Therein he discusses the impact of the welfare-system and the demographic changes on further financial and social development in Germany and focuses additionally on issues of immigration and integration. Almost simultaneously with the book’s publication Sarrazin said that Jews had a common gene and that “Muslim migrants” were not as intelligent as Germans. Within days, political pressure on him rose tremendously: The chancellor asked for his retirement, the president favored his retirement and the Bundesbank distanced itself from its member Sarrazin, who finally retired “voluntarily” on Sept. 9. The leading social democrats planned to exclude Sarrazin from their party, accusing him of being racist and of arguing in eugenic terms. However, following thousands of letters of protest by party members, they reconsidered this move. People argued Sarrazin was one of the few telling the truth and said freedom of opinion would be at risk if he were excluded from the party. Newspapers have written daily about Sarrazin and several TV-shows have dealt with the question whether he was right or wrong. Journalists usually accused him of being racist and xenophobic. But public opinion polls indicate the majority of Germans agree with Sarrazin. Does this mean the majority of Germans are racist or islamophobic? Or does the majority simply agree with Sarrazin that there are serious problems with Germany’s demography and the integration of immigrants?
In his book, Sarrazin himself asserts that it is not easy to discuss problems of integration objectively in Germany. Politicians usually avoid such debates. He laments that someone criticizing Islam or “Muslim immigrants” is soon accused of Islamophobia, racism, right-wing-radicalism or nationalism. Even Muslim feminists, who pointed out problems within the Muslim culture, were called racists and right-wing-oriented. Due to the burden of its nationalist and racist German past, the accusation of racism is exceptionally effective in Germany, Sarrazin concludes. Apparently, he is aware of the sensitivity of the topic. Why then does he still provoke in such a populist manner? Given that the book has by now become Germany’s best selling political non-fiction book of the decade, one might wonder whether his populist statements accompanying the book’s publication were simply promotion. In the book itself he mentions that he stated provoking hypotheses and even nonsense in previous debates, in order to get the attention needed to discuss his topic more seriously. He explains: “A public discussion must be colorful and concrete in the beginning and can be universal and abstract in the end.” It might be possible that he tried to reuse this strategy to turn the focus of public attention on problems of immigration and integration. After the debate had started, he apologized for his misleading phrasing about a common Jewish gene and assured that it was not meant to be racist.
Sarrazin does not oppose immigration in general. Quite the contrary, he points out Germany urgently needs highly qualified migrants. Furthermore, he emphasizes the success of Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian and Eastern European migrants in the German educational system and job market. But he opposes a further immigration of “Muslim migrants” with little education. According to Sarrazin’s interpretation, 15 million people with immigrant backgrounds live in Germany whereof up to 45 percent have a Muslim background. He asserts that these “Muslim migrants” are hardly integrated in contrast to all the other immigrants and he declares that they cause up to 80 percent of all problems. Sarrazin accuses them of immigrating only because of the welfare-system, of rejecting western culture and refusing integration. He argues that their language skills, educational background and integration in the job market are below average. By contrast their birthrate, dependence on welfare, religiousness (with the tendency to traditional or fundamental ideas), crime (involving violence or terror) and social segregation are above average. While others blame the German system for the problems with immigrants, Sarrazin primarily blames the “Muslim migrants” themselves. But what does he demand of the “Muslim migrants”? He assures that he does not ask them for assimilation or the loss of identity and declares: “It is enough, if they respect our laws, don’t oppress their women, abolish forced marriages, prevent their teenagers from committing acts of violence and earn their own money.” He welcomes the “Muslim migrants” that are in Germany and supports the improvement of their integration. But he wants to restrict further immigration to highly qualified experts.
Sarrazin’ writing is easy and comprehensible and at first glance his analysis seems to be very convincing. However, sooner or later an attentive reader might miss clear definitions and cautious interpretations. The terms “migrant”, “Muslim”, “Muslim migrant”, “Turk” or “German” are not convincingly defined. For instance, Sarrazin uses a very simple definition of “Muslim migrants”, who are considered as including all people from Turkey, Africa and the Middle East, because more than 95 percent of them are Muslim. Furthermore, it is unclear for how many generations descendants of a migrant are still seen as migrants. Sarrazin’s ancestors were French Huguenots and his family name is not of Western European origin. Should Sarrazin himself be regarded as a German or as a migrant? Many of his “Muslim migrants” have German nationality today and can be regarded as Germans as well. Figures and statements on “Muslim migrants” are easily misleading if the terms are poorly defined.
In order to estimate the process of integration correctly and to avoid false evaluations and conclusions, it is important to discuss statistics critically. Sarrazin claims for example that “Muslim migrants” are more criminal than others and refers to convincing personal experiences and assessments of judges or Muslim feminists. But, he barely discusses implied trends and shortcomings of crime statistics. Police crime statistics, for example, are highly problematic. The police itself emphasizes that the number of criminal acts of non-German suspects must not be compared to the ones of German suspects. “Non-German” suspects also include tourists who are not inhabitants of Germany. The number of crimes may therefore not exclusively represent immigrants who live in Germany. The terms “migrants” or “Muslim migrants” do not appear in the police crime statistics at all. Moreover these statistics are all about suspects, not about actual perpetrators. People may suspect foreigners more often than others, although these foreigners did not commit any crime. Figures of crime statistics should be interpreted with extreme care, as well as figures on labor-participation or other issues.
It is hard to figure out, what those Germans who support Sarrazin’s statements really think, because he discussed different topics in his book and his statements are not always presented correctly in the media. But nevertheless the debate focuses mostly on Muslims and on issues of integration. The positive reactions of many Germans to Sarrazin’s hypotheses may lead to the conclusion that there is a growing fear of the increase of Islam and Muslim culture in Germany. On the way towards a more objective debate on migration and integration, it might help to discuss not only more or less serious statements, but also the risk of superficial interpretations of statistics. However, a more constructive discussion may have started already in October at the celebrations of the German reunion 20 years ago. In his speech, the German president spoke in detail about integration and mentioned many issues Sarrazin had discussed in his book. He clearly pointed out existing problems of integration that should be solved and he assured at the same time that no stereotypes or exclusions should be tolerated in the discussion. The next months will show whether the debate will lead to an effectively constructive dialogue or whether it will remain polemic and superficial.
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