Court evidence reveals KCK terror network is worse than PKK

    The KCK has long been subject to debates over precisely what type of group it is, and now, after a three-year investigation, a 7,500-page indictment on the group and 151 individuals provides a more detailed portrait of the gang.

    The indictment contains information including telephone records of KCK members, legally obtained recordings and remarkable documents confiscated from suspects. Previously, some without sufficient knowledge about the organization had decried operations to take into custody members of the pro-Kurdish BDP, including mayors.

The evidence in the indictment, however, paints a different picture. Some observers had seen a contradiction between the government-launched Kurdish initiative and the simultaneous detention of BDP members. But when the truth about the KCK emerged, it became clear that it was not the innocent civilian extension of the PKK as has been claimed.

Three years of preparation

The new police operation against the KCK began after a three-year preparation period. At the end of the most comprehensive, most technically demanding investigation in recent years, tens of thousands of documents and telephone records were examined, and money and personnel transfers were recorded.

In the operation against the KCK, important transfers of information took place in the context of real-time intelligence sharing agreements with the United States that have continued since 2007. An X-ray was taken, so to speak, of the image of the seemingly innocent, handcuffed mayor and provincial administrator that were taken into custody -- revealing the truth of a dark and organized crime organization behind the scenes. The 7,500-page indictment reveals details as to how the KCK was founded in connection to aspirations to form a nation of Kurdistan and what its goals and aims were. Much of this information was secured from information gathered from the PKK’s own media organs.

The KCK was established in 2005 upon the order of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. It has been learned that the organization’s goal was to bring the Kurds of Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq together under the roof of a “great Kurdistan.” Despite their discourse in recent years claiming that they have no dreams of establishing an independent Kurdish state, it has now become clear that BDP members who are part of the KCK indeed aimed to bring about the foundation of such a state. Information in the indictment suggests that the KCK is not a civil society arm of the PKK but an umbrella terrorist organization that includes the PKK.

Unlike the PKK, which committed acts of terrorism first in the mountains and then in cities, the KCK has a deep structure that includes activities in every arena. The KCK has developed its own legislature, executive and judiciary, in which the PKK only has a role to conduct armed conflict.

Sabri Ok is accused of being the organization’s leader and is a personality with extensive connections. Experts say he is the name that secures the close ties between the KCK and the Ergenekon terrorist organization, a clandestine gang planning to overthrow the government. Amidst internal conflict within Ergenekon, it has maintained direct ties of communication with the terrorist group regarding attacks -- and this is mentioned in the case indictments for both the Ergenekon and KCK cases.

As far as can be seen from the indictment, the deputies of the now-defunct Democratic Society Party (DTP) were chosen and elected by the KCK. There are even examples of the KCK handing down sentences to its district mayors who were not on the front lines during street protests. In municipalities, there are bureaucrats who were chosen by group leaders in the Kandil Mountains. Those bureaucrats must give at least two months’ salary to the KCK every year; the KCK determines their every move, from whom they have meetings with to what they sign off on.

The indictment also contains important documents related to the transfer of state resources to PKK militants in the Kandil Mountains. For example, it is known that the $2 million the Diyarbakır Municipality gained in a 10-year petroleum tender was transferred to the group. It has also been proven that the terrorist organization used pressure and threats to prevent strong candidates for posts who were not members of the DTP from being elected in the East and Southeast.

Critical information regarding the KCK’s hierarchical structure has also been uncovered. One janitor working at a BDP-controlled municipality, for example, can easily interrogate and hand down a judgment on his own mayor if he is above him in the KCK hierarchy.

How was the KCK founded?

According to information in the indictment, the PKK was at the point of breakdown when Öcalan was captured in Kenya and brought to Turkey in 1999. In order to counteract the effect that resulted in shaking up the PKK’s grass roots, it tried to show its strength through bloody attacks, but did not succeed. Ultimately, in 2005 Öcalan intervened and decided to gather all the legal and illegal Kurdish movements under one roof.

In so doing he aimed to put a stop to the erosion and disorganization within the organs of the Kurdish movement, and in the initial stages recommended that a Kurdistan Society Confederation be set up. The decision to establish it was made, and Öcalan was made its head. His right-hand man was Murat Karayılan.

The June 1, 2007, the 5th General Congress of the group was held in the Kandil Mountains and made the decision to change its name to Koma Civaken Kürdistan, the KCK. There were five main subdivisions of the KCK: the ideological front, the social front, the political front, the military front and the women’s division. The KCK’s division for Turkey was called the Turkey Coordination.

The KCK’s most critical cell, Kongra-Gel, functions as its legislature. The Public Protection Forces (HPG) was established as the PKK’s propaganda division but turned into a group that ran demonstrations and attacks. Following this transformation, the PKK began focusing on urban conflict. The HPG comprises a 41-person parliament, a five-member main decision-making command and an 11-member control council. Divisions underneath these commands are the terrorist training camps, the main defense forces, the special forces and the Free Women Divisions (YJA-STAR).

The organization’s structure

Öcalan is the KCK’s honorary leader, while PKK leader Zübeyir Aydar is the head of its legislature and Karayılan leads the executive. Some of the cabinet members within the executive in Kandil are top PKK leaders. It is also clear through PKK websites that all of the KCK’s administrators are also administrators within the PKK. The indictment details PKK websites that include hints as to the joint structure of the PKK and KCK, including references to Öcalan as the “KCK leader,” to Karayılan as the “KCK executive council president,” Cemil Bayık as the “KCK executive council vice president” and Duran Kalkan as a member of the KCK executive council and the “Public Defense Center president.”

The indictment also includes information on the organization’s plans to assassinate any Justice and Development Party (AK Party) candidate elected to high-ranking seats in the Diyarbakır province.Also among the goals of the organization is to get Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to stop visiting the East and Southeast.