A perspective on Turkey
by
TAHİR ABBAS*

I use this space to reflect on my first 100 days in relation to questions of Europeanism, cultural cohesion and regional identity politics in Turkey and to point to some of the general and specific social science questions likely to remain important in the near future.

İstanbul is at the heart of the “bridge of civilizations”; a delicate balance between Islam in the public sphere and its intersections with a post-statist model of modernity and nationhood; where Turkey professes to be 99 percent religiously Muslim but remains a “secular nationalist republic.” Since 2002, the country as a whole has experienced eight years of unprecedented economic growth, political stability, rising wages, increasing consumerism, improving living standards, a remarkable health service, a growing higher education sector and strong geopolitical confidence, although there remain distinct wealth gaps. Turkey’s strength could well encourage the EU to potentially grant it full membership as early as 2014, or, perhaps, never. In an ideal world, Western Europe could look towards Turkey as a positive partner in relation to the integration of its own Muslim minorities, which are now close to 20 million, as well as in creating the opportunities for a young and talented Turkish workforce within a set of beleaguered Western European economies feeling the effect of ageing populations and low birth rates. But certain elements of the EU are far too short sighted for that.

Orhan Pamuk recently wrote in The Guardian (“The souring of Turkey’s European dream,” Dec. 23, 2010) that the Europeanization project has been lost by Turkey. This is quickly becoming a defunct argument in my view. Turkey is not beholden to Western Europe in relation to formal entry into the EU; rather Europe itself is going through profound changes which mean that it may well desperately need Turkey to be part of it, rather than the other way around. Furthermore, why would Turkey want to join the EU when the eurozone has a huge debt crisis, a severe problem of inward investment and rising unemployment? Limited economic stability leads to weakening political leadership and a “clash of culturalism.” Western Europe is certainly becoming more racist, xenophobic and intolerant towards its minorities and especially towards Muslims since Sept. 11. Aspects of the structures and institutions of the Western European experience simply cannot let go of deeply held perspectives in relation to Islam and the Muslim world. Turkey secularized in the early 20th century not because it was adopting a superior model from outside, rather that Europe reworked the ideas of how to manage religion and politics in the public sphere, which were handed down by the Muslims of the classical Islamic period, who in turn learnt all they could from the then unknown texts of Aristotle and Plato. This is not to suggest that the Islamic-Eastern model is far superior; there are always improvements that can be made to the lived experience there. In reality, the Muslim East is looking towards Turkey in relation to broadening Muslim attitudes toward democracy, citizenship, tolerance, cohesion and economic stability in their own countries. These are reasonable outcomes for any European or Islamic nation in the current period. Ironically, however, some Turkish nationalists oppose EU entry while certain “new Islamic bourgeoisie” very much support it.

Although superficially Turkey is booming on a number of economic, social, cultural and political fronts, there remain many underlying tensions. “Secularist nationalist fundamentalists” still hold sway in the senior ranks of the media and the academy, but with the military and the judiciary moderated to a limited degree. The majority in Turkish society is moving towards the center ground where the so-called “Islamists” are embracing democracy and citizenship, and this is politically squeezing out the hard-line secularists and nationalists. With the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) likely to win a third consecutive general election in 2011, there is a growing sense that a persuasive political, social and cultural project is bearing fruits for all. But this could be derailed with ethno-national conflict potentially re-surfacing nearer June 2011 as marginalized groups seek to gain attention. Ethnic nationalism is highly dangerous. There has been far too much of this in Europe, and it is not to be emulated.

It is important to think about the nature of how ethnic and religious diversity is conceived of and managed in Turkish society, and the impact this has on the development of a confident multicultural citizenship framework in relation to pluralism, much as it did during the height of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey may well need a civic nationalism model that effectively incorporates minorities and diversity into its legal, political, cultural and economic systems. Consensus is important for stable democracies but lest we forget the need for a critically engaged opposition. Only then can democracy be truly held accountable.

There remains much to develop here in Turkey after the many changes to the national political and cultural psyche since the post-Kemalist secularization process of the early 20th century, but it has come a long way in a very short period of time. Turkey is currently powerful enough to have both the West and the East look to it for direction and guidance. The challenge now is to build on it for the future.