Problems of a multicultural democracy and what needs to be done
by
LEVENT KÖKER*

It is a fact that equality, freedom and participation as basic values of democracy were formulated during the 19th and 20th centuries in line with the concept of the format of a nation-state, one of homogeneous unity. It is also a fact we have gone beyond the concept of “old democracy” formulated according to this nation-state configuration that deserved to be designated as “backward” and that the understanding of the nation as a political community consisting of individuals/citizens who have equal freedoms before the law has also been overcome.

Today’s high standards for democracy are intended to reconstruct the benefits -- which the old democracy would implement in a system of individual rights and freedoms -- within the context of supranational and sub-national (or more correctly, intra-nation-state) formations. This reconstruction relies on the assertion that we should go beyond the practice of granting rights and freedoms only to individuals who are considered equal before the law and extend them to social groups that are distinguished from each other in terms of language, religion, faith, gender and other references to the diverse identities of these groups and to their “lifestyles” as the practical expressions of these identities.

As I previously noted, referring to German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who analyzes this extension from a critical point of view, these new and advanced standards of democracy, which imply that “differences should be taken seriously,” are not without problems. In this context, there are a host of problems that need to be solved based on new (transnational/supranational) intellectual grounds as they exceed the solution capacities of the mentalities that portray the “old democracy” -- formulated in line with the nation-state format -- as the only possible and acceptable type of democracy.

Turkey, too, is challenged by these problems, particularly with respect to “recognizing the political reality of differences” that it has come to realize in a process from which it cannot isolate itself, especially with regard to “multiculturalism” debates in a European context.

Demanding ‘equal freedom’

One of these issues, as Habermas put it, is about a cultural group’s demand for equal treatment with other groups. This is a demand for the “equal freedom” mentality invested by intra-nation-state democracy in individuals to be extended to “diverse cultural identity groups,” and in the Turkish context, it arises most prominently with respect to the Kurdish issue, the Alevi issue and issues concerning non-Muslim minorities.

Prohibitions the repressive institutional structure borne out of the military coup of 1980 imposed on the public expression of diversity, as you may remember, covered the Kurdish language and eventually amounted to an overall denial of Kurdish identity. This prohibitionist/denial-centered state practice as one of the most fundamental sources of the Kurdish issue in the recent past laid the groundwork for the political rhetoric that promised to “recognize the Kurdish reality” or “make everyone first-class citizens” in the 1990s.

The ban on the Kurdish language was partially lifted during the Turgut Özal administration, and a 2005 bill allowed the Kurdish language to be freely taught. However, reformist practices -- which reinforced these important and positive steps toward the elimination of the repressive legacy of the military of 1980 -- such as the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation’s (TRT) launch of a Kurdish TV channel (called TRT Şeş) in Kurdish -- still could not live up to modern democracy’s multiculturalism mentality that demands equal respect for diversity.

This can best be exemplified in the “mother tongue/official language” dichotomy, a context in which reference to some public institutions’ “archaism” of describing Kurdish as “an unknown/unintelligible language” can be made.

Education in mother tongue: fundamental right

A phrase in the name of the law that freed the use of the Kurdish language -- thereby manifesting the mentality that tends to distort the requirement for equal respect for diversity according to the “nation-state” format in Turkey -- indicates that “Kurdish” is treated as a “different language” used by Turkish citizens. This mentality should be overcome, and the fact that the state’s language can be designated as an “official language,” while the language used by citizens may be defined as a “mother tongue,” a “foreign language,” etc., should be accepted by everyone.

To do this, teaching Kurdish is insufficient; at the same time, education in one’s mother tongue should be accepted as a fundamental right. Also, given the fact that compulsory primary education is conducted freely by the state, a new public education policy should be formulated to include languages other than Turkish for education in a mother tongue. This provision will certainly imply a restructuring of the “national education” system by cleansing its current centralism and introducing instead a form of decentralization that makes it possible to implement the principle of equal respect for diversity.

If this is not done, the complications resulting from the denial of the Kurdish identity which lies at the heart of the Kurdish issue -- and which unfortunately harbors violence associated with this issue -- will continue. Moreover, given the fact that Kurdish is no longer openly denied, the situation is more urgent.

Indeed, there is nothing stopping you today from learning or teaching Kurdish. TRT Şeş continues to broadcast programs in Kurdish, and statesmen and politicians may give speeches in Kurdish, but education in the mother tongue is still prohibited. This contradiction provides a justifiable basis for why Kurdish-speaking citizens of Turkey continue to be guided by a sense of “being oppressed” due to their “unequal” position in relation to other groups, although they are duly entitled to the right to education in their mother tongue under the Treaty of Lausanne.

This also applies to demands concerning cemevis (Alevi houses of worship), mandatory classes on religion and filling out the religion box on ID cards -- which collectively make up what we call the Alevi issue.

Here especially, demands for official recognition of cemevis as places of worship are remarkably important with respect to the principle of giving equal treatment to diverse cultural groups. The importance of these demands manifests itself in several aspects. The first of these concerns the fact that Turkey acts with a mentality that even lags behind the formulation in the Treaty of Lausanne, which corresponds to a period that I describe as the “old democracy” within the confines of this article.

Indeed, Article 38 of the Treaty of Lausanne provides that not only “non-Moslem minorities,” but also “all inhabitants of Turkey” shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief. It is clear that this provision also covers Alevism and the observance of the Alevi faith.

This may not be a problem up until this point. However, Alevi demands for official recognition of cemevis as places of worship stem from the fact that public resources are not allocated for the exercise of their faith. The practice of rejecting these demands by saying, “As Alevism is not a different faith, cemevis cannot be considered places of worship,” clearly contradicts with the principle of treating different cultural identities equally.

Clearly, no person or entity -- particularly those exercising public power or authority -- is entitled to make assessment about religions or beliefs of people or define what should be considered a place of worship or not, and, consequently, make judgments as to how public resources should be allocated to these places. The existence of such an authority is incompatible both with the freedom of religion and conscience as one of most robust pillars of the “old democracy” and with the principle of equal respect to differences as advocated by the new democracy.

In this important aspect of the Alevi issue, Alevi groups justifiably feel that they are discriminated against, albeit partially, with respect to Sunni Turkish nationals. This applies to the mandatory courses on religion and the designation of religion on ID cards, as well as recent efforts at reform that failed to provide sufficient support to the principle of equal respect for cultural diversity.

Turkey has to recognize the diversity of its citizens in terms of ethnic origin, mother tongue, religion, conscientious conviction and other groups of belonging, and develop practices to treat them on equal terms. When this is done, another problem may arise as rights introduced to ensure equal treatment of different identities (ethnic or religious) are perceived by the majority as “concessions.” It is a real challenge for our new multicultural democracy to prevent this mentality that underlies the discrimination of non-Muslim minorities and that has the potential to rear its ugly head in the context of the Kurdish issue and Alevi demands, but it can be overcome with sound and appropriate political stances.