TESEV’s Kurban: Solving Kurdish problem would bring more votes to AK Party

“Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan would definitely not lose votes if he solves the problem. On the contrary, he would have more votes and he would get them from Kurds,” Kurban said in an interview for Today's Zaman's Monday Talk, referring to Erdoğan's 2005 promises -- in which he acknowledged that the Turkish state had made mistakes about Kurds and the Kurdish issue, and that now was the time for it to confront its disturbing past -- which have been left largely unfulfilled so far. 

Last week at a two-day conference, “Politics, Institutions and Citizenship in a Changing Turkey: Is It Possible to Live Together?” organized by TESEV, researchers presented several new field studies done in both the eastern and western parts of Turkey to understand the current thinking in society regarding the Kurdish issue.

Despite government concerns over how voters would react to measures to solve the Kurdish problem, one study indicated that society is way ahead of politicians when it comes to a solution to the country’s long-standing problem.

She answered our questions on the issue, referring to the research and her observations in the field.

After all of your field work and reports on the Kurdish question, did you anticipate that the violence related to the Kurdish problem would escalate to the levels it has reached today?

A lot of people who have been working on the issue have known that if the problem was left without a solution it had the potential to reach this point. There has always been a risk. It has often been said that opportunities of the 1999-2004 period were missed because it was when [Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah] Öcalan was captured, the PKK had declared a cease-fire, Turkey was starting the EU accession process and the AK Party government was pro-reform. There was a period of normalization in the region then when people did not have to be locked in their homes at night because of security concerns. There was a generation which had experienced some normalization in their lives. It was also the period when a variety of civil society organizations, both Kurdish and Turkish, flourished. One of the worst mistakes the AK Party government made was not taking advantage of that environment, although the government’s attention was drawn to the problem both by Kurds and Turks who were aware of the situation.

Later, there were new hopes when Prime Minister Erdoğan went to Diyarbakır in 2005 and made that remarkable speech in which he acknowledged that the Turkish state had made mistakes about Kurds and the Kurdish issue and that now was the time for it to confront its disturbing past. What went wrong then?

It is so interesting that the government was voicing peaceful rhetoric at the time -- but the practice was just the opposite. In that period, which was full of contradictions, the government increased the authority of the police, expanded the scope of the Counterterrorism Law [TMK] and increased penalties for the crime of terrorism under the new Turkish Penal Code [TCK]. When the Compensation Law [in order to pay damages to the mostly Kurdish citizens who were forced to migrate during the years of armed conflict in the Southeast in the 1990s] was passed in 2004, we and other organizations and individuals working on the issue warned the government about the problems again. Although the Kurdish problem has repetitive cycles and although the government has been warned several times, no concrete steps were taken regarding a solution. The government lost another chance. It was possible to avoid the violent situation we are in today.

Do you agree with comments like Turkey is on the brink of a civil war?

At this point, our comments would be speculative. But I should say that I’ve never thought that there is ever going to be a civil war. This is a chance for society, even though we are not that aware of it. When we look at the practice of emergency rule in Turkey’s Southeast in the 1990s, there are more than a million people who have been internally displaced, and more than 3,000 villages were vacated in an area with a population of about 6 million at that time. Can you imagine the size of the problem? If that happened in another country, there would have been a civil war.

Tensions between Kurds and non-Kurdish people

In the panels, some Turkish speakers have indicated that if they had faced such suffering, they would be furious and would see Turks as enemies. What kind of social and cultural dynamics do you think might be playing a role in preventing a civil war?

Kurds have a problem with the state, not with the Turkish people. Kurds have a problem with the system, with the judiciary and so on. But when you look at Kurds in the west [of Turkey], we have seen in our field research that they also have a problem with society because Kurds living in the western provinces have difficulties in their daily lives arising from discrimination, which happens both at the hands of the state and of private citizens. The Kurds in western Turkey were critical of our 2008 report “A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question” because it did not mention discrimination as such. No, it did not, because we had then spoken with the Kurds in Diyarbakır. And the Kurds in Diyarbakır did not face discrimination when dealing with their neighbors and employers since it is mostly a Kurdish region.

But now as there are more Kurds in Turkey’s western towns there might be more tension between them and non-Kurdish people.

Yes, this is a serious concern. But still it is hard for me to see a civil war ahead. In our latest field research we brought people together to discuss the issue. These were people from a varied political spectrum with strong views, and they would normally not get together to discuss anything with each other because they would be suspicious of each other. What we saw is that once together on the same platform, they were quite willing to talk and listen to each other. Both sides have fears, and those fears are stronger for the Turks who have not met Kurds. This is obvious in the Black Sea region, where the Kurdish migration is recent.

You indicated that there is a large volume of laws and regulations which are discriminatory against the Kurds. It is difficult to rank them but which ones are the most damaging and remain barriers to a solution to the Kurdish problem?

The worst ones are the arrangements regarding the penal code and the TMK. These are the most worrisome because they restrict all basic freedoms and rights. In such an environment, you cannot talk about freedom of expression, right to assembly and political expression, language rights and so on. This is a big obstacle to a solution to the problem because people cannot talk. When such legislation comes together with judicial practices in Turkey, you have a disastrous situation. There is a widespread reflexive practice of arrest by the judiciary and as a result a great number of people are jailed. We see this most openly in the case of the child victims of the TMK, known as “stone-throwing children.” How can you put a 15-year-old child, even if he carries a PKK flag or even if he covers his face during a demonstration, in jail? Is it possible to talk about the “Kurdish initiative” to this child’s family? Is it possible that this child will not feel hatred for the state or the government?

‘Not only politicians, civil society plays critical role’

We are going through such extraordinary times in Turkey that there is also debate on whether the Constitutional Court will review the substance of the reform package, although it should not. How can we talk about change when Turkey is still at that stage?

Change will not happen right away. If our studies are not taken into consideration now, we hope that they will be used in the future when a new constitution is planned. We are aware that we should not expect change over night. We have realized that it is not only the ruling party or the BDP [Peace and Democracy Party] which should play the most active roles in finding a solution to the problem. Civil society plays a critical role, too. We have seen in our field work that providing a platform for genuine debate pays off. These efforts should be increased to alleviate fears of the both sides.

Could you give an example of those fears? What do people say?

For example, people from Trabzon ask whether or not they can enter Diyarbakır in their cars which have the number 61 on the license plate [identifying the province.] The same situation exists for Diyarbakır residents who never use their province’s number 21 license plates on their cars!

Do you think steps in solving the Kurdish problem would cost the ruling party votes, as suggested by some? In the panels, speakers who have observed people in the field suggested that, indeed, society is way ahead of politicians when it comes to a solution to the Kurdish problem. If that is so, not solving the Kurdish problem would not cost the government votes, right?

The key point might be how well the prime minister has been briefed by his advisors. Does the prime minister listen to the deputies from all regions? Are those deputies aware of the demands of their grass roots? Do AK Party provincial organizations brief the prime minister regarding the issue? Still, the prime minister has said things like he would not turn away before the problem is solved. As a pious Muslim, he also thinks he needs to keep his promise. In the end, he is a politician and would like to be elected again. And he definitely would not lose votes if he solves the problem. On the contrary, he would have more votes and he would get them from Kurds. An AK Party which could find a solution to the Kurdish problem would receive a lot of votes from Kurds. When it comes to people in the west [of the country], if they believe this war would end if the problem is solved, why wouldn’t they support the initiative? If they that believe their sons who do military service will not die as a result of this conflict, they will support the initiative to solve the Kurdish problem.