PKK’s strategy and the European Charter of Local Self-Government
by
EMRE USLU

When we trace back the discourse of pro-PKK organizations, the concept of “democratic autonomy” was first mentioned in 2007 by Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK accepted it as one of the “pillars” of its proposed “peace” plan. Then the predecessor of the BDP, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), adopted it in its party program, but this debate was a forgotten one until May 2010. All of a sudden, on May 24, Öcalan stated: “I will withdraw from my self-appointed peace negotiator position. If I do that, the Kurdish Communities Union [KCK -- an affiliated organization to the PKK] may demand ‘democratic autonomy'.” In that statement Öcalan embodied the model of Kosovo and northern Cyprus.

Bayık clearly states that the new fight aims to protect the new institution of “democratic autonomy” and to reduce the central state's influence in local municipalities. When we look at the statements of the BDP municipalities, what we see is that they are referring to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which Turkey signed back in 1991, albeit with conditions on several articles. It seems that what the PKK means by the concept of “democratic autonomy” is to push Turkish authorities to sign the articles of the charter that Turkey put conditions on back in 1991.

The articles that Turkey did not accept are the following:

* Local authorities shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due time and in an appropriate way in the planning and decision-making processes for all matters that concern them directly.

* Without prejudice to more general statutory provisions, local authorities shall be able to determine their own internal administrative structures in order to adapt them to local needs and ensure effective management.

* Any functions and activities that are deemed incompatible with the holding of local elective office shall be determined by statute or fundamental legal principles.

* Administrative supervision of local authorities shall be exercised in such a way as to ensure that the intervention of the controlling authority is kept in proportion to the importance of the interests it is intended to protect.

* The financial systems on which resources available to local authorities are based shall be of a sufficiently diversified and buoyant nature to enable them to keep pace as far as practically possible with the real evolution of the cost of carrying out their tasks.

* Local authorities shall be consulted, in an appropriate manner, on the way in which redistributed resources are to be allocated to them.

* As far as possible, grants to local authorities shall not be earmarked for the financing of specific projects. The provision of grants shall not remove the basic freedom of local authorities to exercise policy discretion within their own jurisdiction.

* The entitlement of local authorities to belong to an association for the protection and promotion of their common interests and to belong to an international association of local authorities shall be recognized in each state.

* Local authorities shall be entitled, under such conditions as may be provided for by the law, to cooperate with their counterparts in other states.

* Local authorities shall have the right of recourse to judicial remedy in order to secure free exercise of their powers and respect for such principles of local self-government as are enshrined in the constitution or domestic legislation.

It has been revealed now that Öcalan and his follower Kurdish nationalists think the European Charter of Local Self-Government provides enough room and “autonomy” for them to create a de facto “autonomous” region. But the Turkish government back in 1991 carefully avoided the articles that could strengthen local municipalities and allow them to function as semi-autonomous governments within the nation-state.

Calculating this strategy, Öcalan recently called on the BDP to not be an advocate of the PKK and not speak for the PKK, which was a demand of EU diplomats back in 2005 that the DTP politicians did not accept. With this move, the BDP, by distancing itself from the PKK, took a “positive” step in the eyes of European countries. In the next phase of the strategy, BDP mayors are asking to fully implement the European Charter of Local Self-Government.

Parallel to this strategy, the PKK states that they are intensifying violence to protect the “democratic autonomy” model. With this strategy, Öcalan and the PKK are carving new room for them to bring Turkey in confrontation with the EU while justifying their actions. In the future, whenever EU representatives call for an end to the violence, the PKK would have a legitimate “reason” and explain to them that the Turkish government is not granting the rights that most local people exercise through their municipalities. It hopes to derive some support for the European Charter of Local Self-Government to be implemented fully. With this strategy, the PKK will not only find a “good reason” to justify its actions but will also find an opportunity to harm the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in the eyes of Europeans as well as Kurds in the region.

While Öcalan, the PKK and BDP are carefully building their strategy to force the government to adopt the articles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, the AKP government is busy with the search for the perpetrator that uses the PKK as a subcontractor. By no means am I suggesting that the PKK is not used as a subcontractor of a certain government -- in fact the history of the PKK is full of tales that indicate this organization has been used as a subcontractor of some states. Yet this outlook underestimates the capability for strategic thinking on the part of Öcalan and the PKK. This organization has survived this many years because of that strategic thinking. If necessary, no doubt, Öcalan would want the PKK to do some dirty job as a subcontractor of a state, but the PKK also benefits from that business as well.