Kosovo's independence the point of no return
by
Hajrudin Somun*

Kosovar Albanians had enough reasons to spend the first night celebrating the ICJ decision, together with other Kosovars who agreed to be loyal citizens of the country. They were joined by thousands of Bosniaks, Turks, Goranis and other minorities. It marked the end of Serbia’s violent repression of Kosovo’s majority ethnic Albanians not only under former President Slobodan Milosevic but since they lost the last battle for independence in 1912, following which Serbia was given sovereignty over Kosovo at the London Conference.

While in Yugoslavia, the “Land of the South Slavs,” Kosovar Albanians were forced to listen to the national anthem, which is also common to several other Slavic countries and which starts with the words “Hej Slaveni jos ste zivi” (O Slavs, you are still alive). They now wait to overcome the last obstacle in their way to full sovereignty and normal functioning as an independent state -- admission to the United Nations and other international organizations. Kosovar Serbs in the north of the country are disappointed by the ICJ ruling and still expect to be in some way affiliated with Serbia proper. But it is encouraging that some Serbs inside the country do not want to separate from Kosovo.

Belgrade disappointed

The ICJ decision was met in Belgrade with much stronger disappointment and opposition. President Boris Tadic said Serbia would never recognize the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo and repeated his earlier request for new talks over Kosovo’s status. However, he stressed that Serbia would continue its struggle to keep Kosovo an integral part of the country through strictly peaceful means. He was immediately followed by the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which also emphasized the need to keep peace and remain patient.

Judging by statements of other politicians and experts broadcast by Belgrade state TV for hours, the ICJ ruling was not a final defeat for Serbia when it comes to the legality or illegality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. This may also be a case of the traditional Serb habit of declaring lost battles victories, but some reasons for not considering the ICJ decision the final word might be found in its precise reading.

ICJ President Hisashi Owada said international law contained “no applicable prohibition” of Kosovo’s declaration and, “accordingly, the court concludes that the declaration on Feb. 17, 2008 did not violate general international law.” Serbian and some Western experts of international law understood that the ICJ confirms Kosovo’s declaration of independence was legal but does not say that the state of Kosovo is legal. That is why it might be considered a victory in Belgrade as well.

Legal experts contacted by The New York Times stress that the “court’s studious avoidance of ruling on the legal status of Kosovo as a state had been calculated to avoid encouraging nationalist movements and left the issue of a territory’s independence at the discretion of the countries that chose to recognize it.”

Skillful Serbian diplomacy will certainly play on that card in its offensive that probably already started with the aim to discourage those countries that were only waiting for the ICJ opinion to recognize Kosovo -- around 30 more are needed for full UN membership.

Kosovo or the EU

It will, however, be more difficult for Serbia to score points in further efforts to approach the European Union. So long as the dilemma of “Kosovo or the EU” exists in Serbia, the country cannot expect a debate about its application, submitted in December of last year, to start, and several more years might pass before that application is approved. Serbian politicians have been told many times, and most clearly by the Swedish ambassador to Serbia, that “if Serbia does not resolve the issue of Kosovo, Serbia will not become a member of the EU.”

In its indulgence towards Serbia, at the expense of other regional countries, the EU went so far as to forgive it the obligation to catch Gen. Ratko Mladic, the man most responsible for the Srebrenica genocide, and to hand him over to The Hague tribunal. Who knows, it might be that Serbia will continue the EU accession process without recognizing Kosovo’s independence. There is already a formula for such an option: avoid mentioning the territory in the EU application form. In such a case, however, Serbia should change its constitution first as it “clearly stipulates that Kosovo is an inalienable part of Serbia.” There is even the “Cyprus option.” As was revealed by the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) Security Watch, a senior Serbian official told British Minister for Europe David Lidington in Kosovo that “the Cyprus model was the best solution for Serbia.” The idea was “that Serbia would join the EU with its entire territory, including Kosovo, but when it joined, European rules would not apply to Kosovo.”

In any case, pressure on Serbia from the EU and the US to reach a compromise on Kosovo will continue because it is in the interest of the Western powers to one day have Serbia and all remaining Balkan countries in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Otherwise, the whole region will remain undefined and exposed to new and uncertain crises, as happened in the last two decades. The Balkans are still an undefined area in the wider relations between the EU and NATO and Russia. Only rarely has the world been as divided as after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The same is now the case regarding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The world is as divided as it was in the last phase of the Cold War. On Kosovo’s side stand the US, Canada and the majority of EU member states. However, Russia, China and a few European states, including Slovakia from the former communist block, are against recognizing Kosovo’s independence. The reason for this is more than Kosovo setting a precedent.

One of the most frequently heard comments on the ICJ ruling was that it would set a precedent or have “profound ramifications” for wider international relations, reinforcing demands for recognition by autonomous provinces and territories such as Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. Some even add northern Cyprus. Serbian experts count more than 60 such territories in distant parts of the world and which carry a variety of statuses. Keeping in mind that Kosovo was, due to repression it suffered for almost a century, “a special case” with the backing of the whole Western alliance, we can hardly expect such a level of attention and support to be given to any of the other “cases.”

We have yet to hear about Bosnia and Herzegovina despite the fact that it has often been mentioned in the same sentence as Kosovo because its entity Republika Srpska may wish to join Serbia as a kind of compensation for losing Kosovo. Due to Serbia’s current pro-European government, and especially to its president, Boris Tadic, who often reiterates his firm support for Bosnian territorial integrity, only radical Serb nationalists speak of such an extreme solution. Within Bosnia itself, however, the ICJ ruling spurred very different reactions, showing once more how the country is divided in all matters and directions.

The first reactions came from the country’s tripartite presidency. Its chairman, Haris Silajdzic, a Bosniak, denied that there was any connection between Kosovo’s recognition and Bosnia. Its Bosnian Croat member, Zeljko Komsic, said the ICJ decision represent a final point of no return for the former Yugoslavia. They both supported the court’s ruling, but the presidency’s third member, Nebojsa Radmanovic, a Bosnian Serb, said he would never allow Bosnia to recognize Kosovo’s independence and that such a ruling “is dangerous for the whole Western Balkans.” The leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Milorad Dodik, went further, expanding such a danger to Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. “We in Republika Srpska have long been unhappy with the fact that we are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but we shall fight for the original solutions of the Dayton Accords. We shall not, however, exclude,” he stressed, “additional political struggle for a status that is not against international law, as was defined in the ICJ opinion.”

It could be expected from the US and the EU, and all those speaking about Bosnia’s sovereignty and integrity, including Serbian President Tadic, to at least condemn the attitude of Dodik, who says the ICJ ruling represents a “signpost for further struggle” of Bosnian Serbs.