Referendum calculations
by
MÜMTAZ’ER TÜRKÖNE

So we can say the opposition parties are waging a battle they are doomed to lose. This analogy to war is quite fitting for the Turkish political scene, which is typically seen by political actors as a battleground. The decisive battle in this war will come with the general elections slated for next year. The referendum clash has been considered a major front in this final battle. The opposition parties have rushed into battle and mobilized all of their units and weaponry without making serious calculations. Yet, there was a better option: to avoid this clash, and to concede the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) referendum move without joining the clash and with the minimal damage and save their power for the general elections. To start a battle that one is doomed to lose is not a wise choice. But the opposition parties did so without careful planning or forethought. The outcome was already known.

The MHP’s losses

The AK Party’s calculations for the referendum were very sound: to pin the opposition against the wall with a well-justified and legitimate constitutional reform package. As they oppose justified and legitimate demands, the opposition parties lose their own legitimacy and justification in the eyes of their supporters. This is indeed what has happened. It was the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) that suffered the greatest damage because of its erroneous calculations.

The bulk of the MHP’s supporters are victims of the Sept. 12, 1980 coup. After this coup, the MHP was closed down and its legendary leader, Alparslan Türkeş, and many leading MHP executives were jailed for a long time. Many young MHP supporters were hanged by the military administration after show trials. The constitutional reforms package not only paves the way for the trial of the perpetrators of the 1980 coup, but also makes it virtually impossible for the military to overthrow a democratically elected government in the future. It was very difficult for the MHP leadership to convince their supporters to oppose to this package. Indeed, they couldn’t manage it and the MHP voters started to divide and lend support to the referendum package until the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) claimed that they had “made a deal with the state.” Before that the MHP leader was desperately repeating that the referendum package was part of the “democratic initiative” geared toward Kurds. When the PKK declared a cease-fire and suggested that it might loosen its boycott on the referendum, this came as a relief for the MHP leader, who then, resumed his rallies. He started to weaken the government with the PKK-deal argument. The MHP leader says he has precise information about this deal. He speaks so confidently that he apparently holds a copy of the recording of the meeting with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in İmralı.

The PKK’s own war

It may be said, “A little stone can upset a large cart,” when looking at the referendum rallies centered around accusations of a PKK deal. The PKK is trying to promote its policies using the scant resources available to it. In this way, it takes steps to reap political results from them. It creates hostility and contention among parties. And these moves seem to be paying off. There is only one answer to the question, “Who is it that helps the PKK pursue a winning policy?” The MHP, which is eager to use the PKK’s moves as its arsenal in the referendum battle. Paradoxically, the MHP is doing what it is complaining about: it is politicizing the PKK to an extent it could never achieve on its own.

There is a narrow labyrinth into which terror has pushed Turkey. When this terror claims lives, the MHP hits its head against the wall on the right, uttering curses and wailing, “Stop the bloodshed!” When the PKK silences its weapons and engages in politics, the MHP hits its head against the wall on the left, complaining, “The terror is being politicized.” Time moves on in this labyrinth even if you choose to stop. The MHP’s duplicitous resistance and emotional objections hinder the abilities -- reason and foresight -- that can actually eliminate the terror. It is the MHP alone that prevents the solution of the Kurdish issue.

The Turkish state has been grappling with ethnic problems for about two centuries. We are the remnants of an empire. Any person who has the slightest knowledge about these two centuries of experience knows well that rallies, TV debates, and public debates will not serve to settle these issues in the least. Terrorism never derives its power from its weapons. No terrorist organization can attain its goals without securing public support. All democratic actors are responsible for severing the ties between terrorism and the masses. The way to do this is to win the hearts of these masses. The real power of Turkey in the face of terrorism is Turks’ and Kurds’ will to live together. Any move that strengthens this will deprive terrorism of its nutrients. There is no risk of separation for Turkey in the future. Turkey will remain whole despite all fears and plans to take advantage of these fears.

PKK deal

“Has the state made a deal with the PKK?” We are talking about a state whose job is to fight terrorism with all of its intelligence, security and diplomacy organizations. If there is such a deal, who can say that it is treason to make it? Does the state of the Turkish Republic consist of traitors? Why is it bad to stop the bloodshed? To those who ask about the concessions given in return we should mention the arsenal of capabilities available to a state that has been wrestling with ethnic problems for 200 years.

This time the state and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) gave a challenging response to the MHP’s PKK-deal argument. And the MHP was left alone with its typical policy. The government said, “There is nothing wrong with having talks.” Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s statement, “The intelligence service can talk even with the devil,” stopped the MHP. The most important response came from the CHP, which, it seems, has realized that it will lose the referendum battle, but is seeking tactical gains within the broader war. It not only said that it was a right move to have talks with Öcalan, but also suggested that a “general amnesty” should be declared to take the solution a step further. In order to disarm the PKK, a general amnesty is needed. A general amnesty is a peaceful method to stop the violence. But the likelihood of declaring a general amnesty was previously weak since it would have weakened the government to do so without support from other parties. Now, as the one who has raised the general amnesty proposal, the CHP has taken from the government part of the heavy burden for the solution of the Kurdish issue.

The PKK cannot follow a straight line in its referendum plans. The PKK leadership intends to use the referendum as a means for bargaining with the government. The pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), on the other hand, is a political party and cannot make maneuvers easily after declaring a policy. While the PKK favors a slackening in the boycott, the BDP wants to keep the boycott strictly in place. However, even this dilemma creates a sufficiently secure environment for the local people in the Southeast to go to the polls and vote “yes.” An overwhelming majority of Kurds intend to vote “yes.” The PKK’s boycott decision would have decreased the number of “yes” votes, as it involved an armed threat. Now this obstacle seems to have been eliminated.

With the constitutional reform package, the AK Party launched a battle against the opposition parties. It also set the ground, means and time of the battle. Without considering the possibility of not fighting-- i.e., supporting the package -- the opposition drew its sword and rushed into the fray. Two weeks before the referendum, the MHP has declared its defeat. The CHP, on the other hand, is making maneuvers. The PKK’s war is different, and it does not care about the referendum battle.