The end of the 20th century: Western-oriented state order is collapsing in Middle East
by Gökhan Bacık

As you know, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)-centered state system was demolished as a result of developments that began in 1989. The process began in the Baltic countries and stretched over to Central Asia via the Balkans, causing a quick collapse of the Moscow-based international system. The current process in the Middle East is identical to this: The Western-oriented Middle East system that was set up in the 1940s is showing signs of a downfall.

This system never developed social legitimacy and tried to survive solely on the support of the West. To put it more clearly, the structure we are talking about collapsing is an important part of the international system. There are two points we need to underline. First, if the process in Egypt leads to more comprehensive change -- in other words if the Egyptian regime falls -- then a bigger process will begin in the region, and countries like Jordan will not be able to stand in the way of it. That is because states like Jordan and Saudi Arabia are more vulnerable to social and political movements than countries like Egypt and Tunisia. The same wind that is shaking Egypt can destroy Jordan. Secondly, if Jordan and Saudi Arabia are shaken politically, then it won’t be simply a prediction to claim that physical, geographical forms will change in the medium and long term. These changes might entail a redrawing of borders or a demand for a transnational structure like the EU. But it’s important to bear in mind that currently the Middle East region is shaped according to the needs of its patron, the West (not according to local and sociological needs). To be more specific, without the West’s support countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia would not be regarded as “modern states” according to sociological, political and other similar concepts. In other words there is no geography or national identity called Jordan. Historically there is no social establishment that brings Jordan into existence. Even those who are ruling Jordan are historically not “Jordanian.” But despite this “absence,” countries like Jordan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have been living according to the desire for a Western-based system for many years. If the Western-based Middle Eastern subsystem collapses, then the basis for the existence for these states will collapse as well.

The US and Israel axis: the West’s depression

Naturally, the West is the main force addressed in the face of these developments. But first let’s point out that the US is still paying an agonizing price for the view that advocated protecting interests after the Cold War through force and that it will continue to pay for it. When the US, the massive power machine of the West, which is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy in just about every part of the world, is unable to use force it will become ordinary and unremarkable. But the US will want to sustain its interests with other methods just like Russia did after the fall of the USSR. The main objective of America’s foreign policy in the Middle East is to come up with a formula that will satisfy the people who are shouting in the streets and maintain the old order.

In Tunisia, pressure was put on the land forces, and President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to flee the country. In other words, some concessions were made in an attempt to satisfy the public. Similar attempts will be made in Egypt via actors like Mohamed ElBaradei. In the final analysis, it is America itself that is being shaken in Tunisia and Egypt. US diplomacy is now searching for a magic formula that will make everyone happy but essentially protect US interests. This formula could be ElBaradei or it could be someone else, but the main principle is not to look like the US is insisting on the continuation of the current regime. But as long as America does not establish equal relationships with figures in the Middle East that come to power through democratic means and does not give up its old hegemonic habits (puppet regimes) it will not be able to succeed in the long run. Of course, such an egalitarian relationship would require the US to make some concessions from its share of the pie in the region (especially from energy). The political math here is very clear: If the US does not act more wisely and does not agree to a smaller share, then it will lose everything else it has in the long run. Americans should consider the following important paradox carefully: How come American society can’t produce soft power in the international system like Luxembourg or Turkey when it has the most democratic structure in the world? How come the American system, which has bright and successful institutions like Harvard and Stanford, restricts itself to the Middle East’s authoritarian and anti-democratic systems to protect its interests?

Legitimizing and protecting Israel

Another very important issue is Israel. One of the basic functions of the Western-centered Middle Eastern system is to legitimize and protect Israel. For example the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is in a sense Egypt’s Lausanne Treaty, and it determined the borders of Egypt’s position in the international system. In fact, the international legitimacy of Middle Eastern countries has always been assessed according to their relationship with Israel, not according to their own rights.

If democracy was a measurement, then Hamas would have to be the West’s biggest ally. For this reason, if the Middle East’s state order is built on social values, Israel will pay the biggest price. In practical terms, in a Middle East built on social values the political and economic cost of support for Israel will be extremely high for America. Even though it may seem contradictory, there is a point that must be noted: Israel is essentially at least as artificial a state as Jordan and the existence of this state can be explained not according to different regional and social reasons but according to the needs of the international system. It would be misleading to think that Jewish people who genuinely weep at the Wailing Wall are aware of what’s going on. When the Israeli military invaded the Old City in 1967, many of the Jewish generals crying at the foot of the wall were atheists. It is for this reason that in a changing Middle East Israel will either undermine itself by insisting on its conflict theory or it will try to “speak” with the new Middle East to be able to produce a natural, local and sociological reason for its existence. Additionally, if the US starts to negotiate with democratically elected actors in the Middle East saying, “Things have changed” -- in other words if it gives up a bit of its hegemonic attitude -- it will make a change in the historical nature of Israel inevitable. This change will include becoming an actor that can communicate with people in the region. It is important to bear in mind that the falling Hosni Mubarak regime has been Israel’s most effective security shield since 1948. If the Mubarak regime falls, Israel will have to come out from its incubator and develop the ability to get along with the people whom it described as “enemies.”

On the other hand, the tragedy of Egyptians fighting each other in Tahrir Square also explains this: Authoritarian regimes and individuals do not hesitate to burn down their own countries for the sake of their own interests. People who work for the improvement of their country should never, not even for a moment, forget this point.