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Tehran, Ankara vie to gain influence over Gaza
While condemning Israel, most Arab states also praised what they called Turkey’s role in spearheading such an initiative and exposing Israel’s harsh policies against the Gazans. Iran, however, while strongly criticizing Israel’s “piracy” in international waters, remained distanced from Turkey’s role in lending a supporting hand to the Gazans.
In contrast, Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards said they are ready to provide a military escort to cargo ships trying to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza, a representative of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said last Sunday.
“Iran’s Revolutionary Guards naval forces are fully prepared to escort the peace and freedom convoys to Gaza with all their powers and capabilities,” Ali Shirazi, Khamenei’s representative inside the Revolutionary Guards, was quoted as saying by the semi-official Mehr news agency.
In addition to this, Iran’s Red Crescent Society said last Monday that it was preparing to send three cargo ships and a plane carrying humanitarian supplies to Gaza by the end of the week.
Hamas reportedly rejected the offer, saying they do not want to internationalize their cause and that the Iranian escort would only escalate tension in the region. Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (STRATFOR), a Texas-based think tank analyzing current events through political forecasting, released a series of analyses last week in which it claimed that Turkey’s involvement in Gazan affairs shows there is an increasing fissure between Turkey and Iran over their Gaza policies. Iran’s decision to escort aid ships, the argument continues, underscores Tehran’s concern that its reputation as the foremost defender of the Palestinian cause is being challenged by another rising regional power: Turkey.
Beril Dedeoğlu, an expert in international security from Galatasaray University, said in an interview with Today’s Zaman that she completely agrees with the idea that Iran is irritated by Turkey’s increased popularity in Gaza. She said political developments in Gaza are increasingly related to Turkey’s political position. Dedeoğlu also added that although Israel is criticizing Turkey now, in the long run, Turkey may play a different functional role.
The US regards Hamas and Hezbullah to be Iranian-funded terrorist organizations, and Israel accuses Iran of using Hezbullah and Hamas against the Jewish state. Turkey’s engagement with Hamas will definitely help Hamas free itself of Iranian influence, and Turkey, Dedeoğlu noted, may turn out to be a blessing for Israel.
Through expressing their desire to send additional aid ships, Dedeoğlu noted, Iran is attempting to hinder the process in which Hamas is opening up to the world through Turkish assistance. Noting that Iran builds its anti-Israeli policy through Gaza’s impoverished people, the expert said there is now a heated debate among Palestinians, too, with respect to this (pro-Iranian) policy.
George Friedman, STRATFOR CEO, told Today’s Zaman that he does not think that Turkey sees Iran as a rival in this matter but a distraction from the core issues. First, he said, Iran adds nothing to the issue of the nine casualties, all of whom were Turks, and its effect on Turkish relations with Israel. “Second, Iran’s involvement complicates solving the blockade of Gaza. Iran’s involvement will serve as confirmation of the radicalism of Hamas, and reduce international pressure on Israel from those who are concerned about Iran,” Friedman said. Stressing that Iran will further make the already strained atmosphere more intense, the STRATFOR head said, “Iran complicates an already complicated situation.”
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