The 3CHP, 0.5AKP, 1MHP, 0.2BDP…formula
by
HERKÜL MİLLAS*

This system of tutelage is desired and supported by some political parties (the Republican People’s Party [CHP], for example) and a segment of the public. The desire of a modern society for “tutelage” is in itself a paradox. Let’s say that this segment is nearly 20-30 percent of society -- and this is of course a very high estimate. That is to say, it does not seem possible for us to speak of an oligarchy. Put differently, what is at hand is not tutelage over the entire public but rather a stance with regard to one segment of the public. If this is the situation, then the solution can be ensured not just by forwarding opposition to “some institutions at the state level,” but also by changing an understanding widely espoused in society.

As was also reiterated at the meeting, there are those who believe that they will benefit from the tutelary system and that difficulties presented by that system will only be experienced by the “other side.” Those who defend the “tutelary system” do so because of this; those who oppose it are discomfited by the harm caused to them by this system. It comes to mind that there is a possibility that those who complain about the system today could, should they gain control of the state institutions in question, one day use the same system to their own advantage. We aren’t missing a couple of indicators of this. For example, there are those whose universities are under tutelage -- they cannot select their own rectors and complain when the president assigns them a rector. But when the opportunity arises, we see that they run the same “tutelary” system. A second indicator is that those who criticize a “taking control” of Parliament with the 10 percent election threshold method do not change this when an opportunity for them to do so appears.

Coefficient obsession

The basic problem is really one of the citizen-state relationship, of equality between citizens -- in short, a regime and democracy problem. There are those who do not count all citizens and their votes as equal. An example would be considering a vote for the CHP to be worth more than a vote for the Justice and Development Party (AKP). As for a vote for the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), it is considered to be of much less value than either of the other two. The legitimacy of this understanding amongst citizens is “secured” through the development of a scale of values: those who “scratch their bellies,” the ignorant, the non-secular, those who are not considered ethnically “normal”, etc. -- these people are perceived as less valuable citizens. In some minds, there are probably coefficients lurking in their subconscious.

If people’s votes are multiplied in an imaginary manner by these coefficients, then the system they desire to implement and its political representation power is laid out in the open. Think about this formula for a moment: 3CHP, 0.5AKP, 1MHP, 0.2BDP. Once you multiply the coefficients by the percentages of the votes each party garnered (let’s say 20 percent, 40 percent, 15 percent and 8 percent), then the Parliament you get looks like this: 60 percent CHP, 20 percent AKP, 15 percent Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), 1.6 percent BDP and 3.4 percent filled by representatives of other political parties. There you have it, the ideal Parliament! The regime has been saved!

But under the current elections system and due to “democracy,” votes are “mandatorily” counted as equal, and these coefficients aren’t used. However, other mechanisms have been set into operation in an attempt to secure the ideal Parliament. Party closures, political bans and the 10 percent election threshold do the work of coefficients. Even if it is without legal basis, in practice the (internalized) coefficients have entered our lives. In some modern democracies there are also political forces outside the system. For example, in some countries there are political bans on revolutionary communists or fascists. But in these countries those banned and excluded are small minorities, or at least they are minorities. In Turkey, however, those whose exclusion is desired make up the majority, or at least very large swaths of society. When you look at it this way, the basic problem with the system is that no consensus has been reached. It’s still up in the air as to who will be kept inside and who will be kept outside the system. There are attempts at hand to talk about this topic without sincerity or openness, act as if there is no such problem and to implement the coefficients through legal and administrative acrobatics and illegal efforts while speaking theatrically of how “everyone is equal.”

But why can’t a social consensus be attained on this topic? In modern democratic countries, the minimum level of societal consensus on these issues has been attained and the topic of who has the right to establish a government and administrate the country has been handled. This consensus was attained after centuries-long struggles and conflict and a slew of bourgeoisie revolutions and efforts. The most important outcome of this process is that between citizens there is equality at least when it comes to the law. Turkish society is more traditional in this way. Think about this hierarchy for a moment: Ahmet, Ahmet Abi, Ahmet Amca, Ahmet Usta, Ahmet Bey, Ahmet Efendi, Ahmet Beyefendi, Ahmet Paşa -- and despite the prohibition of such titles, they are widely used. The upsetting thing is that those who carry these descriptors occupy an envisioned, special place in society as “secularists,” meaning that they have accepted the inequality.

We can actually view the process of democratization as a process of becoming a nation. The consensus obtained during this process is above the public equality known as “nation/people.” But in Turkey, the biggest problem being experienced is on this point. Equality amongst citizens has remained on paper. Differences in religion, sect, language and lifestyle are put at the forefront, and on this basis equality is questioned or outright ignored. If this situation is perceived as “the tutelary system” without its foundation being understood, then as a goal we will only oppose those institutions and people who oppose us. And when we surpass those obstacles, we’ll continue on with the same unequal system. Above, I gave an example with regard to rector selection. We also cited as the fundamental reason for problems with the selection as the selection being in the hands of persons who are disconnected from the public and who have no respect for it. And with the understanding of “we’re not like that,” we thought that what we ourselves did was different. But had we looked at the rector selection from the perspective of the rights of those taking part in it -- that is to say, had we viewed it from the perspective of equal rights amongst citizens, respect and even democracy -- then it would not even occur to us to appoint someone who suits our own fancy.

The problem of the “tutelage” discourse and model prevents us from seeing the problem correctly. The issue isn’t respect for the public, and not being the conservator of the public, rather being at its side and sharing its feelings and beliefs. This sort of sentiment isn’t bad, but it’s not the remedy to the problems. That is our seeing that citizens -- with their beliefs, languages, political views and so forth set aside -- as possessed of equal rights. Furthermore, it is our accepting that not each and every one of us has an exceptional side. For what lies beneath the “tutelage system” application of which we speak, the fundamental understanding there is that there are those who consider themselves to be exceptional. From those who defend that they know what is best through science (Kemalism, in the name of Marxist-Leninist scientific socialism; that same old positivism that we know); to those who believe they are on the right path due to religious beliefs and holy texts (we see an example of this in Iran, and may call it “Eastern positivism”); to those who believe they are the only ones who are right because they are loved by the public and were elected.

The shared component of these three understandings is that these people think of themselves as independent of voters’ views, as the owners of some “correctness.” The behaviors of these administrators begin to exhibit a tendency toward disrespect of democratic and human rights. If the conjuncture is commented upon in this fashion, then the problem is not “tutelage,” it is a lack of democracy; and it’s not limited to political parties and institutions. It is a wider, deeper societal state of affairs. I think this kind of a model is more functional both in terms of commenting upon goings-on and producing solutions. In addition, it is also more beneficial in our understanding of our own behavior as people and individuals.

*Herkül Millas is a political scientist.