Two of the synagogues on the map were those targeted in the deadly terrorist attacks in İstanbul in 2003. The folders of evidence were delivered to defense lawyers in the case on Tuesday. According to the folders, Sledgehammer documents included a 20-page file that showed sketches of 169 churches and synagogues in Turkey.
The locations of the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Galata and the Bet Israel Synagogue in Şişli were clearly marked in red.
The two synagogues were targeted in what are widely considered al-Qaeda-backed suicide bomb attacks on Nov. 15, 2003, in İstanbul. The British Consulate General and an HSBC bank were also targeted in attacks that took place five days later. More than 50 people were killed in the bombings and as many as 700 were injured.
However, the prosecutors overseeing the Sledgehammer probe believe that the attacks may actually have been planned by the Sledgehammer junta. In late February, retired force commanders Adm. İbrahim Fırtına and Adm. Özden Örnek and retired Gen. Çetin Doğan were questioned as to whether the synagogue attacks were part of the Sledgehammer plan. Sledgehammer, the most recently exposed of a series of shadowy military plots, is an alleged Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) plan that aimed to create an atmosphere of chaos in the country through a series of acts of violence that would eventually lead to a military coup.
The additional folders suggested that the Sledgehammer junta prepared a detailed list of the addresses of churches and synagogues in a number of Turkish cities, including İstanbul, Bursa, Çanakkale and Edirne. “It can seen [on the maps] that the Neve Shalom Synagogue and the Bet Israel Synagogue were marked in red, singling them out from the other synagogues and churches on the list. In simultaneous attacks perpetrated by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization on Nov. 15, 2003, many citizens were killed and injured. The list in question was drafted approximately eight months before the attacks,” the folders read.
Controversial plan divided into 5 stages Additional folders of evidence related to the Sledgehammer coup plan note that the plan was to be put into operation in five stages: “situation,” “duty,” “operation,” “administration and logistics” and “command -- task and battle.” Under the situation stage, the Sledgehammer junta discussed the existing situation of the country and concluded that Turkey was being dragged into an atmosphere of reactionaryism under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government. For the junta, reactionary circles were placing their own men in state posts and were attempting to seize control of the economy. The junta noted that Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Internal Service Law gave the Turkish military the authority to “protect the republic.” The article effectively paves the way for the military to intervene in domestic affairs under certain circumstances and carry out coups. The plan would later jump to the duty stage, which included steps to unseat the AK Party government. The operation stage detailed how the previous stage would be accomplished. According to this stage, democracy would be entirely suspended and all members of “reactionary” circles would be rendered ineffective. Within this context, the AK Party and its government would be dispersed and the TSK would resort to forceful measures when doing this. The government and state posts would be taken over by military officers assigned by the armed forces. All key posts in the country would be filled by military officers. In directed developments, the armed forces would confiscate the assets of all reactionary individuals and minority groups. The next stage, administration and logistics, concerns the material and financial means to be used when staging the planned coup. Accordingly, technical equipment would be provided by the military command centers and financial needs will be met with monetary aid flown to military command centers. The plan would then jump to the final stage, which indicated that the coup would be coordinated from İstanbul. The public would be informed about the coup through the radio and the military would seize control of certain TV stations to provide the public with details of the coup. İlyas Koç İstanbul |
In addition, the folders note that the military junta drafted detailed sketches that clearly marked the locations of bombs and explosives to be planted in the Fatih and Beyazıt mosques in İstanbul. According to the folders, the coup instigators planned to kill or injure hundreds of people during Friday prayers. A group of military officers would plant remote-controlled bombs in the mosques, and the bombs would be detonated only seconds after the completion of the Friday prayer. In the ensuing chaos, a number of provocateurs would help increase the chaotic atmosphere inside the mosques.
According to the additional folders, the junta led by Gen. Doğan, former head of the 1st Army, hoped to “benefit from” a number of terrorist organizations in increasing the chaotic atmosphere created by the attacks. The organizations included the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Turkish Hizbullah, the fundamentalist Islamic Great East Raiders Front (İBDA-C) and al-Qaeda.
In the past, coup planners used the chaos -- such as the unrest before of the March 12, 1971, memorandum and the Sept. 12, 1980 coup -- as a precedent for their actions. The social unrest in the country preceding other military interventions is thought to have aided the military in seizing control of the country.
A section of the Sledgehammer plan is dedicated to a number of TSK plots to create tension between the Turkish and Greek militaries, which was to culminate in a Turkish jet crashing after a skirmish with Greek jets. The TSK would intentionally down the jet if the plan failed.
A recently prepared indictment against the Sledgehammer coup plan mentions 196 suspects and names Gen. Doğan as its prime suspect. The 10th İstanbul High Criminal Court ordered the arrest of 102 suspects, including two former force commanders, in late July.
The main objective of the plans mentioned in the Sledgehammer coup plot was, according to the additional folders of evidence, to make the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government seem “weak” and “incapable of ensuring peace and security in the country.” The Sledgehammer plan was drafted in 2003, shortly after the AK Party came to power.
Bomb explosions in mosques and crashing Turkish military aircraft would, the junta hoped, increase public pressure on the government. People would accuse the AK Party of not preventing the incidents and urge the military to seize control of the government. The military would comply with the public’s calls, and unseat the AK Party government.
The additional folders also dismissed claims that the Sledgehammer plan was “fabricated” by opponents of the military. According to such claims, the plan was a fake because it was “compiled” after 2003. The prosecutors, however, pointed to a report by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK). The report certifies that CDs and DVDs found among the documents detailing the Sledgehammer coup plan are original. It also said the coup documents were drafted in 2003 and were not added to later.
The junta also prepared separate lists of military officers who supported or obstructed the coup plan. According to the list, admirals Eşref Uğur Yiğit and Metin Ataç refused to lend their support to the coup; a minus sign appeared beside the names of the two admirals. There is currently an ongoing criminal case that concerns an alleged plot to assassinate Yiğit and Ataç. Seven naval lieutenants were arrested last year on charges of plotting to kill the admirals.
The name of Lt. Col. Ali Tatar, who reportedly shot himself in late December, appears among a large number of officers to support the planned coup. Tatar had been arrested due to suspected links to the assassination plot against the admirals, but was later released upon an appeal by his lawyer.
Similarly, Sledgehammer instigators planned to “re-order” the police force. High-ranking police officers who were expected to oppose the coup plan would be forced to retire shortly after the coup was staged. In addition, more than 430 police officers in Bursa would be forced to retire, as well as 112 in Yalova and 612 in Balıkesir.
In the meantime, Selim Berna Altay, who is currently representing the İstanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office until Deputy Chief Prosecutor Turan Çolakkadı returns from summer holiday, appealed to postpone the arrest of Sledgehammer suspects until the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting is over. However, an İstanbul court rejected the appeal on Tuesday evening, and jurists slammed the appeal, arguing that it was an attempt to “ensure the promotion” of the suspects. The TSK’s official policy bans the promotion of officers on trial.
The additional folder of evidence also indicated that a list of sample signatures belonging to Zekeriya Öz, the top Ergenekon prosecutor, were seized from the home of retired Gen. Doğan during a police search. Ergenekon is a clandestine criminal organization accused of working to overthrow the government. A group of prosecutors led by Öz is overseeing the ongoing investigation into the alleged coup plans. The prosecutors are now looking into how Doğan was able to obtain a list of Öz’s signatures and for what purpose.
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