Turkey helping prevent war in Nagorno-Karabakh
by Sabine Freizer*

At least 25 people were killed in 2010 in fighting between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces. An arms race, vitriolic war rhetoric and a virtual breakdown in peace talks are now increasing the chance of war. Already in 2011 three soldiers have been shot dead. As the International Crisis Group describes in its Feb. 8 report, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War,” it is urgent that the sides sign a document on basic principles to resolve the conflict peacefully, and undertake confidence building to reduce tensions and avert a resumption of fighting. Here Turkey has an important role to play.

Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan is planning an immediate all-out offensive, but skirmishes could easily spiral out of control. Cease-fire violations are occurring over a wider territory, employing more sophisticated tactics and sniper weapons. In August and September 2010, there were between three and eight exchanges of sustained small arms fire daily, lasting five to 10 minutes, on different parts of the line of contact. The more lethal weaponry both sides are acquiring puts response time on an ever shorter hair trigger. If a war started, however, neither side would be likely to win easily or quickly.

Azerbaijan starting an offensive?

Many in Azerbaijan believe that they could start on an offensive with a blitzkrieg to grab a few of the occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, but they would quickly face an uphill fight into the steep mountains. The Armenian side, who control the high ground, would unleash a serious counterattack. Azerbaijani civilians are more vulnerable, as towns and new internally displaced persons (IDP) settlements are in low lands close to the Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact. Armenian tactical missiles and large-caliber artillery could also strike Azerbaijan’s largest cities, including Baku. Azerbaijani warplanes and helicopter gunships could target deep in Armenia, but powerful defense systems, including Armenian S-300s and a MiG-29 fighter interceptor squadron at the Russian base in Gyumri, would make them vulnerable.

The worse outcome would be an accidental war, after an incident along the line of contact deteriorated. Lack of international monitoring, ambiguity about operations along the line of contact and growing military capabilities all make this option more likely. Monitoring mechanisms should be strengthened and confidence-building steps implemented, including withdrawal of snipers from the line of contact, suspending large-scale military exercises near the line of contact, pulling back and ceasing use of any artillery and halting trench advancements towards each other’s positions. Armenia should stop sending regular army conscripts to serve in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan has opposed these steps, and arguably more has to be done to change a status quo that is deeply damaging; 586,000 Azerbaijanis have been internally displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas, and some 16 percent of the country’s territory is occupied. Otherwise, Azerbaijani public opinion and leadership may feel well justified to make use of its growing military assets; the already substantial defense budget is slated to rise by some 50 percent between 2010 and 2011, to $3.1 billion out of a total $15.9 billion state budget. Defense spending has increased 20-fold during the presidency of Ilham Aliyev. The Azerbaijani leadership says the military build-up is primarily to pressure Armenia into diplomatic compromise.

The issue of arms embargoes

With help from Israeli, Pakistani, South African and also Turkish companies, Azerbaijan is developing a domestic weapons industry. Turkish-owned Otokar will jointly produce armored vehicles and Roketsan will help manufacture 11-kilometer and 40-kilometer rockets for multiple launch systems. Turkey is upholding the non-binding Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN arms embargoes against selling offensive weapons to Azerbaijan and Armenia, but Russia, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina are not. Clearly, Russia, as the leading mediator in this conflict, should cease supplying offensive arms and technology, and others should adhere to the recommended arms embargoes.

Conflict prevention would be best ensured by signing the basic principles agreement, first outlined by the OSCE in 2005. Unfortunately 2010 saw little progress. Baku and Yerevan argue that they have offered the maximum concessions. Azerbaijanis insist that any peace settlement must preserve their country’s territorial integrity and guarantee IDPs the right of return, including to Nagorno-Karabakh, while Armenians seek the right to full self-determination for the (Armenian) population of Nagorno-Karabakh, including the possibility of independence. It is difficult, but not impossible, to square this circle. For a start, both sides should not insist that a timeframe be set or a specific outcome be pre-ordained or excluded in a referendum on Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status.

The failure of the Turkey-Armenia reconciliation that had seemed so promising in 2009 has limited the room for maneuver of President Serzh Sarksyan and President Aliyev. Hard-line domestic opposition in Armenia condemned the October 2009 protocols as Turkey’s effort to press Yerevan into Nagorno-Karabakh concessions and prevent Armenian genocide resolutions. The Azerbaijani side felt betrayed at the idea that the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border could occur before withdrawal from the occupied territories began. Yerevan suspended signing the protocols in April 2010, accusing Turkey of failing to ratify the protocols unconditionally and within a reasonable time frame. The consequence of all this has been a hardening of positions by both sides in Nagorno-Karabakh talks.

Turkey has demonstrated its solidarity with Azerbaijan and most Azerbaijani analysts are confident Ankara would be compelled to take military action if Azerbaijani statehood were threatened. Clearly if there was a war, there would be some public pressure in Turkey to assist its Azerbaijani kin. In 2010 Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a strategic partnership and mutual assistance agreement, stipulating they will support each other “using all possible means” in the case of a military attack or “aggression” against the other.

Armenia, meanwhile, trusts that Russia will come to its aid. The polarizing strategies of Armenia and Azerbaijan may try to put Russia and Turkey at loggerheads. A strain in Russian-Turkish relations, which have greatly improved since 2002, is strongly against the interests of Moscow and Ankara. A high-level cooperation council solidifies their strategic partnership, Russia has become Turkey’s second biggest trade partner and the two cooperate on a major energy transportation project, the South Stream pipeline. A total of 3 million Russians annually are now Turkey’s biggest group of tourists, and visa-free travel may start in April 2011. Turkey has removed Russia from its national security threat list.

Neither Russia nor Turkey wants to damage the increasingly beneficial economic and strategic relationship over Nagorno-Karabakh. Peaceful transformation of the status quo is in the best interests of both. Turkey has an important role to play, working closely with Baku to convince it that a quick war is unlikely to succeed and confidence-building measures will not dent its fundamental war-fighting capabilities. Such measures could make the current situation more predictable and controllable and incidents more verifiable, so that an accident does not escalate out of proportion, against the interests of all.