Rethinking Turkish-Western Relations: A Journey Without Maps

In this sense, the fashionable controversy over “neo-Ottomanism” is actually a two-way street, reinforced by a revival of very old ideas about Turkey’s geopolitics. It is too easy by far to see the Gaza flotilla crisis and Turkey’s “no” vote on Iran sanctions as straightforward confirmation of a Turkish drive to the Muslim East. Recent events underscore some striking changes in Turkish society and policy, and these will not make for an easy relationship between Turkey and its European and North American partners. The roots of this friction are diverse, with a strong nationalist component. Yet, important avenues for cooperation remain open and may expand even as traditional patterns wane. The new Turkish-Western relationship will be a la carte, and driven by convergent national interests rather than amorphous notions of geopolitics and identity. It could still be a rough ride.

The Fire Next Time

Under these conditions, the quality of cooperation with the United States, Europe, and regional neighbors in containing the PKK threat will become the key test of partnership for Turkey’s political and military leadership, and for public opinion. Amid all the pessimistic commentary, it is worth recalling that this is one area where U.S.-Turkish cooperation has been close and effective in recent years. The challenge will be to convince Congress, where there is now widespread criticism of Turkish policy in the Middle East, that enhanced intelligence sharing and new defense equipment transfers are in American interests. The outlook for Turkish cooperation with Europe is even less clear, with many Europeans unconvinced of the soundness of Turkish strategy in this area, the very real risk of human rights abuses flowing from counter-PKK operations, and the ongoing problem of PKK financing in Europe.

A Far Less Predictable Partnership

Clearly, the Turkish-Israeli strategic relationship is anything but immutable. The disastrous Mavi Marmara incident reflects a degree of improvident risk-taking on all sides; a slow-moving crisis with a tragic ending and little thought to the long-term consequences. But the trouble started years earlier, and a good case can be made that the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations was inevitable. The “strategic relationship” was a product of special conditions prevailing in the late 1990s, including a shared interest in the containment of Syria and Iran. These conditions have changed completely. At the same time, cooperation with Israel has come under growing pressure from Turkish public opinion and the evident discomfort of the AKP leadership. In the 1990s, public opinion hardly counted in Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey’s security elites drove the foreign policy agenda. In short, conditions have changed completely across the board.

An Agonizing Reappraisal

There is a growing need to rethink the course of Turkey-EU relations in a deliberate manner, before disenchanted publics and short-term politics capture the process entirely. At the current rate of one negotiating chapter opened per European presidency — or perhaps something short of this — Turkey’s candidacy will be a very long-term proposition, with no clear end state. In the meantime, there is a risk that Turkish and European policies in key areas, including foreign policy, will begin to diverge. Critics of Turkish membership are already pointing to Turkey’s policy on Iran as evidence of sharply different international perspectives.

The Iran nuclear issue offers a rare example of visible European consensus and an explicitly concerted policy, and Ankara is simply not on the same page. As Europe and Turkey develop their respective neighborhood policies — the current term of art to describe Turkey’s new activism in the Middle East and Eurasia — it is less and less clear that these policies will be compatible.

Ultimately, there may be more tolerance for an assertive and independent Turkish regional strategy in Washington than in Brussels, where foreign policy cohesion will be a leading test of Turkey’s European commitment. Looking ahead, it is worth asking whether the concept of privileged partnership, by this or another name, will be more in tune with Turkish and European preferences. The mood among leading Turkish politicians, bolstered by continued high growth rates (on the order of 6 percent per year, while much of Europe faces economic stringency) certainly points in this direction. From the perspective of the American national interest, it is the outlook for continued Turkish convergence with European norms, rather than the issue of membership per se, that really matters. The psychological barriers to a more wide ranging discussion of Turkey’s European options are falling rapidly.

What Next?

The future of Turkish-Western relations may well be ala carte, but the stakes associated with individual policy choices will be higher without the fly-wheel of comfortable strategic assumptions.

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