Turkey, the Iranian nuclear crisis and US foreign policy
by Aaron Stein*

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is opposed to Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, but believes that imposing sanctions and threatening military action is counterproductive and only strengthens the Iranian hard-liners. In the short term, Turkey is interested in kick starting diplomatic negotiations, so that the likelihood of an American or Israeli military attack is diminished. From the Turkish perspective, the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran is secondary to the regional chaos that would ensue if the United States or Israel were to attack Iran.

Proponents of Turkey’s soft power approach were likely relieved to hear US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tell an audience that Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon has been delayed, thus lengthening the timeline for nuclear negotiations with Iran and the P5+1. Echoing these statements, Meir Dagan, the departing director of Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, said Iran would not be able to make a bomb until 2015 because of the sanctions and “other measures” that were used against them.

However, Secretary Clinton was quick to point out that now is not the time to ease the pressure on Iran, arguing that countries should continue to enforce the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), European and American sanctions against Iran. Thus, it is likely that the United States will continue to pursue the robust enforcement of sanctions, while at the same time, encouraging Iran to come clean about its nuclear program. The Obama administration and its allies in Congress prefer this two-pronged approach of pressure and incentives.

There is broad bi-partisan support in the US Congress for sanctions, backed by overwhelmingly strong support by the American public. In the United States there is a consensus that sanctions are an effective foreign policy tool and that they have slowed the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. The Obama administration has made it a priority to ratchet up the pressure against the Iranians by pushing through a new series of UNSC sanctions in June 2010, while at the same time reaching out to Iran diplomatically to try and entice Tehran to give up parts of its nuclear program. In tandem, the United States Treasury has launched a global campaign to convince foreign governments to enforce unilateral American sanction law.

In addition to these efforts, the US Congress, which plays a dominant role in America’s Iran policy, passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, which restricts Iran’s ability to make or import gasoline. All of these efforts are meant to bolster the weaker UNSC sanctions and increase pressure against Iran.

The UN sanctions cater to the lowest common denominator in order to ensure the support of veto-wielding countries like Russia and China. However, they are worded in such a way so that third countries can use the UN sanctions as the basis to impose their own “more biting” unilateral sanctions against Iran.

The United States has always hoped that Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952 and EU candidate country, would enforce unilateral US and European sanctions. Thus far, the Turkish government has shown little interest in enforcing American unilateral efforts, saying that they would only enforce the far weaker UN sanctions. The AK Party government has told US Treasury officials that decisions about doing business with Iran are being left to private Turkish businesses. Privately, reports suggest Turkish banks in particular have become hesitant about dealing with Iran, even though Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly touts and promotes Turkey and Iran’s growing trade relationship.

What remains to be seen is what impact these differing views over the efficacy of sanctions and the threats related to Iran’s nuclear program will have on the nuclear negotiations. For now, Turkey has said it will only host the talks and not mediate the dispute. Thus, it seems unlikely that these diverging viewpoints will have little or no impact on the negotiations in the short term.

However, gaps about how to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis remain and will likely impact negotiations moving forward given Turkey’s growing trade relationship with Iran and its extensive ties to the West. Turkey is not likely to change it stance on US sanctions and its vociferous objection to military action. It will likely continue to insist on robust diplomacy, while repeating its call for discussions about a regional nuclear weapons free zone. The United States has generally been supportive of Turkey’s diplomatic relationship with Iran but questions how Turkey will react if these upcoming talks fail. In short, how will the AK Party’s foreign policy change if Iran and the P5+1 can’t find a solution during these series of negotiations?

Significant differences remain between the Western powers and Turkey over how best to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem. However, Turkey has succeeded in muscling its way into the discussion by winning a seat at the diplomatic table, ensuring that its solutions and its points of view will have some impact on the end game settlement. Moving forward, it is clear that both countries will have to work more closely to overcome their differences over policy implementation in order to maximize their diplomatic strengths to resolve this vexing issue.