Underlining that Turkey is experiencing a polarization between the supporters of the status quo and the supporters of change far beyond the traditional left-right division, Bozyel said: “We are experiencing a breakage that transcends all ethnic, ideological and sectarian divisions. The supporters of the status quo and the supporters of change are going to come face to face in the constitutional amendment referendum. While those who say no will be protecting the status quo, those who, like us, say yes will display their demand for change and democratization. There is nothing understandable about the BDP’s boycott call. It is a timid version of the ‘no’ campaign. That is because if they openly say ‘no’ they will become even lonelier.”
Rights and Freedoms Party leader Bayram Bozyel says that the supporters of the status quo and the supporters of change are going to come face to face in the constitutional amendment referendum, noting, ‘a boycott [of the referendum] is a timid way of saying ‘no’ and this is ‘not an attitude that paves the way to the future for Turkey or for Kurds’ |
Bozyel underlined that the recent escalation in terror attacks shows just how desperate the proponents of violence are and noted that Turkey has taken a leap towards finding a solution despite the spiral of violence. Calling on everyone who supports democracy and peace to take responsibility in solving the problem even though it is essentially the government’s duty to overcome the crisis and tension with the least damage, HAK-PAR leader Bozyel said the progress that has been achieved in the initiative process cannot be ignored.
Bozyel responded to Today’s Zaman’s questions recently:
How did you decide to vote yes?
We determined our stance while the package was still being discussed in Parliament. We had decided to support it as long as no major changes were made to it.
Was this decision taken unanimously?
There wasn’t any serious opposition. In contrast to the BDP and the Republican People’s Party [CHP], we’ve never had a wholesale mentality. We evaluated the Justice and Development Party’s [AK Party] policies by taking into consideration the concrete steps they’ve taken.
Division between status quo and change transcends traditional divisions Is it a coincidence that while parties with groups in Parliament -- the CHP, the MHP, Democratic Left Party [DSP] and the BDP -- are opposing the referendum, parties without groups in Parliament who appeal to the same groups -- the Felicity Party [SP], the Grand Unity Party [BBP], the Equality and Democracy Party [EDP] and HAK-PAR -- are leading a ‘yes’ campaign? There is an interesting situation here. As the opposition, parties with groups in Parliament seem to identify more with the system. Polarization in Turkey does not fit into classic right-left, liberal-conservative patterns. There is a very deep line in Turkey. There is a division that transcends all polarization taking place. It is between those who support change and those who support the status quo. While on the left, the CHP is supposed to represent the proponents of change, it is aligning with the status quo. The conservatives -- in other words the AK Party -- are in favor of change. That’s the kind of different situation we have. Kurds, Alevis, religious people, villagers and urban people no longer divide into classic right and left groups or according to sects and ethnicities. There is a division that is greater than all of these divisions taking place. It’s a basic division between being in favor of the status quo and being in favor of change. Parties are taking a stance on Turkey’s fundamental change dynamic. If the prime minister had visited HAK-PAR what would you have said to him? A trap is being developed for democratic and pro-change forces, including the AK Party. There are efforts to make the militaristic tone become more dominant. Militarist circles are trying to take the initiative. If violent discourses become dominant it will be a serious threat for the AK Party as well. We would have recommended not surrendering to a violent discourse for the sake of a compromise. A step was taken back in Şemdinli, and then there were talks of a compromise at Dolmabahçe Palace. We would have told him that these are harmful for both the democratic process and the AK Party. We would have said the democratic rights of the Kurdish people cannot be predicated on ending violence. We would have asked for the government to take faster steps to solve the Kurdish problem and to be more firm on democratization independent of the PKK and violence. We would have told him that democratic steps would quickly change the climate that feeds violence and therefore the PKK. The military officer who wanted a Heron unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV] to be shot down turned out to be an Ergenekon suspect. Doesn’t the quest for a resolution on Ergenekon, drugs and terror overshadow the quest for a solution? The developments in Turkey all have implications for Kurdish society. As nationalism and violent discourse becomes dominant here, it becomes dominant over there as well. The PKK is like the deep state’s small child. It raises and nurtures it with its practices, mentality, relationships and policies. We said that steering Kurds toward the mountains was the biggest trap against the Kurds ever. It’s very clear that violence clouds demands for basic rights and freedoms. The state deliberately creates the perception that Kurds are equal to the PKK; the PKK equals terrorism and therefore a Kurdish movement is equal to terrorism. |
We believe that Turkey is passing through a transformation period. EU negotiations, the developments in Iraq and, most importantly, Turkish society’s experiences of the last 30 years all have an impact on this process. All these experiences and processes made Turkey confront change and made change inevitable. It is this change that brought the AK Party to power. In 2005 the prime minister said: “The Kurdish problem is my problem. It will be solved by improving democracy.” That could be considered a milestone. Then TRT Şeş was launched, the president said, “Good things are going to happen,” and initiative talks began in July 2009. For the first time, Parliament held a special session on the Kurdish problem. That was very important.
What did all this mean? How did your constituents perceive it?
It meant Turkey had actually given up its policy of denial regarding the Kurdish problem, which it had been observing for 80 years. From this perspective, we as a party attached tremendous importance to the initiative process. We saw it as an indication of a new policy change in the Kurdish problem and supported it.
Do you see the referendum as a continuation of the initiatives?
Frankly, we were expecting a new civilian constitution. However we see the constitutional amendment package as a continuation of the transformation and initiatives as well.
While you are saying yes, the BDP is appealing for a boycott. What are the views of the constituents you appeal to?
The Kurdish people are on the side of change just like Alevis, religious people and the other groups that have been victimized by the system. As a group that has experienced oppression and torture, Kurds are the ones that want change the most and will be the most relieved if it happens. The Kurdish people see all these changes as positive developments that are in their favor.
Can’t the BDP see this?
Of course it can. But unfortunately parties don’t always highlight society’s demands. They sometimes take a side based on their special situation and status. That’s why the BDP’s opposition to the constitutional amendment referendum conflicts with the demands of the Kurdish people.
Why are they calling for a boycott instead of just saying “no”?
A boycott is a timid way of saying “no.” Their stance is actually in favor of voting “no.” That is what Abdullah Öcalan has called for as well. They know that society is in favor of change and they know that they won’t be able to control this inclination at the polls. They are calling for a “boycott” because it is a method that is more controllable.
Under normal conditions, 30 or 40 percent of the society is not interested in a referendum anyway. Taking into consideration the percentage of people who won’t participate in the poll, they want to use this additional tactic to their advantage. Not only is it a bad policy, but it’s not even actually a policy. This is not an attitude that paves the way to the future for Turkey or for Kurds.
Will they impose the boycott on people?
First of all, the party’s militant segment will do what is necessary. There will be nothing surprising about that. That applies to both the BDP and the MHP. But I don’t think coercing people to not go to the polls will be very effective in big cities. I don’t know how successful the secret oppression mechanism will be in rural areas.
Could the attitude of the public, which is opposing the “no” campaign, soften the boycott campaign?
It’s a possibility that they will change their stance according to the reactions they receive and try to avoid imposing the boycott on people. Actually the current trend shows that the rate of participation in the boycott is not parallel to the rate of votes they won in the elections. Of course we can’t count how many people choose not to go to the polls on their own. If tensions do not rise and the referendum is held under the current conditions, then certainly the boycott decision will not receive as much support as they received in the local elections.
What if tension increases?
Then naturally people will not go to the polls. No one will participate in the referendum if it means risking their life. Safety is always the most basic humanitarian concern. It’s hard to play the game by its rules when violence is high. Under such conditions, the public will not be able to reflect its will in the polls and an environment of free debate will not be formed.
How will you explain this?
The crux of the matter is this: For 28 years Turkey has had a Constitution that is a product of a coup. It is like a straitjacket on our back. The Sept. 12 regime and Constitution are the regime and constitution that engendered the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK]. It caused thousands of villages to be burned down, thousands of Kurds to be lost and millions to be displaced. The public is aware of this. Even if they don’t know every single article of the constitutional amendment package, the Kurdish public knows that they are going to settle accounts with the Sept. 12 regime that victimized them.
They know firsthand what the politicization and caste system within the judiciary means. They know it from the Sept. 12 courts, from their party closures and from the freedom of speech and freedom of thought problems they’ve faced. They know about the prosecutions and newspaper closures. They know that the judiciary is one of the most important strongholds of the status quo in Turkey.
Finding a solution and reaching salvation both depend on getting rid of this current Constitution. Therefore, the more this Constitution is eroded and the more it is weakened, the more this society is going to be relieved and the better Turkey is going to see its future. We are going to explain this every where we can go. The fact that Kurdish people have a higher interest in political developments than the average person in Turkey is going to make our job easier.
However, the BDP is saying, “No to Evren’s constitution and no to Erdoğan’s constitution.”
The BDP is in conflict with itself. They are saying there is no article that directly concerns the Kurdish people. We know that democracy in Turkey is directly related to every problem, including the Kurdish problem. When we say democracy, it doesn’t mean mentioning the Kurdish problem specifically.
Every step taken in the direction of democracy is related to the Kurdish problem, even if not directly. It will yield results that will facilitate solving it. Downgrading the issue to a matter of there not being an article under the “Kurd” heading is nothing but distorting the problem. Solving the Kurdish problem is closely linked to improving democracy. As democracy improves and an environment of free debate is developed, solving the Kurdish problem, like all other problems, will become easier.
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