Which Kurds?
by
FETHİ TURAN*

But who is such a general and critical question as “what do Kurds want” being addressed to? Who should it be addressed to? Who can answer this question on behalf of Kurds? Are the answers given reflective of the answers of all Kurds? Are Kurds happy with these answers? We can go on and on with these types of questions. But precisely at this point, the response to the question “what do Kurds want” should be “which Kurds?”

Are Kurds a homogenous group? Do all of them evaluate the developments the same way? Is there an organization that represents all Kurds? The answer to these questions is obviously “no.” Like Turkish people, Kurds have different world views and thoughts about the future and are involved in all types of national organizations in Turkey. However, Turkish and Kurdish “intellectuals” who feel they have the right to speak out, can only express and publicize a portion of Kurdish demands and expectations in dialogues and discussions in the media. This does not provide a complete reflection of the Kurdish people, their differences, their inner world and what they want.

In that regard, the question “which Kurds” becomes important again. The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis about Kurds, who are as heterogeneous as Turks.

1. Kurds who consider themselves Turkish: Kurds in this group, which consists mainly of those who migrated to the West, can also be found, albeit in a small number, in the region. These Kurds marry without making a Kurdish-Turkish distinction, do not speak Kurdish at home and do not teach their children to speak Kurdish. They embrace the state’s official views on history. Many of them share the perspective of Turks and see the “Kurdish problem” as a “terror problem.” Kurds in this group do not have any demands from the state. Since they consider themselves Turkish, the people around them do not notice them. The political preferences of those in this group are nationalist Turkish parties.

2. Kurds who are satisfied with their current status: Those in this group, whether in the region or in western provinces they have migrated to, are ordinary citizens of Turkish origin who are committed to their state and flag. They approach the state’s official view of history with skepticism but prefer not to show overt opposition. They cannot make sense of the Turkish-Kurdish distinction nor do they want to make sense of it. The deaths of Turkish soldiers sadden and worry them deeply. News of fallen soldiers makes them secretly feel embarrassed towards their social environment. They do not care to be called Kurdish or Turkish. Sometimes they express themselves as a Turk and sometimes as a Kurd. They speak their mother tongue at home but hesitate to speak it outside. They do not have a special goal to teach their children Kurdish but they want their children to speak Turkish better than they do. They are respectful of religious values. They do not have definite political preferences. While center parties are in the majority, they vote according to the conjuncture.

3. Kurds who want the current situation to be improved within the unitary structure: They would like to express themselves as a Kurd both in the region and in the western provinces they have migrated to, as well as abroad. But they are not bothered by using Turkishness as their superordinate identity. While they do not persist on using ethnic symbols they do want the symbols to be seen as a part of Turkey’s richness. They speak both Turkish and Kurdish at home, they enjoy reading and writing in Kurdish and playing and listening to music in Kurdish. They want their children to learn Kurdish but they do not insist on it. They do not want any confrontation with Turks but expect people to respect their choices. They do not see any problem with intermarriages between Kurdish and Turkish people. They are pragmatic. They support Turkey’s stance in international relations and they are aware that their future depends on a democratic and strong Turkey. They do not accept the state’s official views of history and express objections to them whenever they have the opportunity. They collaborate with Turks who oppose official views like themselves and they extend support to and expect support from them. They accept the references of religion and universal democracy. They support political movements that aim to change and transform the state against the status quo.

4. Kurds who do not believe improvements in the unitary structure is enough: They have problems with the state in the region and in the places they have migrated to. They stress their Kurdish identity at every platform. They are against symbols of the Turkish state while they protect and espouse symbols that belong to Kurdish people. They do not approve of intermarriages. Speaking Kurdish is a mission. They want Kurdish to be taught to their own children and other Kurdish children. They develop and defend their own views against the official views on history. They have a belligerent style. They try to justify violence and do not hesitate to use it as a mean when needed. Compromise happens only when their views are accepted. Their ethnic identity prevails over their individual identity. They see themselves as representatives of the Kurdish people and they try to impose that view on to others as well. The limits of their views and goals are unclear. They are in a dilemma. They don’t believe that separation from Turkey is realistic or beneficial for the Kurdish people. They are not satisfied with the solutions recommended by the national parties. They are distant to the phenomenon of religion, they see religious arguments as an obstacle to their goals and they would choose “language” if they had to choose between language and religion. But they do not want to openly take a side against religion. Even though they come from a leftist tradition and use leftist terminology, they support nationalist Kurdish parties or candidates.

5. Kurds who want independence: They have no emotional ties to the state. They are openly or secretly hostile to the state and its symbols. They do not hesitate to use provocative terrorism. They are pan-Kurdist. For them, Kurds who are not from this group are collaborators depending on which group they belong to and they are the biggest obstacle to their goals and deserve to be eliminated. At the global level, they do not hesitate to cooperate with enemies of Turkey and Turks. In terms of numbers, they are the smallest group among Kurds.

Kurds can be a part of any one or more than one of the groups mentioned above and they can switch from one group to another. But when it comes to the demands that have been made public, it should be known that these groups have not found the opportunity to express themselves equally and this has made it difficult to find a solution. The reason for this “dead silence” and its positive and negative aspects are the subject of another article.