In this regard, the nuclear fuel-swap deal with Iran is a huge diplomatic breakthrough, because engagement has not been based on a myopic worst-case scenario assumption. Turkey's efforts are praiseworthy, because their product, i.e., the deal, can provide a basis for future attempts to solve the impasse, which has potentially grave implications for regional and global security. The costs of not trying to solve the matter are beyond what Turkey is willing to incur. Turkey's efforts are also prudent, because they boost Turkey's prestige globally and regionally. But, bearing in mind the aforementioned points, Turkey has to see the limits of what she can affect.
Considering that Iran previously rejected a similar swap deal offered by the permanent five UN Security Council members and Germany, the international community's suspicion over Iran's real intentions is understandable. So, Turkey can and should rally for multilateral, primarily US and European, support for the swap deal with a view to launch another round of negotiations and contribute to a comprehensive long-term solution to the dilemma. But Turkey neither can nor should, for her own sake, serve as a guarantor of Iran and its nuclear program until the IAEA verifies its wholly peaceful purposes. Nor can she allow Iran to drag Turkey into a new axis of cooperation, the implication of which would suffice to jeopardize Turkey's hailed unique role in the region.
From a realist perspective, Iran has been able to capitalize on the deadly Gaza flotilla assault and Turkey's sensitivities in this regard insofar as it gained access to intergovernmental platforms via Turkey's sphere of influence where it could step up its anti-Israeli rhetoric and promote its own interests under the guise of common concerns. Iran has already sent out one aid ship to break the Gaza blockade, which expectedly will raise tensions with Israel even further, since it can be viewed as a direct provocation for which Turkey paved the way. Since she did not prevent Iran from sending aid ships, Turkey should refrain from approving of its actions without investigations regarding the Mavi Marmara event having been concluded and a resolution found.
It is highly rational on the part of Iran to grasp such opportunities, which are out of proportion to what Iran was in fact able to perform in the international political arena without having to incur any consequences. Although Turkey is not directly accountable for Iranian politics, she is bound to prevent a politically self-encircling atmosphere from evolving in the first place. If Turkey does not manage to curtail Iran's expectations as regards the extent to which Turkey is willing to tolerate Iran's moves, she runs the risk of suffering the unintended consequences of actions she did not bring about alone.
Turkey's unique geographic location, in the midst of a heterogeneous region, requires an equally complex foreign policy vision. Therefore, Turkey has to revise her actions and contain any efforts by others that damage her reputation as an unbiased, but multidirectional, assertive, but multilateral, cautious, but proactive, and strong, but benevolent, force of moderation and balance in her region.
As such, Turkey's initial response to Israel's deadly attack on the Mavi Marmara is justified. The fact that the besieged Gaza-bound aid ship and all the deaths claimed have been Turkish legitimizes Turkey to spearhead calls for an impartial and timely investigation of, and acceptable solution to, the tragic event. The international community for its part voiced grave concerns over Israel's disproportional use of force and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged Israel to lift the aid embargo on Gaza.
Turkey's move to bring the issue before the UN Security Council in an emergency session, first of all, lends credence to Turkey's appearance as a benevolent power that abides by international law, despite its lack of enforcement teeth, and that is distant from impetuous unilateral actions. Simultaneously, it proves Turkey's ability to capitalize on assertive, albeit multilateral, channels in addressing this security-sensitive matter. Having said that, finally, it can also signal that if no acceptable outcome follows at the multilateral level, Turkey may take matters into its own hands.
Even under such affecting and polarizing circumstances it is imperative to uphold a foreign policy stance underpinned by the consideration of minimal costs and maximum utility, most notably for national security. In achieving this, first, Turkey has to cautiously and consciously avoid using the tragic event at home for domestic political purposes. It is paramount not to ignite emotions and provoke expectations which Turkey cannot attend to at foreign political level, since this may be beyond her present capabilities. If Turkey's pledges to the domestic audience are not constrained by or do not correspond to what Turkey can bring about on the international stage, she runs the risk of losing creditability domestically, while causing misperceptions about its real intentions internationally.
Secondly, neither with respect to the current crisis in the aftermath of Israel's raid on the aid ship, nor under any other circumstances that pertain to the state as a whole, can Turkey identify with and advocate the parochial interests and aspirations of any civil groups. Turkey should not approve of any groups' actions, the consequences of which she cannot endure. The same is true for states, the benevolent intentions of which Turkey cannot underwrite.
Thirdly, the tragic event has to be understood and treated as not only a regional, but a global security issue. Since the raid took place in international waters, the focus has to remain on Israel's systematic violation of international law. Although this may not result in immediate punitive measures against Israel internationally, it is the only solid basis upon which Turkey can and should mobilize support for its concerns among all states in the international community, particularly those 32 whose citizens witnessed the same assault. It is a legitimate common ground upon which states would want to act with a view to avert similar crises in the future. More important, a diplomatic foray that also involves Israel would demonstrate that Turkey is not interested in marginalizing and delegitimizing Israel as a whole, but its unsustainable actions that disregard international law and their diplomatic fallout.
Furthermore, Turkey has to prevent the crisis caused by the Israeli raid from spiraling out of control, particularly out of her own control. Since the issue is not a Muslim issue only, and since it cannot be solved without the support of key states such as those in the European Union, and the US, Turkey should adopt a more fine-tuned position on all platforms that neither relate to the matter of concern, nor involve the states the support of which is a sine qua non.
Finally, the development of measures similar to standard operating procedures (SOPs) based on experiences with other crises can be useful in dealing with a crisis properly. SOPs are simple and short step-by-step instructions to be followed immediately after the occurrence of a crisis. Their purpose is to enhance the efficiency of states' ad hoc performance, while reducing initial perplexity. More importantly, when SOP-like measures are in place, they can save valuable time for states in developing the actual and more appropriate crisis management strategy.
Realpolitik is foreign politics based on the assessment of consequences of policy options in the light of relative capabilities for the pursuit of national interests. Relative capabilities refer to any channels and sources, whether technological, intellectual, economic, military or political, which altogether enable a state to pursue its objectives in comparison to others; channels available and sources utilizable define a state's power, whereas a powerful state not only capitalizes upon these power resources, but seeks to expand them through proactive engagement with regard to its long-term national interests.
Turkey's active membership in NATO, her EU candidacy, and other international regimes that enhance national security, adds as much to the notion of a powerful Turkey as does its increasingly close ties with the Russian Federation, her relations with Central Asia and her rapprochement with the broader Middle East. An unwary trade-off of traditional allies in favor of new ventures would limit her sphere of influence, whereas the new channels of cooperation Turkey has initiated before, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the İstanbul Cooperation Initiative, expand the existing alliance structure to other states in a way as to create new areas of secure and flexible political maneuvering and cooperation, not only for Turkey. Only in this way can Turkey become an attractive power pole and an indispensable peer for states as different as Israel and Iran (and the US and Russia).
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