Does peace abroad mean democracy at home?
by
Gülnur Aybet*

First of all, it would be great if all countries could have zero problems with their neighbors. However, while intentions are unilateral, their implementation in the real world is not. Reciprocity is a term put forward by the famous Prussian strategist Carl Von Clausewitz. It refers to the flow of events once engagement between two sides occurs, which then takes a life of its own, beyond the control of either opposing side. Reciprocity applies not only to war, but also diplomacy and foreign relations. It means that, once locked in a dual engagement, we are no longer in charge of unraveling events, for reciprocity creates a dynamic of its own. The practical breakdown of relations with Israel, the stalling of the Armenian accords and their impact in endangering Turkey’s relationship with Azerbaijan are all perfect illustrations of reciprocity: One thing does indeed lead to another, and no one individual player can have control of the turn of events.

This constitutes the first crack in the democratization-foreign policy paradigm. Foreign policy on its own is not deterministic enough to impact the internal democratization process.

Deep rooted fear of suspicion

The second crack in the democratization-foreign policy paradigm is the uniqueness of the causes of fear of suspicion in Turkish society today, which are far too deep rooted to be guided by a foreign policy that has no aggressive polices towards its neighbors. This is because the identification of the “other” at the level of the individual citizen in Turkey is not due to regional suspicions but very localized ones. Therefore, a foreign policy intention of peaceful regional management is not going to impact individual fears and reactions in a changing society.

However, there is one example where Professor Davutoğlu’s democratization-foreign policy paradigm has worked remarkably well. A peaceful regional neighborhood can impact the internal democratization process, as we saw with Central and Eastern European enlargements to NATO and the EU in the 1990s. But, in that case, there was a “normative” dimension that linked the peaceful European region to the internal democratization processes of those states, under the umbrella of the “Europe, whole and free” slogan. Under this slogan, internal and external policies in the European region were shaped by norms embedded in Euro-Atlantic institutions: democratic governance, human rights and free markets.

On the contrary, there is nothing “whole” or “free” in Turkey’s surrounding neighborhood. If anything, we are witnessing perpetual shifts of regional interests and unsettled spheres of influence. In this picture, Turkey is “locked” in “multiple reciprocities,” each beyond the control of its declared foreign policy intentions: Russia, Iran, Syria, Israel, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Arab Gulf and Egypt, and to the west the unfinished business of the integration of the Western Balkans. I am, of course, not suggesting that Turkey is powerless to influence these reciprocities, but it cannot be their determinant. This is where Turkey’s foreign policy becomes unique and distinct from its internal democratization process.

When I travel around Turkey, as I do quite a lot these days, I feel I am sometimes transported between different planets. I agree with The Economist report that came out earlier this week that Turkey has never had it so good, and we have a lot to thank the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government for and its efforts in the past eight years. For me, it is hard to see how some of the people I talk to cannot see or refuse to see the positive aspects of the transformation this country has gone through in the last decade. But, although I am not one to share their fear that this transformation will lead us to a dark place that resembles today’s Iran, I respect their fears because I know their fears are very real to them, as absurd as they may seem to someone else. And this is the key: to respect the “othering” of others, even if we do not share it or understand it. It is easier to respect the things we do understand, and far harder to respect the things we do not understand.

So, if I see a woman intent on not showing a strand of her hair in public, I will respect it, even though I do not understand it. For me, religion is a private affair, and it was therefore with some unease in this matter that I went public with my nomination as one of the top 20 most powerful Muslim women in the United Kingdom last year.

Reactions to my nomination

The reaction from Turkey to my nomination was interesting. Some of my “secular” friends were puzzled by the “Muslim” adjective. Some “Muslims” were puzzled by my uncovered long blonde highlights. But most, from both sides of this so-called “divide” embraced my success sincerely, and I received many a heartfelt congratulations from wonderful people from all walks of society in this country, who genuinely felt proud of the nomination of a Turk.

I experienced what it is like to be an oxymoron, of belonging to “both” but “neither” of this so-called divide, and it made me realize that the softening of this polarization between so-called “secular” and “Islamist” is not tied only to a headscarf nor can it be guided or soothed away by a regional foreign policy. These are real fears of real people that cannot be erased by grand designs of social engineering -- and those who are critical of the social engineering phase of the early days of the republic should know that better than anyone else.

Fears are not generated by policies but by attitudes. And I know for one that attitudes could be easier to alter than policies. It is all about style, not substance. It is now time to change our attitudes towards one another.