This is unfortunately not true. The reason why I say “unfortunately” is not that I regret that the PKK’s “efforts” have been wasted. What saddens me, even overwhelms me, is the fact that about 40,000 people died in vain.
Some 35,000 PKK supporters and around 5,000 security officers have been killed in clashes between the army and the PKK and in PKK terrorist attacks.
It was a first for the nation when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly admitted that the deep state had assassinated certain public figures to manipulate public opinion. While the oft-quoted figure of 17,500 is neither official nor realistic, the number of such murders can reasonably be said to be around 4,500.
And today in particular, groups close to the PKK stress that the Kurdish issue has been legitimized thanks to these deaths and this war. In this way, they also propagandize that the PKK has won the war against the state.
But this is not true.
In my opinion, the PKK’s desire to opt for violence as a method of resistance has led to the profound suffering of the Kurdish people living in the region. The PKK’s resistance has played into the hands of shady networks nested within the state, the Ergenekon network or, simply, the hawks, causing people in the region to be targeted by violence from both sides, eventually suffering more than ever.
In this way, proponents of tutelage have managed to maintained their power and pro-coup groups have managed to maintain their control over the system, partnering with the PKK when it comes to arms and drugs trafficking, smothering the voice of common sense and the leverage of politics in the country.
What do victory, justice and fairness mean to a region where dead soldiers and PKK militants come from the same house?
As for the PKK’s contribution to the Kurdish initiative and paving the way for discussing peace, I am of the opinion that this dirty war has not led to the settlement of this issue but to deadlock, making it an endless and complicated story. This is because no peace is secured by killing innocent people.
If the western and eastern parts of the country are experiencing division because of the Kurdish issue, and if, as seen in the recent referendum, opposition parties can secure votes because of the continuation of the war with the PKK, and if many Kurdish voters could not cast their “yes” votes in this referendum because of their fear of the PKK, what achievements are they talking about?
Still, I claim that if the PKK had never existed and if Kurds had had the opportunity to defend their rights using nonviolent methods, such as civil disobedience and politics, we would have been able to talk about peace much earlier and with fewer traumas.
The real reason why we can talk about peace today is, unfortunately, not dependent on domestic factors but on international ones. It is the international conjuncture, the developments in Iraq and the fact that we have a reformist government imposing peace on us. The globalization process by which the world has evolved toward higher awareness in human rights, the breakthroughs in information technology (IT) that do not allow any despicable plan to go unnoticed, and the emergence of the Internet and civil society as a political player have convinced us to give Kurds their rights.
I ask you: If the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) had not come to power in 2002, and if reforms as part of the European Union accession process had not been undertaken one after another, and if the strongholds of tutelage had not been destroyed one by one, would the Kurdish initiative have been possible today? I am not trying to justify the state’s Kurdish policy here, which is a concept we have always been critical of. The source of the problem is already this perspective of the state that tends to ignore Kurds. But, if we argue that the PKK has brought the war to an end, this implies we advocate that killing people brings peace, which is a totally wrong and misleading attitude.
Indeed, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s unreliable role in the process of PKK militants stopping their violence is evidence of this. The PKK’s resistance in the 1990s, when the deep state completely dominated politics, particularly in the context of inhuman torture in Diyarbakır Prison, might be understandable, but it is no longer an option in today’s Turkey and today’s world.
Today, one can see that Öcalan and Kandil are not convinced of this but are concerned more about their own future than Kurdish peace.
All the trivial matters such as the size of his cell and the lack of a facility in which he can watch TV can be seen as matters that should be discussed to ensuring the two peoples can come to terms and bloodshed can be prevented. Öcalan can even thunder, “If something happens to me, there will be war and Erdoğan will not be able to weather it.”
Indeed, he recently allegedly met with the National Intelligence Organization (MİT). What did he want in exchange for arranging that the PKK’s Kandil leadership could go to Europe, for a cease-fire to be maintained until elections, for stopping to make harsh statements, and for the Kurds to abandon their demand for democratic autonomy? He stipulated that his imprisonment conditions should be improved and that he should be allowed to watch TV as well as be placed under house arrest instead, etc.
How can such a person advertise himself as a freedom fighter or a patron of the Kurdish people? Shouldn’t a true leader of people put his people before himself? It is true that his control over the PKK makes Öcalan an important facilitator of peace, but his unreliable attitudes and his emphasis on his personal benefits is not reassuring.
Furthermore, as was seen in recent debates over democratic autonomy, Öcalan frequently puts Kurdish politicians into awkward positions. The pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) does not make a move without seeking his prior approval, but Öcalan still lays the blame for any negative developments on this party. This makes Öcalan the wise and indispensable man while the BDP and BDP deputies become scapegoats and have to assume responsibility for any failure.
Indeed, it is known that the draft model of democratic autonomy was originally prepared by the PKK leadership in Kandil and the idea of establishing self-defense forces belongs to Öcalan. However, when it was showcased in Diyarbakır on Dec. 19, it received critical remarks even from groups that tend to adopt the most liberal and pro-freedom approach to the Kurdish issue. This was because the proposed model was antidemocratic, utopian and tutelary. It was a badly prepared draft model that would organize society, politics and economy in a top-down fashion, as seen in the most totalitarian regimes, that would put the PKK in complete control of society, and that would deny the Kurdish reality that exists beyond the PKK. Such a draft would only add icing to the cake of hawkish groups.
Öcalan’s first statement quickly accused the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) and the BDP of ineptitude. He admonished Kurdish politicians, saying it was badly written and untimely and poorly marketed. He also threatened, without explicitly referring to, Galip Ensarioğlu and Emin Aktar, who has raised their voices as players external to the PKK, but uttered similar criticisms as Öcalan. “I will not let you live in Diyarbakır,” he said.
Yet again he admonished the BDP during his meetings with his lawyers last week. “The BDP must reinforce the organization of the people. If it does not do this, I will strongly criticize it,” he said.
What I understand from this picture is this: Öcalan wants no rival to emerge from the BDP or the DTK, and he is never happy with independent Kurdish politics. When he is out of focus, he tends to spoil the entire process.
Such a leadership is unacceptable.
But it at least won’t make a Gandhi or a Mandela out of Öcalan.
However, a leader who really seeks peace and who is altruistic when it comes to his own people must take advantage of the current favorable atmosphere to the fullest extent. A true leader should be ready to give his own life so that another man does not die in this dispute.
What would he do instead?
If Gandhi were in Öcalan’s shoes, he would say: “I refuse to use violence and arms as a method independent of the state. I stipulate no conditions for the state to meet. I will conduct my struggle purely on the political platform and through civilian and peaceful means. I won’t kill anyone even if I am killed. To pave the way for peace, I will not spill anyone’s blood, even if my blood is spilled. I will resort to all democratic means to rightfully claim my rights.”
I now ask my initial question again: Where would we be today in respect to the Kurdish issue if the PKK had not been established?
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