Current situation in Kyrgyzstan, the reasons of change in gov't and short term foresights

CURRENT SITUATION IN KYRGZSTAN, THE REASONS OF CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT AND SHORT TERM FORESIGHTS

Summary

* According to the representatives of the political environments in Kyrgyzstan, the members of the interim government, as they have entered in the process of seat sharing, have started to lose their control over the developments of the domestic situation.

* The success of the political leaders depends to some extent on their cash resources. Some part of these cash resources will be provided undoubtedly by the external powers (players). During the following period, the candidates may receive, provided that they have paid their debts, external aids for the election campaign.

* As the socio-economical situation of the country has deteriorated, the activities of the corruption and mafia groups have increased. And this issue may cause that the concern from this matter turns into new regional revolts.

* In order to strengthen the stability on the South of the country, the party in power wants to apply for the aids of the foreign politicians and to use the religious ideology to solve the ethnic problems within the country.

* It is also possible that new conflicts break out between the ethnic groups. There is even the risk of politization of these conflicts and utilization of these conflicts as a mean within the framework of the sovereignty struggle having been maintained in the country.

* It is also true that articles being published in the newspapers and internet sites which might cause the increase at the conflicts between the ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan. As a consequence of the declaration about the foundation of the national commission related to the state language and examination of the public officers in order to control if they know the Kyrgyz or not, the migration movements among the Uzbeks and Slavs at Osh and Jalalabat started again.

* It is anticipated that the activities of the international Islamic movements along with the criminal forces will increase in a short term in Kyrgyzstan. It is foreseen that with these activities the extremism will be disseminated within the country and that it will penetrate into the administrative organs. So in this way, the criminal forces try to become legalized.

* There have been some rumors claiming that the warriors of the organizations such as the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union having aimed to take the control in the southern borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during the first half of August will take action in order to destabilize the region. The stated warriors may pass to the territories of Kyrgyzstan through the Province of Cirgital of Tajikistan.

* It is also claimed that the effect and the role of F. Kulov will not be limited to the consultancy feature and his opinions will be determining over time. Stating such a claim depends on the effect of Kulov both on the party in power and the opposition environments and his popularity both in the northern and southern regions. Moreover, it is thought that F. Kulov may receive the support of the Russian Federation.

1. The Reasons of the Government Change

The revolution in Kyrgyzstan that took place in April (the second in the last two years), points out the existence of certain deep problems and the strategic faults of the Kyrgyzstan’s governors on government, on domestic and foreign policy, on economic and social fields. Systematically, it is possible to categorize the reasons leading to the destabilization of the country in several groups (levels); these reasons are still valid today and under certain circumstances the repetition of the events that took place in April would not be a surprise.

1.1. Failed State

The first reason (level) of the revolutions is that the Kyrgyz Republic is in “a failed state”, in other words “unformed” state position. Put it differently, although Kyrgyzstan maintains her independence juristically, she cannot enable her national security, domestic stability, the efficient operation of the State mechanism on her own, and she cannot independently pursue her social and economic policies.

In this kind of States, the governing regimes remain under the influence of external political powers, and in terms of economy they become to be dependent on global and regional powers, even on certain organisms. Just like in Akayev and Bakiyev periods, this situation continues in the current period of rule as well.

1.2. Political, Administrative, Economic and Social Reasons

The second reason is related to certain objective and subjective factors, and it is composed of:

1.2.1. The Division of Nort-South

The division of the country into northern and southern regions in historical course. Besides the geographical division, here also exists the interests of the tribes and clans (the experts suggest that there are over 40 clans in Kyrgyzstan).

It is clearly seen that the President Bakiyev could not enable the balance among the regional elite groups in such a complex structure.

He used to conduct a policy intended towards a ruling system that envisages sharing the whole political and economic power among his relatives. Bakiyev’s coming into power strengthened the southern clans and drew the northern elites away from the government. Therefore, the opponents centered upon the north of the country and they led to events that took place in April. After Bakiyev had been drawn away from the government, he went to the southern Kyrgyzstan and he tried to bring his supporters together.

1.2.2. Weak Economy

Weak economy also led to the events in Kyrgyzstan. The reason of the present economic condition is the unsuccessful governmet and policies, and especially the lack of strategic foresights. The prolongation of the system crisis in government has caused to the instability of macroeconomic datas, the deterioration of the investment environment, the failure of the economic reforms, the instability of social field and the increase in migration. K. Bakiyev’s government could neither reform the Kyrgyz economic system nor attract the cross-border investment for the development of economy.

One of the major indicators of having taken unsuccessful and reckless steps in economy is the position in hydroenergy. Although Kyrgyzstan ranks number three on the reserves for the potential water energy resources among the CIS countries after the Russia and Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan could not use the source found in her strategic nature. Only 10% of the potential of the hydroenergy resources is used.

In order to solve the problems in this field, the government has preferred the most dangerous way out: Since the early 2010, the electricity price has doubled, while water and gas prices have increased five times.

1.2.3. The Effect of Global Economic Crisis

Kyrgyzstan firstly felt the economic crisis effecting the whole world, when the money sent by the Kyrgyz citizens working in the Russian Federation and in the neighbouring country, Kazakhstan were suspended. According to the Department of the Service of Immigration of Kyrgyzstan, between 500.000 and 800.000 Kyrgyzs citizen have been working abroad. They used to transfer so 1 billion dollars in the country before the crisis. In these circumstances, the government could not implement a steadfast program to take the country out of the economic crisis. The high-level corruptions in the bureaucracy also effected negatively 1.2.4. An Increase in the Corruption The size of the underground economy has got to a dangerous level. According to the independent experts, the grey economy reached the level of 3 billion dollars in 2009, and this constitutes 50% of the gross domestic product.

The corruption peaking was observed especially among the President’s surroundings. These corruptions came in view distinctly during the processes of sharing the foreign investments, signing profit bringing contracts with the foreign corporations and using the public properties for enriching their own family members.

The revelation of the information claiming that the rent money which the U.S. was paying for the Manas military base was paid directly into the bank account of Bakiyev’s family and that most profitable contracts on the fuel supply (the fuel supplied by Russia with great privileges) were signed with the corporations close to the President created a tremendous impression.

After all, the opposition coming into power mentions the necessity of periodically revising the contracts related to the investments of the former government. And consequently, just like in 2005, Kyrgyzstan has begun to share the public property all over again.

1.2.5. Government Pressure on the Opposition

Bakiyev preferred a radical method to solve the problems with the opposition. As a result, opposition leaders were arrested, the freedom of the press was limited and the properties were shared again. So, the opposition representatives lost their assets.

The irruptions of the President’s family representatives against both the Kyrgyz and the foreign business men, led to the sharing out of the properties as a whole again and the seizure of these properties.

1.2.6. Coalescence of the Government with the Criminal World

12 so powerful mafia groups are active in the country. These were also used by the surroundings of the President for the fights between the elites.

But the government has lost the control over these mafia groups. This should also be taken into consideration that to some extent the political and the social condition in the country depends on the attitudes of these mafia groups. The mafia groups own a huge economic potential.

On the other hand, these proofs against the current and the former government are used actively by the special forces of the foreign States.

The connections with the former and the current government make these mafia groups one of the long term instigators of the instability in the country.

1.2.7. K. Bakiyev’s Geopolitical Faults and the Foreign Policy Mistakes

One of the major faults of the Bakiyev regime was the decision taken to close the U.S. Manas military base and conducting the negociations with Russia, foreseeing getting a 2 billion dollar credit. However, after Kyrgyzstan came to an agreement with the U.S. (increasing the rental money of the military base three times and its being 60 million dollars) and Bakiyev took a decision about the U.S. military base in favour of the U.S., these were also reflected to the relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia.

Another factor creating discomfort for Moscow was Bishkek’s “flirting” with Beijing in the economic field. Russia has mainly been disturbed by the agreement between Kyrgyzstan and China on the construction of electric power transmission line (Datka-Kemin, 500 kilowatt). In fact, the cost of this project is 342 million dollars. However, the projects foreseeing the construction of the hydroelectric power plant and highway and railway constructions by Kyrgyzstan and China have also disturbed Moscow.

The first major signs of Moscow’s discomfort is the fact that she “suspended” the 1,7 billion dollar credit which she had promised to give to Kyrgyzstan, that she launched negociations with the opponents in Kyrgyzstan and that the Russian press started to create a bad image of K. Bakiyev.

Besides the increasing reaction in the country against K. Bakiyev, the attitudes of the external powers also provided new people’s coming into power.

The fact that the external powers did not support K. Bakiyev in this critical period was not only because the external powers did not want to intervene in domestic affairs of Kyrgyzstan or because of the sudden developments. Bakiyev’s losing confidence was also effective on this. All these have to be said especially for Moscow’s role that, Russia is the one who has profited the most from the government change in Kyrgyzstan.

2. The Current Situation and Short-term Foresights

* Although the problem related to K. Bakiyev was settled “peaceably” and the current government was “legalized” to a certain extent after the referendum, it is possible to describe the current domestic situation in Kyrgyzstan as relatively stable, but also as a situation carrying a critical potential both in short and in long term.

* Kyrgyzstan’s “technical” government formed on July 14 (this government is going to stay in power for about 3 months, until the constituency elections) is composed of 17 ministries, 7 agents, 6 public offices, 2 funds and a committee.

* The first Deputy Prime Minister is Amangeldi Muraliyev, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the period of A. Akayev. Muraliyev supports the idea of having the support of Russia’s political leaders and of developing the multifaceted cooperation with the neighbouring countries.

* The Deputy Prime Minisiters are A. Kostyuk, J. Satıbalsiyev and U. Abdullayev, the Ministers of Foreign and Internal Affairs are R. Kazakbayev and K. Baybolov. While R. Kazakbayev is the creator of R. Otunbayeva, K. Baybolov is supported by SDPK (A. Atambayev) and AkŞumkar (T. Sariyev) parties. Under the pretext of maintaining order in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they have stood for his candidacy for the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

* The National Security Committee is directly dependant on R. Otunbayeva. E. Kaptagayev has been assigned for the administration of Presidency.

* By command of the President of Kyrgyzstan, State Border Services were proscribed. Instead of that, border units dependant on the National Security Committee were created, and the the commanding officer of these units would also be the head of the National Security Committee.

* Keneşek Duşebayev was assigned as the head of the National Security Committee.

* On July 17, 2010 the deputies, managing directors, heads of the central units, commissioners convened under the presidency of A. Muraliyev; and the problems requiring urgent solutions were detected: determining the policies of the heads of the State, settling the disputes in Oş and Celalabad, holding the conference of international donors successfully, getting the economy and the people ready for the autumnwinter seasons, carrying out honest and transparent (constituency) elections. Issues such as; ensuring the subsistence security, restoring the foreign trade, activating the primary pillar of the Kambaratinskiy hydroelectric plant, building the banking system on solid basis were detected as the priority issues.

* The government granted tax privileges to the business men for 2,5 years in order to restore the economy in damaged regions (According to the Deputy Minister of Emergency M. Kasımaliyev, during the events in Oş and Celalabad, the total damages was 3 billion 265 som.)

* The government wants to appeal to the foreign politicians to reinforce the stability on the south of the country, and wants to use the religious ideology to solve the ethnical problems within the country.

* So as to prevent the possible controversies that could emerge between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyzs, the government brought the people and the representatives of the international Islam organizations together. For this purpose, the secretary-general of the Council of Muslim Religious Scholars A. Karadahi and the scholars of the divinity schools in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Tunisia visited Bishkek.

* By the way, there has been spreading rumors saying that in the first half of the August, the warriors of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Community aspiring after taking the control over the southern borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan would take action to destabilize the region.

* The above-mentioned warriors can enter in the territories of Kyrgyzstan through Cirgital province of Tajikistan.

* Therefore, joint operative headquarter was formed. This headquarter has become the alternate headquarter of the military command in the Oş region and it has concentrated its actions on increasing the cooperation among the armed forces of the republic. Moreover, the provincial borders of Batkenkaya have been reinforced, the additional units and the equipments have been brought here. The on station time of the reserve units on the south has been lengthened.

* An increase in quantity of journals and articles that could lead to increase in conflicts between the ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan is also a fact.

* With the establishment of the national commission related to state language and with the announcement of tests that would evaluate whether the public servants knew kyrgyz or not, the movements of migration between the Uzbeks and the Slavs in Oş and in Celalabad have started all over again.

* The mafia groups willing to share the impact area and the drug market again to take advantage of such an occasion have increased their actions. In the north of the country, mafia groups such as Talas and Karabalta have taken action. Controlling the highways near to the border, these groups racketeer especially from the vehicles with foreign licence plates and turn this highway into hell for the foreigners.

* The aggravation of the situation in Kyrgyzstan could also be effected by the prevailing discomforts in political and social surroundings, and these discomforts are originated from the policy of the current government related to their staff policy. According to this policy, most of the political parties have been isolated from the country’s political life and they have been drawn away from the government and the executive organs.

* The leaders of the political parties “falling outside the ship” criticize, for example the constitutional amendment, because the new constitution has been prepared without any contribution of the political scientists, sociologists and jurists; without asking the opinions of the political parties not taking place in the provisionaş government; and regardless of the conditions in the country. The ones who criticize argue that with the President whose authorization is going be limited by the parliament, the government would not be able to ameliorate the economy of Kyrgyzstan. There were these kinds of attempts in 2006-2007 as well, but they could not be achieved then.

* The Kyrgyz political scientists (experts) put forward that the increase in the role of the minority groups in the parliament would indistinctly affect the studies, activities and the order of the parliament. In the following process, the fact that the President is going to talk over the process of designation of the governors would lead to the resurgence of the centrifugal forces in the coutnry. According to the experts, partys’ increasing their powers in the legislative organ is ill timed, because most of these parties fo not have the political programs. Besides, the existence of the domestic pluralism and partys’ lack of the potential of influencing the society point out the fact that the process of increasing the role of the minority groups in the parliament has started ill timed (early).

* Other than that, most of the mentioned parties were established according to the leaders (personalities) and only one leader’s authority is valid. And the members of a party are only composed of the family members of the leaders and their acquaintances. Therefore, frequently major problems emerge between the parties in the new parliament, and these parties defend the interests of various clans and industrialeconomic surroundings, not the interests of the people. For instance, there have already been major disagreements on Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy among the members of the provisional government which is composed of the Social Democratic Party, Ata-Meken and Ak Şumkar Parties. In these circumstances, the efficient function of the parliament does not seem possible.

* It is necessary to indicate that the talks between the leaders of the parties who are excluded from the political process (Erkindik, Kyrgyzstan Comunist Party, Erkin Kyrgyzstan, Asaba, Liberal Party, Provincial Party, the Young and Veteran Party, Turan, Jani Kyrgyzstan, Jani Mezgil, the Party of the Veterans of the War in Afghanistan) have increased. According to them, the new government wants to grab the power. It has been seen that the leadership of the “new opposition” used to be assumed by the former officers expelled from the Armed Forces (now most of them have become business men) in the period of the Minister B. Kalıyev.

* In the course of events, the influence of Ar-Namıs Party is increasing day by day. According to the party members, their leaders F Kulov has been waiting for “the right time for Kyrgyzstan’s coming into the political scene.” It is possible to say that this kind of attitude has been exhibited to prevent any fault that the provisional government would make and to prevent big problems among the members of the government.

* It has also been put forward that the influence and the role of F. Kulov would not remain limited by his consultancy nature and his opinions would be determinant in the process of time. He is considered to be one of the major candidates during the presidential elections. Such a foresight is associated with Kulov’s influence both on the government and on the opposition surroundings, and also with his popularity in the southern and northern regions. Besides, F. Kulov is also considered as he could get the support of the Russian Federation.

* One of the significant indicators showing that the struggle between the political movements and organizations would go through a rough phase is the active movements of the of the young people around the opposition and their demands for making room for the young people in the government as well. According to the young people, it’s only the young politicians who could ameliorate the current situation in the country, because only the young people have progressive opinions and the elder politicians cannot affect the situation of Kyrgyzstan in a positive way anymore.

* Accoding to the representatives of Kyrgyzstan’s political surroundings, as the members of the provisional government have entered into the process of seat sharing, they have started to lose the control over the progress of the situation within the country.

* The struggle among different groups on the political field prevailed by the lack of confidence and the obscurity is going to increase as the constituency elections get closer. The possibility of formation of new temporary political associations is also quite high. The achievement of the political leaders is going to be related to their pecuniary resources and undoubtedly, the leaders search for some of their pecuniary resouces abroad.

* In an environemnt where the competition is on the highest level to get the votes of the people, the political leaders would try to get in touch with the mafia groups and the religious movement that are getting stronger. Free from any doubt, this would legalize their existence in the next process.

* Furthermore, it seems that the disagreements among the political powers in the parliament are going to increase. In the next term, the competition among the President of the provisional government, the Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly can also be considered as a possibility. In the present circumstances, the political power distribution and the perspectives of participating in the new parliament is as follows:

* Atameken, Ar-Namıs, the Social Democratic Party (SDPK), Ak-Şumar and Meken Tuu Parties have the biggest chances of getting into parliament.

* It is estimated that the Atameken Party led by Omurbek Tekebayev is going to receive the highest amount votes in Jokorku Keneş (High Parliament). This party has a strong infrastructure both in the north and the south of the country. The Social Democratic Party is also considered to have a high chance. One of the strategic targets of this party is that the party leader A. Atambayev has been voted into Premiership.

* Under these circumstances, O. Tekebayev’s and A. Atambayev’s joining their forces is also probable in order to have the majority in the parliament and to form a coalition before the election. In this case, O. Tekebayev is going to be the president of the assembly and then the majority in the parliament is going to elect A. Atambayev as the Prime Minister

* Being in the same position with the Social Democratic Party, the Ak-Şumkar Party (led by T. Sariyev) is estimated to rank number three in the elections. The existence of strong and and active young wing within the party is going to enable party’s being the third most crowded group in the parliament. This young wing does also gather the youth movements emerging after April 7 around itself. It is a fact that T. Sariyev has an eye on the Finance Ministry.

* It is higly possible that the Ar-Namıs Party led by F. Kulov is going to rank number four in the elections. The spread of the ideas claiming that only F. Kulov could assure stability and order again in the country, has increased the chance of Ar-Namıs Party to receive votes. Articles and papers, claiming that Kulov saved the country from chaos by using force in 2005 and that he stabilised the country, have been sent to all the media organs

* The increase of the sympathy towards F. Kulov disturbs the new leaders, because Kulov has not recognized the provisional government since the beginning amd has continued to criticize the governmental acts. Because of that, the the party in power may launch a defamation campaign against F. Kulov. The existence of the small and medium sized enterprises has already been started to be questioned. Most probably, the investigators are going to be sent to this kind of organizations led by F. Kulov.

* The Meken Tuu Party led by U. Barıktabasov does also have a chance to a certain extent. As Barıktabasov has major financial resources, he has launched an aid campaign for the Kyrgyz people, in order to receive votes. Some parties such as Ata Jurt (O. Suvanaliyev, A. Keldibekov, K. Taşiyev), the Whole Kyrgyzstan (A. Madımarov), El-Armani (M. Niyazov), the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (İ. Masaliyev) could also unite between each other in order to become a member of parliamanent.

* According to the experts, these alliances use the following strategy: Ata Jurt is going to get into parliament thanks to the electors in the south; while El-Armani and the Communists are going to gather the votes from the north.

* On the list of the “Whole Kyrgyzstan”, M. Niyazov ranks number one. A. Madumarov has accepted to give the rank on the list in order to join forces during the election process. At the top of the “Whole Kyrgyzstan” list; M. Sultanov (the former finance minister), E. İbrahimova (the member of the provisional government) and maybe the leader of the Communist Party İ. Masaliyev and the former mayor of Bishkek, N. Tuleyev is going to take place.

* According to the foresights of the respresentatives of the ally mentioned above, Ata Jurt is going to have 35 seats while the Whole Kyrgyzstan is going to have 31 seats in the parliament. According to the constitution adopted on June 27, it is possible to constitute a majority in the parliament with 65 seats. In case of constituting the majority of this alliance, their major objective is reviving the Presidency system by making constitutional amendments.

The Consequences

In the light of the mentioned above, it is possible to forecast and draw conclusions:

1. The instability period has become a longterm process by the crisis in Kyrgyzstan. The most significant reason of this is the lack of a real organized power that could get a grip on the situation and that could rule the country. In a period where the present disagreements and the lack of confidence exist, the coempetition between the political parties continue and in this context the formation of new political alliances is possible.

The achievement of the political leaders depends on their own financial resouces. Undoubtedly, certain part of these financial resources is going to be provided by the external powers (actors). In the following stages, the candidates could receive help from abroad “in return for the redemption” as well.

2. One of the essential problems of Kyrgyzstan’s political system is the lack of dialogue and concensus between the political powers before and after the election period. Therefore, there may occur some problems in the new system of government.

3. Because of the aggravation of the socio-economic situation of the country, the corruption and the activities of the mafia groups have increased. This can lead to the regional riots originating from the discomfort.

The emergence of the new conflicts among the ethnic groups is also possible. In fact there is also a threat of politicizing these conflicts and using these conflicts as a mean of struggle for power.

In short term, in Kyrgyzstan, an increase in the actions of the criminal powers and the international Islamic movements is expected. These actions foresee the spread of the extremism all around the country and the leak of this extremism into the administrative bodies. So the criminal powers have been trying to become legal.