Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s religious background and previous affiliation with Dr. Necmettin Erbakan’s now outlawed Welfare Party (RP) are often cited as proof of his Islamist leanings. These suspicions are confirmed by Turkey’s recent rhetoric surrounding Israel and its growing relationship with Iran. However, many of the WikiLeaks cables contradict this narrative and reveal that Turkey’s new foreign policy is pragmatic and interest driven.
The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has changed the tone, tenor and scope of traditional Turkish foreign policy and has reasserted itself in the Middle East, a region that Turkey benignly neglected since the founding of the republic. The evidence suggests that the AK Party’s foreign policy is based on pragmatic factors relating to Turkish national and economic security. In one leaked diplomatic cable, US diplomats determine that “with the end of the cold war, relative success in the struggle with the [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] PKK, and the ‘taming’ of Syria, Iraq, and (at least from Turkey’s point of view) Iran, Turkey’s need for NATO and US security is reduced.”
This thinking, combined with the military’s decreasing influence on Turkish foreign policy making, has prompted the AK Party to more closely intertwine economic growth with national security. The AK Party sees its economic progress, its inclusion in Western institutions, its relatively stable democracy and legitimacy at home and on the “Arab street” as the centerpiece of its new national security policy. The details are neatly laid out in Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s popular and influential book “Strategic Depth.”
At the heart of Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors policy” is an assumption that Turkey’s unique understanding of the Middle East, which Davutoğlu attributes to Turkey’s Ottoman history, makes it the perfect state to mediate conflicts in the region. The quelling of regional conflicts eases tension in the region, which in turn decreases threats to Turkish national security, while promoting Turkish economic interests abroad. The AK Party’s foreign policy reasons that Turkey’s extensive trade relations with the West and relatively strong democratic institutions make it an ideal candidate to influence the behavior of its neighbors through example and engagement.
The leaked cables also discuss the role domestic opinion has on Turkish foreign policy. Standing up to Israel, which is often used as proof of the AK Party’s alleged Islamist links, plays really well on the “Turkish street” and promotes Erdoğan’s popularity at home and abroad. With regards to Iran, the WikiLeaks cables show that Erdoğan’s support for Iran helps him politically. His support for the Iranian regime helps the AK Party secure votes from “a group of Islamic voters associated with former Prime Minister Erbakan.” The same could certainly be said about his recent anti-Israel rhetoric and outspoken support for Gaza.
However, it is unlikely that domestic politics is Erdoğan’s only reason for supporting Iran. There are certainly other factors that contribute to Turkey’s Iran policy. The first and most obvious reason for closer relations is Turkey’s desire to diversify its suppliers of natural gas. Turkey, a net oil and gas importer, is highly dependent on natural gas imports from Russia. Naturally, Turkey began looking towards its hydrocarbon rich neighbors to shore up and overcome this problem. Iran was a natural choice given its abundant reserves and proximity to Turkey. Iran is now Turkey’s second largest supplier of natural gas and the two countries are actively looking at ways to increase Iranian gas exports to Turkey. However, these ties coincided with the revelations about Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities and ran afoul of the United States’ sanctions efforts.
Turkey, despite claims to contrary, continues to value its alliance with the West. One could argue that its relationship with the West is the lynchpin for the AK Party’s foreign policy aspirations. If Turkey loses the West, its appeal to the East and the Middle East is diminished. The more likely reason for Turkey’s support of Iran has to do with the AK Party’s unique perspective on Turkish security.
The WikiLeaks cables reveal “that Turkey sees a military attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities as the worst possible outcome on the Iran issue. Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability would only be the second worst outcome.” The AK Party’s foreign policy places an emphasis on regional stability and the promotion of dialogue over coercive diplomacy. This explains Turkish behavior towards Iran’s nuclear program, Western sanctions and the rationale behind the Brazil-Turkey-Iran Joint Declaration. In essence, it can be boiled down to the belief that “soft power” best enhances Turkish security.
A poll referenced in the cables shows that “a third of Turks polled do not consider a nuclear-armed Iran to be a threat, believing that Iran would never attack a fellow Muslim country.” It is impossible to know if Erdoğan and high-level AK Party officials believe this to be true. But this poll does show that the Turkish population is not nearly as concerned about the Iranian threat as the Americans, Europeans or the Gulf states. Thus, AK Party officials are not being pressured by domestic constituencies to do something about the Iran problem.
Thus far, the leaked cables reveal that the basis for Turkey’s new foreign policy is entirely pragmatic and based upon a nuanced and different understanding of Turkey’s geo-political position. What they don’t show is a lurking Islamist menace actively seeking to subvert ties with the West, in favor of a Turkish led Islamic alliance. Domestic political pressures and geo-political factors like energy security, the economy and security all have a role in shaping Turkey’s new foreign policy. In short, they reflect a pragmatic approach to world politics, rooted in Western political theories like neo-realism and neo-liberalism.
*Aaron Stein is a freelance journalist based in İstanbul.
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