100 years ago. These societies and Turkey shared the same fate for a long period of time. Now, it appears, they are starting to share a common fate with Turkey again. These societies maintained their existence, their cultures and traditions under the umbrella of the Ottoman state, which employed an imperial system that was not like traditional tribal societies and which offered a framework of political and social organization that was different from Western modernity. In order to predict the course of the winds of change in Arab societies, it is important to acknowledge the difference of this experience.
In Turkey and Egypt, traditional tribal networks are very weak. These networks can be found only among Kurds in the Southeast and in a feeble form in Turkey. The tribal bonds among Turkmen tribes that live in the mountains and that originated from east of the Mediterranean Sea and traveled to the Aegean region parallel to the sea have weakened considerably. Such weak tribal structures are no coincidence as they are a result of state policies that had been deliberately implemented for many centuries.
Since its inception, the Ottoman Empire worked to systematically eliminate the tribal structures because of their potential to lead to a revolt against the authority of the central state. This policy was implemented using two strategies: First, tribes that migrated from Central Asia were divided into small groups which were then scattered over remote places. Second, tribes that were remnants of the Seljuk state were divided into smaller groups when they revolted against the central state. The only exception to this policy was the grant of autonomy to Kurdish tribes who had lent very critical support to the central state during a military campaign against Iran in 1517.
Turkey’s current modern society is largely the result of these policies. The disintegration of tribes in Egypt occurred during a long period of time and in a natural manner with the charm of the Nile.
Tribes and democracy
For liberal democracies to exist, individuals must emerge as social actors. In societies with a dominant tribal system, it is impossible for individuals to go out of tribal boundaries and become individualized. Being an individual in a society where tribal identities matter is the biggest calamity that can happened to one because the social and economic security of an individual is provided not by the state but by his or her tribe.
This should give one hints about the course of developments in the Muslim world. Modern democracies cannot prosper in societies that rely on tribal organizations. The lack of democracies in Muslim societies is not attributable to Islam, as many wrongly believe. Rather, it is the outcome of tribal discipline and solidarity. Therefore, any effort to improve fundamental rights and freedoms, the rule of law and democracy should focus on these tribal structures rather than on theoretical debates about religion. Accordingly, asking, “Does Islam allow democracy?” is of trivial of importance. Instead, one should ask, “How can democracy be promoted within the existing tribal structures?”
Can we obtain a functional democratic system by arranging the organization of tribes as political parties which would then secure votes from as many people as they have members? This question is not an unwarranted one. Afghanistan, Iraq and, lately, Libya are real examples that the world has become closely acquainted with. There is no encouraging answer to this question. A democratic system where tribes emerge as more powerful political actors than political parties cannot be maintained. This is because the possibility of a change of power will not go according to the logic of democracy. In such a system, the ossified tribal structure will put a group in political power, leaving others in the opposition. The outcome is determined not by the public’s preferences but by tribal allegiances. Such a mechanism is a hopeless case for democracy. Democratic freedoms and the right to vote and be elected will strengthen existing tribal structures.
Alternative to tribal structures
Organizations based on religious preferences are much more modern than tribal organizations and constitute a real alternative to tribes. Islamic forms of organization that rely on religious orders or any religious order that is not Sufi in nature emerge by their nature as alternatives to tribes.
Western scholars tend to claim that these Islamic forms of organization tend to delay secularization. However, these religious structures allow much greater individualization than tribal structures and, therefore, are more advanced than tribes. The pressures that prevent religious units from becoming modern civil society organizations come from tribal structures. As individuals seek tribe-like networks for security and solidarity, religious forms of organization reproduce themselves according to these needs.
A democratic political system will develop in Egypt over time, but we cannot be equally optimistic about Libya and Afghanistan. The solution is to allow these countries to exist under the supervision of the wider international community. Europe and the US are unsympathetic to these societies. The modernizing powers of the Muslim world may be used as guides to this end. Turkey’s growing reputation among countries in the region and its ability to serve as a model for Arab societies should be discussed from this perspective.
A voluntary form of the Ottoman policy of forced resettlement should be applied to tribes. This can be done by making tribes part of the entire Muslim world and not only of their own locale.
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