One of the most striking debates last week started with comments made by Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, whose term is almost over, to the well-known anchorman Uğur Dündar on Star TV. The decor had been purposely and meticulously designed to include the color red, reminiscent of the color worn by judges. Just about every comment Gen. Başbug made was criticized at length. It was as if public opinion leaders were all waiting for the general to speak.
Başbuğ defended Ergenekon suspects who are standing trial. He clearly intervened in the judicial process. He repeated the routine, usual sentences. And when speaking on the professional army issue, as someone who leads the army, he uttered very unprofessional words.
Professional army
Gen. Başbuğ knows that once he removes his uniform, people are not going to pay much heed to what he says. He basically, and in a rather amateur way, said “Military service is a debt to our nation,” and “Mehmetçiks [the nickname given to Turkish soldiers] are the backbone of the Turkish army.” He complained that professionalization would break down the link between the army and the nation. These comments show that Turkey’s military question is actually a bureaucracy issue. The one person that should be defending building a professional army is opposed to it. Why? Because he is worried that professionalization will undermine the military’s power in the country and in politics.
No bureaucratic institution ever wants to reduce the number of personnel. Why? Because, that implies losing power. According to “Parkinson’s Law,” derived from Cyril Northcote Parkinson’s book “Parkinson’s Law: The Pursuit of Progress,” bureaucrats work to increase the number of their subordinates, not decrease them. It should be kept in mind that this ironic study, which Parkinson used to criticize the irrational and cumbersome structure of the bureaucracy, was based on years of experience in the British Civil Service and observations about the British Navy. The most bureaucratic institutions are the least audited armies.
The Turkish army’s influence and prestige in the eyes of society stems from the 430,000 Mehmetçiks it employs. If military officers had to command professional experts instead of Mehmetçiks, the army would be bound to the civilian population. Currently military officers live in military quarters and spend their time in military clubs. They live in complete isolation from the rest of society, just like Plato’s “protective class.” Their only connection with the people is Mehmetçiks who are fulfilling their civic duty. Even a person who hasn’t contemplated the subject before could easily answer the question of whether a professional army could stage a coup? An army that stages a coup ensures the public’s compliance by including the public in the army, in other words, through Mehmetçiks.
Why are military reforms lagging behind?
The Turkish army has not been able to implement much needed reforms in the military. The main reason has to do with the army’s lack of oversight. The second reason has to do with the army’s unwillingness to downsize their personnel.
In 2001, then Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu had issued a mandate. According to the mandate, the Turkish army was going to be reorganized into two main centers known as “East Operational Command” and “West Operational Command.” This organization was comparable with America’s “operational structure.” The military forces would become a mobile strike force instead of an over-crowded and bulky military organization. This would mean reducing the number of soldiers and generals as well. During that period, a meeting was held at the General Staff Operation Department in accordance with the mandate. Everyone was stuck by the fact that the reorganization called for a decrease in the number of generals. Colonels who were expecting to become generals in the near future refused downsizing the brigadier general staff. Lieutenant generals who were leading the meeting and expected to become generals in the future were bothered by the idea of reducing the number of positions. The reform encountered strong resistance. As you know, the Turkish army has not been able to shift to an operational structure. This reorganization plan was shelved because it called for a 29 percent reduction in the number of soldiers and military officers.
There is a general staff for the 430,000 soldiers in the Turkish army, a figure provided by Gen. Başbuğ. Currently, there are around 350 general positions. To reduce the number of soldiers, you have to reduce the number of military units. And fewer military units mean fewer generals. This is the main reason why reform of the military has been delayed in Turkey. It is the armed bureaucracy, not the heroic Turkish army, which is resisting a reduction of forces. This reform is essential, but if we leave it up to the military’s own will, it will never happen. As a result, civilians will need to come up with a plan in accordance with Turkey’s security needs and instruct the army to reorganize itself in line with this plan.
Military and bureaucrats
Professionalization is not just a simple matter of “paying military officers.” Professionalization is a military obligation. The armies of our age our comprised of experts that have undergone lengthy training and know how to use advanced technology. But, this level of expertise is only possible by becoming professional. The techniques the US military used when invading Iraq revealed a glimpse of the new technologies that today’s armies are using. An army that mainly relies on Mehmetçiks, as Gen. Başbuğ put it, no longer implies an army that can fight well. To the contrary, an amateur army like that does not stand a chance against professional armies.
The military issue in Turkey is not just about the problem of military tutelage over democracy. The military problem is essentially a bureaucracy issue. This bureaucratic institution needs to undergo reforms that are compatible with its reasons for existing. Like every bureaucratic institution, the military bureaucracy is resisting change. It won’t allow anyone to take away its privileges and the opportunities that provide it with power and prestige. By using its influence over the state, this armed bureaucratic institution is using resources, which Parliament is not allowed to audit, anyway it wants to without being held accountable by anyone.
The solution is to restructure the army with the help of civilians. For this reason, civilians need to become experts on military matters, stay up to date and have the knowledge to be able to decide what the top priority is when there are two different military demands.
Let’s take a look at a report released last week by the US Government Accountability Office. US GAO analysts reviewed a military program on armored vehicle development upon the request of a House of Representatives subcommittee. All factors, including the military’s needs, were examined and restructuring the program was recommended. The US GAO has the ability to determine the fate of a military project. This is unimaginable for people in Turkey, where the military plans its project and budget and the government simply pays for it.
The claim that Turks are a “people of the army” is an outdated claim that belongs to the days when specialization on military issues was not very common.
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