Cease-fire or ‘yes’?
by
MÜMTAZ’ER TÜRKÖNE

The PKK had been maintaining a “medium intensity war” since early June and faced various difficulties in this process. The cease-fire came about as a result of these conditions. However, the PKK is trying to reap benefits from the cease-fire it was forced to declare. Establishing a connection between the cease-fire and lending support to the referendum slated for Sept. 12 as well as the efforts of the PKK and the Peace and Democracy Party to use this as a bargaining tool has given the cease-fire a totally different twist. Having declared the cease-fire, the PKK is pursuing a self-styled diplomacy. In this context, Murat Karayılan’s statement that “they negotiated with the state over the cease-fire” introduced a factor that plays into their hands at the bargaining table. Who gains from this situation? Who benefits from the PKK’s referendum bargaining? Let us try to answer these question starting with why the cease-fire has been declared.

Reason for cease-fire

The PKK had launched a war to achieve its tactical targets. Then it faced great resistance and pressure. It eventually yielded to these pressures and had to declare a cease-fire. The force that urged the PKK to do so was not the will that emerged inside the organization. So-called negotiations with the state cannot be a reason for the crease-fire, either. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) could not exhibit any success in the fight against the PKK that can account for the PKK’s withdrawal. For international players to be taken into consideration in this framework, there must be a development in other conditions. Who, then, was it? What force did the PKK bow to? What willpower urged the PKK to declare a cease-fire?

The correct answer to the questions above is crucial and precious as it is the key to the settlement of the Kurdish issue. This is so valuable and important that peace can survive only if it is built upon the correct answer to these questions.

Most of the debates on the cease-fire are nothing but gory details, and there is one correct answer: The Kurds brought the PKK to its knees. Kurds make the PKK feel obliged to declare a cease-fire. Kurdish willpower brought the PKK to its senses, ending the violence. Thus, the cease-fire the PKK declared should best be seen as a victory of the Kurds against the PKK’s violence.

What Kurds? They are not our or their Kurds. They are the Kurds who experience all the existential problems of being a Kurd in daily life. They are the Kurds who want to exist and live as Kurds. They are the Kurds who have made the settlement of the Kurdish issue the primary purpose of their lives. They are the Kurds who are victimized and traumatized by the Kurdish issue and who should be spoken with regarding its solution.

Kurdish civil society

When the PKK launched its terrorist attack in İskenderun on May 31, a strong civilian will sprung to life from the Southeast to stop the violence. Civil society organizations in Diyarbakır, Mardin, Batman and Van made similar statements, calling on the PKK to stop the violence. As these statements represent the common sense and conscience of Kurds, they were effective. For the first time, Kurds openly and fearlessly challenged the PKK. They boldly resisted violence. And they eventually stopped the violence.

The violence was the product of the PKK, while the cease-fire is the work of the Kurds. It is the work of the common denominator of “being a Kurd,” not of a particular political view, such as being a BDP or Justice and Development Party (AK Party) supporter. Yüksel Genç, Ensarioğlu, Selahattin Çoban, Şah İsmail Bedirhanoğlu, Raif Türk, Emin Aktar and Samet Uçaman all tried to articulate the collective Kurdish conscience. More important than this was perhaps that the groups that are open to these reactions which Çandar refers to as the “Kurdish street” lent support to this conscience.

The previous day the same civil society organizations made a new statement for the post-cease-fire process. This carefully worded statement, too, represent the same conscience. Kurds call on the state to stop the military operations, expand the sphere of legitimate politics and launch a democratic negotiations process to which all parties to the Kurdish issue will be included.

A lifebuoy for the MHP

The referendum had put the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) into the most difficult position concerning the referendum. The party had faced a dilemma related to the constitutional amendments. The content of the package had received the support of MHP supporters, particularly those who had been tortured after the 1980 military coup, but their party launched a “no” campaign in order to not be in the same boat as the AK Party. Reactions from the MHP’s grass roots to its “no” campaign put the MHP management in a difficult situation. Now, the PKK’s cease-fire and its calls on the AK Party to negotiate to lift the boycott are serving as a life buoy for the MHP. The MHP is now accusing the AK Party of collaborating with the PKK.

The biggest weakness in the fight against terrorism is to distance one’s self away from logical solutions because of political strife. There are numerous reasons that impede our reason. The huge profits that terrorism has created are the result of political competition, power struggles within the state, rage stemming from bloodshed and tragic experiences of the last 26 years. The time is now ripe for reaping a positive outcome from these experiences for the peace and unity of the country. Let us make the distinction properly: It is possible to negotiate terrorism with a terrorist organization. The terms of such a negotiation may include how members of that organization will lay down their arms, what will happen after that, the transfer of its leadership to a place of its choosing, passing a general amnesty law, etc. All of this can be negotiated with the representatives of the terrorist organization. What will not be negotiated with the terrorist organization is the Kurdish issue itself. The Kurdish issue can only be negotiated through legal political means. In fact, this is already being done. Everyone is sufficiently informed about what the BDP’s demands concerning the Kurdish issue are. Is there any view that we do not know of? Why should these democratic demands become the subject matter of negotiations that are secretly conducted behind the scenes.

MHP propaganda based upon the prevention of bloodshed may create political benefits for itself. But it may also lead to wasting the opportunity to stop terrorism. It can even be suggested that the PKK’s move to derive political benefits from the cease-fire is actually an ill-intentioned move to put the MHP into action. The PKK is extending a helping hand to the MHP.

Future of cease-fire

The cease-fire will last because it is not the culmination of the PKK’s willpower and strategic priorities. Kurds took control of the situation, and the PKK cannot do anything at the expense of losing them. The PKK declared the cease-fire because of pressure from Kurds. The reason why it is now inclined to soften the boycott is the reactions it is getting from the Kurds. Ahmet Türk crystallized the Kurds’ “yes.” Indeed, a “boycott” or “no” vote means throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

The PKK is trying to leverage big results with small moves. A termination of terrorism will be the result of objective conditions and the state’s intellect. The PKK cannot be regarded as an interlocutor not only because it is a terrorist organization but also because it confuses ends with means, i.e., it is completely distracted by tactics. The Kurdish resistance that forced the PKK to declare a cease-fire tells us what is reasonable. A statement issued by civil society organizations in the Southeast the previous day against the PKK is very crucial. Demands listed in this statement must be taken seriously. Here are the interlocutors of those who seek them. The most important demand from these civil society organizations is that the military operations be stopped. Given the fact that the PKK has declared a cease-fire, what purposes do these operations serve? Other demands relate to democracy and rule of law. The demand for a process of dialogue and negotiations in which all parties are included is a sine qua non for the settlement of the Kurdish issue.