A pseudo-Ottoman policy: Turkey’s new station in the world
by
CAN ERİMTAN*

 Republican leaders opted for a Western orientation from an early date. Traditionally, Turkey’s leadership took Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s famous dictum “Peace at Home, Peace Abroad” (April 20, 1931) to mean that internal affairs far outweighed external relations. As it was, for most of its existence, Turkey was surrounded by weary, if not outright hostile, neighbors. In fact, Atatürk himself stressed the organic ties between domestic and foreign affairs, implying that pacifying the home front was of primary importance. Still this inward-focused stance came to a halt at the end of World War II. The subsequent promulgation of the Marshall Plan (from January 1947 onwards) and the development of NATO as a community of nations opposed to the dissemination of world communism offered Turkey a means to reassert itself on the world stage (1952). In spite of Turkey’s role as the West’s easternmost gatekeeper against the Soviet Union, the reality of Turkish foreign policy remained far removed from active engagement and constructive interaction with the outside world throughout the Cold War.

The saying “A Turk’s only friend is another Turk” largely determined Turkey’s foreign relations. But today, a new wind is blowing, and the 21st century is becoming the setting for a multi-polar world where erstwhile marginal players are to occupy central positions. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s decision to promote his former adviser Ahmet Davutoğlu to the post of foreign minister in May 2009 now appears to have been nothing short of a stroke of genius. At the time, the Reuters journalist Paul de Bendern noted that the “appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu as foreign minister is the clearest sign yet of the priority Turkey places on the Middle East,” adding ominously “possibly at the expense of its troubled European Union membership bid.” As an academic, Davutoğlu put forward his theory of “Strategic Depth” (2001), which according to the Turkey specialist Joshua Walker entails that “a nation’s value in world politics is predicated on its geo-strategic location and historical depth. Following the logic of Davutoglu’s proclaimed theory, Turkey is uniquely endowed both because of its location in geopolitical areas of influence, particularly its control of the Bosporus, and its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire.” As a result, Turkey’s foreign minister is now in the unique position of being able to put his own theory into practice. Davutoglu’s policy aim of “zero problems with neighbors” is but a prerequisite for the full-scale realization of Turkey’s strategic depth.

Winning over the Arab world

Turkey is developing friendly relations with its war-stricken southern neighbor Iraq and other Arabs states in the region as well. In no small measure, inspired by Erdoğan’s performance at Davos (Jan. 29, 2009) -- no doubt somewhat if not outright inspired by his then-advisor Davutoğlu -- Turkey has become highly popular in the Arab world and Turkey’s prime minister a “champion” of the “Arab masses,” in the words of Jamal Dajani, senior director and producer of the Mosaic Intelligence Report. This growing popularity has so far had numerous positive outcomes: a campaign was launched on Arab TV stations encouraging people to purchase Turkish goods and to travel to Turkey during vacations. The Turkish economy subsequently received a welcome boost from its Arab neighbors. At the same time, there are growing commercial and political ties between Turkey and Iran. These developments have led many commentators to use the term “neo-Ottoman” (familiar from commentaries on the late Turgut Özal’s accomplishments) in connection with Davutoğlu’s policy aims and Erdoğan’s self-assured stance on the international stage. While, at the same time, warning that Turkey is turning away from the West. But, in my opinion, it would be misleading to characterize Turkey’s newly established proactive foreign policy as “neo-Ottoman.” Last April, Andrew Finkel accurately stated in this paper that the term “describes an ambition to re-establish a sphere of influence within a region loosely defined by an empire from whose broken pieces the modern Turkish Republic was reassembled. It suggests an illusion of grandeur.”

Using the term neo-Ottoman conjures up the chimera that the Republic of Turkey is still harboring imperialist sentiments that Turkey wants to forcibly dominate its regional hinterland and strike an aggressive pose further afield. The much-respected Economist, in its latest issue (Oct. 23-29) claims in its special report on Turkey that Mr. Davutoğlu firmly “rejects the accusation that he is a ‘neo-Ottoman’,” as well he should. Instead I would like to suggest the use of the term “pseudo-Ottoman” to describe Ahmet Davutoğlu’s foreign policy based on his own concept of “Strategic Depth.” Rather than attempting to establish Turkish hegemony in the region, Davutoğlu’s pseudo-Ottoman foreign policy aims at integrating the erstwhile Ottoman hinterland into the mainstream of Turkish politics today. Turkey’s foreign minister is trying to shine a light on regions and areas previously located in the darkness beyond Turkish recognition and comprehension. A case in point would be Turkey’s recent rapprochement to Iran. Trade between the countries is at an all-time high. Last year, the oddly named periodical Journal of Turkish Weekly claimed that “Turkey and Iran set the goal of doubling their $10 billion in trade to $20 billion by 2011.” In addition, Turkey’s attempts to mediate between Washington and Tehran and the joint Turco-Brazilian proposal to resolve Iran’s nuclear fuel issue indicate that Davutoğlu’s pseudo-Ottoman aims go well beyond traditional Ottoman lines. One should not forget that under the Safavids (1501-1722), Iran represented the strongest challenge to Ottoman primacy in the Islamic world and was a source of constant enmity, rivalry and intermittent warfare.

Bridging the distance between East and West

The current rapprochement between both states is anything but neo-Ottoman, which would actually denote a revival of open hostility. Instead, Turkey’s political leaders have in recent times traveled to Iran and vice versa. During his stay in Tehran in October 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that “Turkey is expanding its relations; it is not changing its direction. Our axis is obvious. … We’ve been exerting efforts to improve our relations with both the West and the East in the best way. One side of Turkey’s face is looking to the West, and the other to the East.” In other words, Erdoğan’s words indicate that Turkey, situated at the threshold of East and West, is a state that is bridging the distance between Tehran and Brussels/Washington. In December 2009, the Turkish prime minister was in Washington, D.C., saying that “Turkey is a transit country for energy issues. And the agreement has been signed for Nabucco and we are ready to take some important steps with respect to Nabucco.”

Rather than displaying his love of opera, Erdoğan was referring to a gas pipeline project, originating in Turkey and terminating in Austria. Agence France Presse reported at the time that the 3,300-kilometer (2,050 mile) pipeline is supposed to start pumping gas westward by 2014. In February 2010, Minister of State Cevdet Yılmaz stated that “Projects such as the transportation of Turkmen and Iranian natural gas to Europe over Turkey [via Nabucco] will bring our relations [with Iran] to a much higher level.” Rather than being a fierce neo-Ottoman bully aggressively throwing its weight around, Turkey is pursuing “zero problems with neighbors” and partners further afield, and is thereby bridging the East-West divide in deft pseudo-Ottoman fashion -- even trying to get Iran involved in supplying the EU with energy security in the years to come. But, just a few months ago, during a Steering Committee meeting in Ankara, the Nabucco shareholders decided to cut Iran from the supply route. Instead, the pipeline will be fed gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq only. Still, Turkey will be host to a pipeline that will link “the world’s richest gas regions -- the Caspian region and the Middle East, to the European consumer markets.”

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin recently made disparaging remarks about this pipeline scheme, indicating that “Nabucco has no future.” Will this Russian “threat” endanger Turkey’s pseudo-Ottoman course? Another delicate point regarding Turkey’s relationship with its hinterland is formed by the US desire to construct a Gradual Warning System Model (i.e., a missile shield directed against several countries perceived as “threats,” including Syria and Iran). During the 29th Annual Conference on U.S.-Turkish Relations last month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates indicated that the Obama administration was hoping for Turkish cooperation in this respect. Prior to Gates’ declaration, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official already indicated that Turkey had “told the US officials that Iran and Syria should not be cited as ‘threats’ for NATO’ s planned missile shield.” The US expects Turkey to make a decision during NATO’s upcoming Lisbon Summit (Nov. 19-20, 2010). A Turkish diplomat told AFP diplomatically and on condition of anonymity that “Turkey has not come to a decision yet, there are technical problems to surmount.” What announcement will Turkey make in Lisbon? Will Davutoğlu’s policy of “zero problems with neighbors” survive Obama’s plans to ostracize Iran? And how will the Russo-Turkish rivalry in the field of the EU’s future energy security affect Turkey’s newfound, pseudo-Ottoman posture on the global scene?