I wish to mention that today I am not writing about the agricultural dimension of the customs union or the Cyprus impasse as there is much more to Turkey’s EU accession problem. These two issues will be dealt with in a future analysis.
Taking all other developments into account, one may be forgiven for asking whether Brussels really wants Turkey’s EU train to continue its decades-long journey. Likewise, one must also analyze whether Turkey itself has done enough to speed up the process.
State of play in Turkey
Let us first recall that the body of EU law accounts for more than 100,000 pages, difficult to be transposed into any existing legal and regulatory framework.
Despite this heavy legal workload Turkey has embarked on a phenomenally successful modernization track. The greater part of the last decade played host to far-reaching reforms in almost all areas of everyday life as well as in connection to Turkey’s economic and judicial framework. With regards to initial enthusiasm about EU membership, Ankara’s EU train seems to have lost steam in recent years.
On the one hand many observers argue that this is due to domestic political upheavals such as party closure cases, the uncovering of a shady clandestine network aiming to topple the democratically elected government and almost any imaginable form of roadblock being erected by the political opposition in order to derail the process of democratization. On the other hand some commentators argue that EU harmonization is mostly a technical process and that many related legal amendments do not require a two-thirds majority in the national parliament.
This group of observers to which I, too, belong would argue that making a country “EU acquis ready” is mainly a task for heads of units in government departments and ministries as well as for the government itself. Exceptions to this rule apply, of course, with regards to issues which require a change in the constitution as we recently witnessed when the Turkish electorate voted in a national referendum on 26 such articles. Having said that, drafting a new constitution is not an EU acquis requirement per se -- what the EU asks for is that a member state’s constitution is in line with universally accepted standards of regulatory frameworks including the protection of individual and human rights.
Hence Turkey is working on two separate projects. First, how to harmonize non-constitutional laws with the stipulations of the EU acquis, and second, how to amend or hopefully ultimately draft an entirely new constitution. That said, Turkey can become an EU member state even without having to adopt a new constitution, should that become reality, although a new basic law would in all likelihood would greatly facilitate EU accession.
In my humble opinion it is absolutely vital for Turkey to re-start this process of making the country EU acquis ready without further hesitation. By doing so Turkey would be ready to quickly open and close all remaining acquis chapters when the time comes. This process should not take longer than two to three years.
Are there ‘good’ and ‘bad’ EU laws?
Let us discuss one example that recently made for unwanted headlines. Those of our readers who follow Turkey’s and perhaps other countries’ EU accession processes more closely may recall that what at first appeared to be a mere technical matter soon turned into a key obstacle with regards to speeding up membership negotiations: The issue I am referring to is food-related health and safety (known in some countries as veterinary checks).
Often referred to as the “abattoir directive” (a metaphorical terminology, not the official legal title), EU law at the heart of the matter stipulates that any animal fit for human consumption and once being slaughtered must be re-traceable back to where it came from. Local -- in Turkey’s case, provincial -- veterinary inspectors would then be obliged to literally put a stamp on each and every animal which then enters the food chain, with producers and consumers benefitting because more meat is sold and eaten.
I am not saying that this regulatory framework has made it absolutely impossible that no contaminated meat is ever eaten by the unsuspecting consumer, but it has created a chain of responsibility which in particular the person or business selling (or selling on) the meat has become accustomed to. One way or another, EU law has made it nearly impossible to have corrupt agents profiting from risking people’s wellbeing, their health and their eating well.
Hence in line with my example, many if not most, EU legal stipulations bring improvements to the individual citizen and to answer the question above, I would argue that most EU laws make sense.
What about Brussels -- indifference, support vis-à-vis Turkey?
It is well known that the EU’s enlargement policies were not driven by any desire for future southeasterly extensions beyond Greece but by a desire to embrace as much former Soviet Union territory as possible. The alternative school of thought that symbolized the deepening of the EU before its widening (mostly attributed to Jacques Delors in his early days as EU Commission president) clashed with those proponents of a speedy eastward enlargement no matter the cost, no matter whether “acquis ready” or not.
Exceptions were made, and early in the new millennium it seemed that Europe had become “Turkey friendly.” A few years later and in its euphoria with regards to leading up to the celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome in 2007 hardly any EU politician would have openly stated their hesitation to have Turkey join, and join fast for that matter. Only after the glitz and glamour of the official proceedings faded away did it become clear that Turkey-related official jargon did not necessarily reflect reality.
If Ankara may be challenged because of a slowdown in its own efforts to streamline Turkish laws with the EU acquis, Brussels must surely agree to take the blame for having sent conflicting signals to Ankara. Put into a wider picture, my very own enthusiasm for Turkey joining the EU has somewhat waned not because of my reflections on Ankara’s partially reduced efforts towards EU harmonization, but because of the fact that I am no longer certain whether Turkey would benefit from joining the present-day EU at all. The EU needs to change, too, in order to regain economic and political status and clout. The EU must become attractive once more.
So, does Turkey really need the EU?
Despite my criticism of recent EU policies and changing attitudes towards Turkey as a candidate country, my answer is “Yes, it does,” and the EU would be well advised to let Turkey in as soon as possible.
Let us be clear: The Turkish economy, particularly when evaluated from an emerging economy viewpoint, fares better than many fellow European market economies. Turkey has rolled up its civic society sleeves and begun to establish a more just, fair, open and transparent democracy. Individual purchasing power has increased and is bound to continue to do so. Pensions will be on the rise, too. International recognition often outperforms indicators attributed to the EU itself. Turkey as a single political actor often outshines the EU’s ill-fated foreign policy efforts. In a nutshell, while Turkey has a foreign policy, the EU’s efforts in this portfolio are in its infant stages, if at all visible.
Trying to assess where both Turkey and the EU are headed in relation to its political marriage of sorts, I hope that although we have a saying that reads “less haste, more speed” this time speed is of the utmost importance as neither the Turkish public nor European decision makers will want to have the “When will Turkey join the EU” saga continue for much longer. It is time (“time” undefined as in the sense of my opening paragraph) for Brussels to put its cards on the negotiating table. Paraphrased, “We want you, we want you not.”
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