Common denominators of Turkish intellectuals and activists on Ergenekon probe (2)
by
ORHAN KEMAL CENGİZ

One of the allegations that we put to the workshop participants was on whether the Ergenekon case created an intimidating “atmosphere” and whether the case had turned into a “witch hunt,” as is claimed by some circles in Turkey and abroad.

The participants stated that “contrary to the above claim, the Ergenekon investigation has boosted hopes for a collapse of the state of fear in Turkey. It has moved to put an end to the immunity from prosecution of certain groups nested within the state and their members, and has heralded a new and democratic era for Kurds and non-Muslims in Turkey.”

The participants also stated that “since the launch of the Ergenekon case, non-Muslim citizens of Turkey have reiterated that there has been a considerable decline in the threats and attacks directed at their communities.”

Some pro-Ergenekon circles claimed that the Ergenekon group’s alleged involvement in provocations and attacks against members of non-Muslim communities in Turkey is just a fabrication. We tried to find out what participants thought about this allegation of fabrication. Since the group evaluation is quite enlightening as regards understanding the “philosophical foundations” of the Ergenekon gang, I would like to include a long quotation from it:

“Since the proclamation of the republic, Turkey has witnessed many attacks against the non-Muslim community, which were mainly aimed at decreasing the number of such citizens. Attempts to cause non-Muslim residents of Turkey to flee the country have been an established state tradition since the reign of the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress). In ideological terms, the Ergenekon organization can be deemed the heir of the committee. Just like its predecessor, the organization has focused on the intimidation of the non-Muslim community in Turkey. The Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate has been active since 1923, though it lacks a community or followers. Ergenekon is a fervent supporter of the patriarchate, as the group’s main objective is to carry out activities that wear down the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Turkey. In addition, the organization prefers to hold its important meetings at the headquarters of the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate [in Beyoğlu, İstanbul]. The group’s spokesperson, Sevgi Erenerol, is currently in jail on charges of membership in Ergenekon. Before imprisonment, she addressed the [Turkish Armed Forces] TSK on various occasions in conferences and presentations over the ‘harm’ of missionary activities. Ergun Poyraz, a journalist known for his controversial writings against Jewish and Christian communities, received payment from the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism Service [JİTEM] for his publications. He is also currently behind bars for membership in Ergenekon. Ergenekon defendant Kemal Kerinçsiz, a lawyer, filed lawsuits against writer Orhan Pamuk, slain journalist Hrant Dink and some Christian missionaries on the grounds that they insulted ‘Turkishness.’ The Ankara Chamber of Commerce [ATO], led by Ergenekon suspect Sinan Aygün, has expended much energy on the preparation of provocative ‘reports’ about ‘missionaries’ and their activities in Turkey.

“Ergenekon prosecutors expressed concern in indictments that some provocative killings that sent shockwaves across Turkey may be linked to the Ergenekon organization. The Cage Plan calls the killings of Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink [2007], Catholic priest Father Andrea Santoro [2006] and three Christians in Malatya [2007] an ‘operation.’

“The Ergenekon investigation has revealed that bloody plans against Turkey’s non-Muslim residents were intended to create a common perception in the country that the attacks against non-Muslims were the result of the intolerance of pious people. The plans also were intended to persuade the public that the [Justice and Development Party] AK Party and the government were also responsible for the attacks.

“Not only religious people, but also many other circles were blamed for similar acts against non-Muslims in the past. The Balyoz and Cage plans have shown that bloody ‘operations’ against non-Muslims continued through the 2000s.

“It is no longer a secret that Erhan Tuncel -- a close friend of hit man Ogün Samast, the alleged killer of Hrant Dink -- was an intelligence agent who tipped the Trabzon and İstanbul police off about a planned assassination against journalist Dink. Ali Öz, who was then gendarmerie regiment commander in Trabzon, however, ignored the tips. İstanbul police neglected to take action, despite prior notice about the planned murder. The fact that Samast made ablutions before carrying out the attack and posed in front of a Turkish flag after the murder shows that the plotters abused both the young man’s religious and nationalist sentiments. A similar abuse was also evident in the missionary killings in Malatya. Suspected assassins who pretended to be religious later turned out to be ultranationalists.”

Finally, I would like to tell you how the participants evaluated the so-called “human rights violations” that the Ergenekon suspects claim to have been victims of. For allegations of “arbitrary” detention and arrests the participants stated that:

“There are six specially authorized courts at the Beşiktaş Courthouse that are hearing the Ergenekon case [İstanbul 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th High Criminal Courts]. When a public prosecutor sends a suspect to court for arrest, the suspect’s criminal file reaches one of the 18 judges at the courts. The prosecutor does not have the opportunity, or right, to choose before which judge the suspect will appear. The decision for arrest comes from a single judge, but appeals against the arrest are examined by a panel of three judges. The judge who made the arrest decision is not among the three. Suspects may appeal the order to arrest or request to be released as many times as they wish. For example, retired Gen. Hurşit Tolon appealed his arrest 11 times during the seven months he spent in prison for leadership of Ergenekon. Similarly, Başkent University Rector Mehmet Haberal presented 25 appeals to the court in one year, which means his appeals were examined by almost all the judges in the Beşiktaş Courthouse.”

Concerning allegations that “the Ergenekon trial does not respect suspects’ rights,” the participants stated the following:

“Suspects’ rights are scrupulously respected in the Ergenekon case. No suspect has claimed that he was tortured or abused during police interrogation. The duration of detention has never been exceeded, and suspects appeared before the judge within the prescribed periods. Each suspect received technical help during interrogations from their lawyers, and some suspects defended themselves before the judge with more than 10 lawyers. No complaint has been filed that suspects were denied the right to defend themselves or given too little time for self-defense. There are no limits on the length of defense statements delivered by Ergenekon suspects during the trial. Kemal Kerinçsiz, an ultranationalist lawyer, spent 60 hours testifying in his own defense over the course of 12 hearings. Four hearings were devoted to Workers’ Party [İP] leader Doğu Perinçek’s 18-and-a-half-hour-long defense statement. Kemal Alemdaroğlu made his defense over 15 consecutive days. The prosecution also spent many days reading the Ergenekon indictments aloud.

“A total of 143 hearings were held as part of the first Ergenekon case, which began proceedings on Oct. 20, 2008, and continued through April 20, 2010. The number of hearings in the second case reached 57, and ended on April 16, 2010. The figures show that Ergenekon hearings would take up to 15 years if any other case in Turkey were the subject of such hearings”